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Under what conditions does the rule of law, especially with regards to the constraining of executive 
power, become institutionalized in newly liberalized countries where presidential authority has 
historically been greatly unchecked?   This dissertation explores this puzzle by exploring two inter-related 
questions:  first, why would a longtime ruling party acquiesce to institutional constraints being placed 
on the executive in the first place, and second, once implemented, why are these institutional rules 
able to successfully constrain leaders in some sub-Saharan states but not others?  To address both 
questions, my dissertation investigates variation in the adoption of, and later adherence to, executive 
term limit laws and other constraints on presidential power across Africa. 
 
Based on both a medium-n quantitative analysis and extensive qualitative interview and archival data 
collected during eleven months of fieldwork in Uganda and Zambia, I construct an explanation that 
challenges previous assumptions about the development of constitutionalism in liberalizing countries.  
I argue that, due to the rarity of divided governments across sub-Saharan Africa, members of 
parliament from the ruling party ultimately choose whether or not to restrain executive tenure based 
on their perceptions of their party’s (and, therefore, their own) electoral competitiveness.  To support 
this argument, I develop an explanation of actor decision making that probabilistically links the relative 
strength of the incumbent party vis-à-vis the opposition to the outcome of term limit choice due to elite 
perceptions of electoral competition and its twin mechanisms of the threat of turnover and the probability 
of winning re-election under the banner of another party.  Ruling party MPs vote to adopt and later 
uphold executive tenure limits in times of electoral uncertainty in order to ensure their party’s ability 
to compete for power in the medium-term should they lose it in the short-term by removing 
incumbency advantage from the opposition.  However, if the incumbent party is not threatened with 
replacement in the foreseeable future by an opposition party, ruling party MPs will not have the same 
incentives to favor constitutional provisions that check the executive’s power and will, in fact, forgo 
or abolish term limits in order to increase their chances of riding the incumbent president’s coattails 
to their own re-election.   
 
By locating the impetus for both institutional choice and strength in the micro-foundations of elite 
decision-making, I demonstrate that conventional understandings of conditions that lead to the 
compliance with constitutional rules in the developing world, such international donor pressures and 
demonstration effects, vertical accountability, pact-making, and levels of democracy in general, fail 
to adequately explain the variation in the ability of constitutions to regulate executive tenure across 
Africa.  In this way, I argue that formal rules are often endogenous to the political environment in 
which they are created.  I further test this theory to see if it also holds for 1) the choice of other 
executive constraints by African governments and 2) executive term limit adherence in other 
liberalizing regions of the world, notably Latin America and the Former Soviet Republics. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
PARTY COMPETITION AND LIMITS ON EXECUTIVE TENURE ACROSS  
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
Introduction 
 Under what conditions would a long-standing incumbent political party suddenly choose 
to unilaterally adopt institutional constraints on the executive’s power?  Furthermore, where such 
formal constraints are adopted, under what conditions are these constraints able to effectively 
restrain executive discretion going forward vs. when are they later easily abrogated?  The wave 
of liberalization that swept across sub-Saharan Africa beginning in the early 1990s provides a 
laboratory in which to study such questions regarding the development of the rule of law with 
regards to executive power in transitioning polities.   An analysis of the variation in both the 
adoption of and adherence to constitutional constraints on presidential power across the continent 
demonstrates that, in both instances, the choice of the governing party to constrain the national 
offices they control is conditioned by the degree to which their power is rising or declining vis-à-
vis opposition forces.  Government officials who perceive that their party’s power is on par with 
or on the decline relative to other parties, leading to a credible threat of replacement in the next 
election, will choose to moderate their own behavior and favor the existence of formal 
institutions of constraint, whereas officials who sense their party’s power is increasing relative to 
a weak opposition do not face the same incentives to limit the executive’s power.   Thus, the 
perceptions of incumbent party politicians regarding the current balance of power within the 
party system in their polity is the key to understanding both institutional choice and endurance 
and, by extension, the development of constitutionalism in a polity.    
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  However, political parties are not unitary actors with singular perceptions.  Thus, it is 
necessary to ask whose perception within the party matters when it comes to the choice of 
institutions of executive constraint.  Evidence from instances of both the adoption and 
contravention of constitutional rules limiting executive discretion demonstrate that the incumbent 
president and his cabinet are generally the ones to propose constitutional amendments that alter 
the status of legal constraints on the office of the executive.  Yet, by and large, when executive 
constraints are added to, upheld or eliminated from constitutional law it is through an act of 
Parliament, which in sub-Saharan Africa is usually dominated by members from the ruling party.   
Thus, if members of parliament from the ruling party agree with the president’s calculations 
regarding their party’s strength and what institutions should be favored in order to best benefit 
the party, they will vote for the president’s choice of institutional alternation.  However, if 
members of parliament from the party in power disagree with the president and cabinet’s sense 
of their party’s power relative to opposition forces, they will not approve of the changes to 
executive power that the president seeks, and the amendment will fail.  In this way, although the 
president and cabinet are players in the institutional choice process, ultimate authority rests with 
the parliament, even on matters pertaining to the shape of executive power. 
 Still, these contingent institutional choice calculations are not made within a vacuum.  
Many unique characteristics of sub-Saharan African party systems influence all actors’ choice 
calculations, both with regards to the institutional arrangement they prefer (outcome preference) 
and with regards to whom he or she wants to appear to align with in the decision (action 
preference).  Some notable structural features of many African party systems that interact with 
relative degrees of party competition to shape actors’ preferences include the high rate of unified 
governments (where both the presidency and the parliament are controlled by the same party), 
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the mixed electoral fortunes of designated presidential successors, the non-programmatic, non-
ideological nature of most parties across the continent and the fact that patronage is the main 
organizational logic underpinning most African political parties.  Therefore, in the end, informal 
patterns of party competition and the agency of members of parliament during votes on 
constitutional amendments interact in a dynamic way to shape the degree to which executives are 
constrained across sub-Saharan Africa by formal institutional limits on their power.  In this way, 
I argue that formal rules are often endogenous to the political environment in which they are 
created.    
 Yet, it is important to disaggregate the political environment to pinpoint exactly what 
aspects of the political setting shape specific institutional arrangements.  One of the most 
interesting and highly surprising findings from this project is that the overall level of democracy 
in a country is not a significant indicator of adherence to constitutionally-mandated executive 
constraints.  This is likely due to the fact that so many diverse factors comprise measures of 
“democracy” that the messiness of the concept obscures the nature of the relationship between 
specific facets of democracy and institutional outcomes.  As Coppedge et al argue, democracy is 
a multi-dimensional concept that comprises logically distinct (and sometimes conflicting) 
principles, including electoral, liberal, majoritarian, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian 
conceptions, each with their own unique indicators.  Since “there is a good deal of divergence 
across these six conceptions” 1 both within individual states and among the world’s polities, 
disaggregating the concept of democracy into its various components in order to identify 
precisely which aspect of democratic governance is impacting outcomes of interest becomes 
                                                 
1
 Coppedge, Michael et al.  2011.  “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach,”    
   Perspectives on Politics, Vol 9,2: 255. 
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necessary when the goal is to “chart variation in political institutions through time and space.”2  
The finding that one aspect of democracy- namely competition within the party system- rather 
than the level of democracy as a whole best explains variation in the adoption of and adherence 
to constraints on executive power underscores the analytical leverage that is attained when 
democracy is disaggregated in political research. 
 
Instituting Constraint: Executive Term Limits 
 
Following the rapid de-legitimization of authoritarian rule in the early to mid-1990s and 
the subsequent adoption of new liberal democratic constitutions in most states across the region, 
many observers hoped for a new dawn for constitutionalism in sub-Saharan Africa.  In the 
former neo-patrimonial regimes, public decisions were based on the whims of personalistic 
presidents to such an extent that “transitions from neopatrimonial regimes [were] concerned 
fundamentally with whether rules even mattered.”3  Thus, rather than being a tool that dictatorial 
presidents used to legitimate repressive tactics, as the original independence constitutions of the 
1950s and 1960s had become, proponents of democracy both domestically and abroad were 
optimistic that these new democratic constitutions would institute a genuine rule of law that 
could constrain leaders’ actions through adherence to regulations that were mutually-beneficial 
to all political organizations.  Nearly two decades later, the jury is still out regarding the degree 
to which constitutional norms and principles are enforced and binding on political leaders, with 
some scholars arguing that the rule of law is becoming a reality in Africa
4
 while others maintain 
                                                 
2
 Ibid,  p. 255 
3
 Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van de Walle. 1997. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in   
  Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  p. 88 
4
 See, for example, Posner Daniel, and Daniel J. Young. 2007. “The Institutionalization of Political  
Power in Africa.” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, 3: 126-140.                     
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that the old practice of “constitutions without constitutionalism”5 still holds.6 The truth seems to 
lie somewhere in the middle, leading to a puzzle regarding why constitutions seem to be 
effective arbiters of the political sphere in some sub-Saharan countries but not others. 
 In order to undertake a meaningful, systematic comparison of the nature and strength of 
constitutionalism across sub-Saharan Africa, it is necessary to identify a specific constitutional 
provision that has been that has a) proved to be controversial in a relatively large number of 
African countries, b) displayed variation on the outcomes of the challenges, and c) about which it 
was possible to obtain complete data.   Based on these criteria, challenges to the two-term limit 
on executive power are the most conducive category of constitutional tests for a systematic 
analysis.  The topic of executive tenure has long been a contentious one in Africa, and the 
widespread adoption of term limits in the 1990s, coupled with the recent constitutional struggles 
over the issue in a number of countries, make the matter suitable for our investigation into the 
choice and strength of constitutional provisions across the continent.  Focusing on just one single 
institution  allows for the an analysis that is able to trace the evolution of the institution over time 
in order to examine whether similar or different dynamics drive variation in adoption in time 
period one and adherence in time period two. Therefore, constitutional struggles over term limits 
will be the primary category of cases examined here, although in the Conclusion chapter, the 
argument developed to explain variation in adoption to and adherence of the two-term limit will 
be tested against other types of constitutional transgressions by executives across the continent 
such as presidential interference in judicial proceedings in order to gauge its ability to explain the 
cause of constitutional strength more generally.   
                                                 
5
 This term was coined in Okoth-Ogendo , H.W.O. 1993.  “Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on  
an  African Political Paradox,” in Constitutionalism & Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World, 
Douglas Greenberg et al. eds. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 65-82. 
6
 See for example Hyden, Goran.  2006.  African Politics in Comparative Perspective.  New York: Cambridge 
University Press 
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Executive term limits were not widely featured in sub-Saharan African constitutions until 
the early 1990s.  As the large majority of independence constitutions drafted in the 1950s and 
1960s provided for either a parliamentary or semi-presidential system of government (mirroring 
the political systems of their former British or French colonial powers), limits to the executive’s 
tenure were not formally proscribed.
7
  Similarly, when many African countries scrapped their 
independence constitutions in favor of single-party constitutions in the 1970s, the institution of 
executive term limits were not chosen for inclusion in the new constitutional order despite the 
fact that the system of government was changed to a presidential system in most countries.  This 
resulted in “life-presidencies” for many leaders who clung to power in excess of thirty years in 
some countries.  In fact, since independence, African presidents have, as a group, remained in 
power twice as long as their Asian or Latin American counterparts.
8
   
  However, this trend changed dramatically in the 1990s when, during the wave of 
liberalization that swept across the content, constitutional amendments put in place many checks 
and balances on executive power including safeguarding parliament from being dissolved by the 
president, giving parliament recourse over presidential veto power, subjecting the executive and 
legislature to judicial review and setting limits on executive terms (usually two terms of five years 
each).
9
  In fact, by 1994, of the thirty-seven national constitutions that underwent liberalizing 
amendments, executive term limits were featured in all but four.
10
  Interestingly, apart from a few 
Francophone countries in West Africa, where term limits were added to the constitution by a 
National Conference that had declared itself sovereign, by and large term limits and other 
                                                 
7
 France did not adopt a limit on executive tenure in its semi-presidential system until 2008. 
8
 Bienen, Henry S. and Nicholas van de Walle. 1991. Of Time and Power: Leadership Duration in the Modern 
World. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
9
 Barkan, J.; Adamolekum, L., and Zhou, Y. 2004.  “Emerging Legislatures: Institutions of Horizontal   
   Accountability” in Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons, B. Levy and S.  
   Kpundeh (eds), Washington, DC: World Bank,  
10
 Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, p. 113 
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executive constraints were adopted by the sitting governments of incumbent presidents, some of 
who had been at the helm of their countries for over twenty years before the advent of multi-party 
elections.  This raises the question of why a sitting president would actively seek to restrain his 
own power through the application of term limits to his office.   Chapter 3 explores why executive 
term limits were adopted by these longstanding presidents and their parties in the majority of 
African countries but not in the handful of holdouts among sub-Saharan nations. 
As the first cohort of post-liberalization presidents came to the end of their two-term limit 
beginning in the late 1990s, the strength of this constitutional provision began to be put to the test.  
To date, twenty-six African executives from twenty-four countries have reached the end of their 
constitutionally mandated tenure.  Fourteen of those have campaigned to have term limits 
abolished so they could run indefinitely.  Eleven have been successful in achieving this goal.  
Burkina Faso was the first country to abolish term limits for President Compaore in 1997 (although 
they were eventually reinstated in 2000). Following Burkina Faso's lead, Presidents Nujoma of 
Namibia, Diouf of Senegal, Conte of Guinea, the late Eyadema of Togo, Derby of Chad, the late 
Bongo of Gabon, Museveni of Uganda, Biya of Cameroon, and Tandja of Niger
11
 have all 
spearheaded successful movements to constitutionally abolish executive term limits.  Most 
recently,  Guelleh of Djibouti joined the ranks as MPs in the tiny country voted overwhelmingly to 
lift term limits in April of 2010, paving the way for Guelleh to run for a third term in 2011.  
However, not all presidents who have attempted maneuverings to circumvent term limits 
have been successful.  In 2006 Nigerian President Obasanjo was forced to suspend his bid for a 
third re-election when it became evident that he did not have the votes in parliament for such an 
                                                 
11
This is the only case of term limits being lifted through a means other than a parliamentary vote, as they were 
lifted after a questionable referendum following Tanja’s dissolution of parliament following that body’s refusal to 
abolish term limits.  However, Tandja's third term was short lived- he was ousted in a military coup in February of 
2010.   
8 
 
 
 
amendment, a story which echoes the similar failed attempts at third terms by Muluzi of Malawi 
and Chiluba in Zambia.   
Furthermore, there have so far been twelve African leaders who have bucked this trend all 
together and have quietly stepped down after two terms in compliance with their national 
constitutions, including Conare of Mali, Kerekou of Benin, both Rawlings and Kufuor of Ghana, 
Moi of Kenya, Trovoada of Sao Tome & Principe, Mwinyi and Mkapa of Tanzania, Monteiro of 
Cape Verde, Rene of Seychelles, Chissano of Mozambique, and Kabbah of Sierra Leone.  Figure 
1.1 illustrates the arrangement of these categories.   
Some might argue that an executive who pushes for term limits to be abolished through a 
parliamentary vote or a national referendum is not acting in discord with the Constitution but 
merely amending the document through the appropriate channels.  While it is indeed heartening 
that modern-day executives are increasingly choosing to work through formal channels to push 
for term limit extensions
12
 (unlike the previous generation of “presidents-for-life” who simply 
coronated themselves by decree), the fact remains that these amendments are not being put 
forward because a gradual shift in national values or policy has necessitated new constitutional 
language.  Rather, these amendments are proposed solely to further extend the privilege of just 
one individual over the rest of the population: the incumbent president.  Other types of legal 
changes that directly benefit those who vote on them (i.e. pay raises for legislators) are drafted in 
such a way that they come into effect after the next election, which lessens the inherent conflict 
of interest at play.  However, none of the African governments that have lifted term limits have 
included this delayed enactment mechanism, making it clear that the sole purpose of amending 
the constitution in this way is to extend the time in power of second-term presidents who are 
                                                 
12
 See Posner and Young (2007) on the increase in formal means of exiting office by African executives. 
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Figure 1.1: The Status of Executive Term Limit Laws across Sub-Saharan Africa
13 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 The Figure is adapted from Posner and Young (2007).  The author has changed some of Posner and Young’s 
categorizations in light of new developments. Sub-Saharan African countries not included in this sample include 
parliamentary regimes (South Africa, Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho and Mauritius), monarchies (Swaziland), failed 
states (Somalia), states with rotating presidencies (Comoros) and states where there has never been a national election 
(Eritrea). 
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reaching the end of their tenure.  As such, they should be viewed, for all intents and purposes, 
contraventions of constitutional rules regulating executive power. 
 
Developing a Rule of Law:  Explaining Institutional Choice, Enforcement and Change 
 
 The development of an effective democratic rule of law is a dynamic process that spans 
both a short and discreet adoption phase followed by a longer and continuous execution/ 
enforcement phase.  How constraining rules come to be chosen and implemented by 
governments, why and how these rules are subsequently enforced or abrogated and the question 
of whether the same variables drive both the adoption of and commitment to formal rules (path-
dependent explanations) or whether different mechanisms are at play in each phase (punctuated 
equilibrium arguments) are all key concerns in the literature on constitutionalism. Recent 
advances within political science to the study of institutional origin, enforcement and change are 
derived from the various strands within the new institutionalism approach.
14
  Rational choice 
institutionalism views institutional choice and change as driven by actors who design institutions 
through bargaining strategies formulated within the immediate context based on their own 
preferences regarding both short- and long-term outcomes they expect the institutions to 
generate.  Alternatively, historical institutionalists contend that forces such as structure and 
history shape institutional choice and change on a longer time horizon due to their effect on 
individuals’ conception of constraints imposed on them by underlying power asymmetries and 
other outcomes of evolutionary processes.
15
  Analyzing these arguments against the various 
experiences of executive term limit choice and adherence across sub-Saharan Africa provides a 
                                                 
14
 Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. 1996."Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms" in       
    Political Studies 44,5:936-957. 
15
 Pauline Luong, 2000. “After the Break-up: Institutional Design in Transitional States,” Comparative Political  
    Studies 33,5: 570. 
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starting ground to construct an explanation for the variation in executive constraint adoption and 
enforcement across the continent.  Ultimately I argue that an explanation that lies at the 
convergence of these two institutional approaches, one which uses the broader understanding of 
interests and constraints in the African context highlighted by historical institutionalism to 
inform the strategic decisions on institutional design made by rational members of parliament, 
can best account for the variation in both term limit adoption and adherence across sub-Saharan 
Africa.   
 How have other scholars approached the study of the institutional origin, enforcement 
and change in constraints on executive power?  How far do they go in explaining the empirical 
patterns of term limit adoption and abrogation visible across sub-Saharan Africa since the early 
1990s and where do they fall short?  While more detailed analyses of alternative explanations 
will be undertaken in both Chapter 3 (the analysis of term limit adoption) and Chapter 4 (the 
analysis of term limit enforcement/contravention), a survey of previous work that aims to explain 
the factors driving institutional choice and institutional enforcement/change both generally and 
with regards to constraints to executive power more specifically is presented below.   
 
Institutional Choice: Whither Executive Term Limits 
 The question of why African presidents imposed (or did not impose in a few cases) term 
limits on themselves is a topic which has been largely overlooked by scholars of African politics.  
Most studies of democratization in Africa during the third wave of the 1990s have simply studied 
the adoption of the democratic “package” by sub-Saharan nations.  The legalization of opposition 
parties, the holding of competitive elections, new or enhanced freedom of the press and other 
12 
 
 
 
constitutional reforms
16
 are often all lumped together along with executive term limits in an “all 
good things go together” mentality when scholars seek to explain the political liberalization that 
occurred in 40 out of 47 sub-Saharan nations during this time.  The rationale for the adoption of 
each of these reforms as particular institutions unto themselves, however, is rarely examined.   
 Furthermore, the explanations as to why transitions to democracy occurred simultaneously 
in numerous African nations is often chalked up to broad notions of international diffusion (i.e. the 
political openings in Eastern Europe touched off a wave of democratization around the world) 
coupled with improvements in communications,
17
 explanations which do little to shed light on the 
adoption of term limits specifically.  Even studies that look to domestic dynamics such as the 
nature of the previous authoritarian regime (especially how competition was structured) and level 
of mass protests in order to explain variation in African transitions
18
 do not provide an 
understanding of why specific constellations of institutions meant to check the power of the state 
were adopted in each country.  Donor conditionality is another factor that has been forwarded to 
explain the erection of formal institutions by liberalizing countries.  However, donor documents 
from this period show that patterns of aid distribution were not yet tied to democratic governance 
in the early 1990s when a majority of African countries adopted executive term limits.
19
  
 Moving beyond Africa, the arguments regarding the adoption of liberal constitutions across 
third wave democracies often rest on the idea that the specific content of constitutions is 
determined by the nature of a pact-making process between soft-liners in both the incumbent 
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authoritarian government and among the opposition forces.
20
  Based largely on case studies of 
successful democratic transitions and periods of constitutional revision in Latin American during 
the third wave era, this explanation holds that political elites enter into pact-making when neither 
side is strong enough to unilaterally impose their preferred political arrangement.  Thus, in order to 
“restrain their counterparts and mitigate their own political insecurity”21 political elites enter into 
direct bargaining arrangements with each other that result in a constitutional arrangement that 
reflects the relative power of each side at the time of the bargaining process.   
Yet, a lack of a pact-making process in most liberalizing African countries preclude this 
line of argumentation from proving satisfactory in the sub-Saharan context.  In the majority of 
African countries, constitutional reform was undertaken unilaterally by the incumbent parties 
without explicit bargaining with emerging opposition forces.  Even in countries like Zambia 
where there was some dialogue between the incumbent UNIP party and the nascent MMD 
organization regarding issues such as the procedure for multi-party elections and the re-
legalization of opposition parties, a look at the MMD manifesto and other documents from the 
1990-1991 period show that the MMD did not have an explicit stance on the issue of executive 
term limits and did not push UNIP to incorporate such limits into the national constitution.  This 
suggests that it may not be the process of bargaining that is they key factor in instances where 
pacts are viewed as driving constitutional design;  rather, the balance of power between the 
actors participating in the negotiations is what really determines the shape of the resulting 
institution.  Thus, in the case of term limit adoption, enforcement or contravention in sub-
Saharan Africa, incumbent parties can be viewed as simply “skipping” the negotiation phase and 
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unilaterally enacting the outcome that reflects the underlying power dynamics within the party 
system.    
Therefore, it is necessary to develop an explanation for the widespread adoption of 
executive constraints in sub-Saharan Africa that does not rest on the dynamics of an overt 
bargaining process between soft-liners on both sides, but that is based on the relative power of 
the political forces within the country.   As the forthcoming analysis will show, low power 
asymmetry between the incumbent and the opposition can lead the incumbent party to adopt 
executive constraints even without a formal bargain with the opposition, making the actual pact-
making process epiphenomenal to the drive for constitutional amendment.  Accordingly, this 
project will follow recent studies by Colmer
22
 and Hyde
23
  that examine the micro-foundations of 
the strategic and instrumental motivations behind incumbent parties’ adoption of, or acquiescence 
to, formal democratic institutions that are designed to constrain executive power.  
 
Institutional Enforcement: The Effectiveness of Executive Term Limits 
 
Constitutional clauses in and of themselves are merely ink on parchment and, as Carey 
rightly contends, “being written down is neither necessary nor sufficient for institutions to act as 
effective constraints on behavior.”24  Early research on advanced industrial democracies during 
the revival of interest in institutions during the 1990s “frequently assumed a tight coupling 
between formal rules and actor behavior,”25 but more recent research on third wave democracies 
in particular have highlighted the frequent disconnect between the two.   Therefore, Levitsky and 
Murillo argue that, once adopted, in order for constitutional rules to become meaningful norms 
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that routinely regulate behavior (in other words, for constitutionalism to take root), they must be 
both enduring and enforceable.
26
  Achieving these two conditions requires the development of 
some constellation of incentives within the given political environment that cause political elites 
to regularly and repeatedly align their conduct with constitutionally mandated limits on their 
actions.  What are these incentives, when and how do they arise in some African cases and when 
and why are they absent in others?   
 The question as to how and why constitutions are able to effectively constrain human 
behavior has been a major topic among new institutionalists, especially those who use rational 
choice or game theoretic models to argue that constitutionalism is, at its base, an equilibrium in a 
coordination game between actors.  Among scholars who analyze the establishment of 
constitutionalism in first, second and early third wave democracies, one popular explanation as 
to why constitutions become equilibrium to be followed by all political actors is that democratic 
constitutions are “self-enforcing.”   This theory maintains that constitutions are such because 
constitutional rules provide a point of coordination for citizens
27
 or administrators (i.e. 
bureaucracies, armies)
28
  to protest constitutional transgressions by their leaders.
29
    
Accordingly, extending this logic implies that constitutionalism breaks down if citizens/ 
administrators are unable to coordinate to check the behavior of elite political actors.  Yet, this 
explanation is problematic in the context of African term limit debates for many reasons.  First, 
the ability of citizens or administrators to check the executive in sub-Saharan Africa often 
depends on more than a coordination game around an idea.   Factors such as the degree to which 
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the incumbent can use laws or law enforcement personnel to quell protests, the extent to which 
citizens view certain actions as constitutional transgressions and/or as going against their will, 
the viability of alternative governing options and the cultural acceptance of protest against an 
authority figure among other issues severely complicates the story of constitutional rules being 
enforced primarily through citizen checks on executive behavior in sub-Saharan Africa.  This 
explanation also seems to assume the government always behaves as a unified actor and leaves 
out any notion of horizontal accountability within the government itself acting as an effective 
check on constitutional transgressions by one of its branches.  In fact, evidence from the African 
countries under study here demonstrates that coordination among members of parliament, not the 
society at large, is  the important nexus of the game in challenges to the executive two-term 
limit. 
Further, this hypothesis is difficult to test empirically due to the “dog that didn’t bark” 
problem.  The hypothesis that constitutional provisions are enforced where citizens would 
strongly object to their abrogation means that we should observe a higher level of protest in 
countries such as Ghana and Mozambique where term limits were upheld and lower levels of 
protest in Uganda, Burkina Faso and other countries where governments lifted term limits.  
However, since there was no attempt to lift term limits in the former group, there was no need for 
citizen protest, whereas there were a number of incidents of protest reported in the second group 
of countries where presidents attempted to alter the constitution.  Without knowing the 
comparative level of protest that would have occurred in Ghana, Mozambique and other 
countries if term limits had been overtly challenged, it is difficult to assert that the variation in 
citizen coordination led to the different outcomes of term limit perpetuation across the continent.      
17 
 
 
 
Finally, most rational choice accounts seem to imply that actors have a clear preferential 
priority that they are ever-ready to act upon.  However, in reality, actors rarely have just one 
preference in any given choice situation.  For example, based on the logic of ensuring that the 
legislature remains strong vis-à-vis the other branches of government, MPs should prefer to limit 
the executive’s power so as to not create a delegative democracy or a similar hyper-presidential 
system.  Actors may also prefer to uphold democratic institutions due to a personal commitment 
to democracy.  These preferences, which would both lead MPs in every African country to vote 
to retain term limits, are clearly valid preferences.  Thus, the fact that in many country term 
limits were lifted creates a two-fold puzzle:  first, what preference is really driving term limit 
adherence across sub-Saharan Africa and secondly, what historical processes have come to 
privilege that preference over other legitimate preferences MPs could enact in the term limit 
choice situation?   
 The argument presented in the next section will posit that differences and changes in the 
relative strength of incumbent parties and their opposition challenges, not a static equilibrium, is 
best able to explain variation in term limit adherence across the continent because this balance of 
power within the party system not only shapes actors preferences but at the same time, is itself 
shaped by historical structures and practices (such as patronage networks and party mobilization 
strategies).     
 
The Argument:  Party Strength, Actor Preferences and Executive Constraints 
 Evidence regarding the status of executive term limits across all relevant sub-Saharan 
African countries demonstrates that variation in the adoption/non-adoption of executive term 
limits in time period one and the adherence to/ contravention of these limits in time period two 
can both be explained by the degree and direction of change in the strength of the incumbent 
18 
 
 
 
party relative to opposition forces in the time period prior to constitutional change.  The 
perceptions of ruling party members regarding their party’s changing strength vis-à-vis their 
closest rival shapes their collective decision-making to favor or not favor a limited executive due 
to the threat of replacement facing the party.  The threat of replacement refers to the probability 
that the incumbent party will win re-election in future electoral contests.  In African countries 
that transitioned from single-party states to  multi-party dispensations in the early 1990s, 
uncertainty over the strength of the incumbent party relative to nascent democratic opponents in 
this time of political upheaval prompted many presidents and their cabinets to propose and 
parliaments to approve the adoption of executive term limits along with a host of other 
democratic checks and balances in order to ensure their ability to compete for power in the 
medium-term should they lose it in the short-term (the first multi-party election).  The group of 
sub-Saharan countries in which such limits on executive power were not adopted are those in 
which the incumbent party did not sense a credible threat of replacement by nascent opposition 
forces.  Thus, institutional choice in this context was driven by actor calculations of the level of 
competition within the electoral arena.   
 Similarly, actor perceptions regarding the threat of replacement in the political sphere 
also shapes term limit enforcement in time period two.  In countries where the balance of power 
between parties remains relatively equal or the incumbent party has lost power relative to an 
opposition party in the years following the initial adoption of executive term limits, electoral 
uncertainty remains high, creating both a high threat of replacement and opening the door for 
party switching (due to the non-programmatic nature of parties) and thus the incentives for 
retaining executive term limits persist.  However in polities where, following the reintroduction 
of multiparty elections, the winning party enjoys a substantial increase in power relative to all 
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other parties over the next ten years, the incentive to retain term limits disappears since electoral 
uncertainty becomes very low, making the threat of replacement negligible and greatly hindering 
the option for incumbent party politicians to switch parties.  In these cases, term limits are 
removed from constitutions through parliamentary votes in time period two, often by the same 
parties who adopted the executive tenure limit in the first place.  
 In both time periods, the balance of power between parties, the direction of this power 
shift, as well as the unique characteristics of African party systems (such as the extreme rarity of 
divided governments and the non-programmatic nature of most African parties) influences how 
members of the ruling party, who are primarily concerned with their own political survival, 
arrive at their choice on executive constraints by informing both their outcome preference 
(whether they prefer term limits to exist or not exist following the Parliamentary vote) and their 
action preference (which side they want to be seen as supporting in the debate).  This argument, 
which will be expanded upon in the following section and fully fleshed out in Chapter 2, can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
                                                     Patterns of party competition in SSA 
                                       
Perceptions of     threat of replacement    Ruling party MPs’    Indiv MP choice   Aggregate decision:             
relative power    ease of switching parties  1. Outcome preference    regarding executive     Exec. constrained 
between parties           (mechanisms)            2. Action preference        term limit clause       OR not-constrained 
                                
                                                                          
                                                                          Desire for re-election 
                  
 
         
Independent Variable: Competitiveness of the Party System 
 
 The main variable that distinguishes African countries that develop meaningful 
constraints on executive tenure from those in which presidents are able to circumvent the two-
20 
 
 
 
term limit is the level of competition within the party system.  The level of competitiveness is 
operationalized by considering the degree and direction of change in the incumbent party’s 
power relative to opposition parties over time.  In this context, “power” is taken to mean the 
ability to attract voter support in elections and influence debates on political issues in non-
election years.  Changes in the relative balance of power between an incumbent and an 
opposition party can occur if the opposition party gains additional popular support, if the 
incumbent party loses support, or if both occur simultaneously.  However, it is the relative 
balance of power between the incumbent party and the opposition at the time of the 
parliamentary vote on the term limit questions (or, if no formal vote is taken, at the time of the 
election in which the incumbent is barred from standing) that is of concern in this analysis.   
One of the key insights of this argument is that it pays attention to the changes in power 
of both the ruling party and the opposition over time, leading to an analysis of how relative party 
strength impacts the degree to which constitutions are able to constrain executive behavior.  
Other studies that have sought to explore disparities in executive or ruling party discretion have 
tended to rely solely on either different levels of ruling party cohesion
30
 or divergent levels of 
robust opposition groups in the polity
31
 to explain cross-national variation without considering 
the status of the other side simultaneously.  In newly liberalized countries where party systems 
are not yet institutionalized, examining changes in the electoral strength of both the incumbent 
and the opposition is important because an increase in the strength of one does not necessarily 
mean a decrease in electoral strength of the other, as in Mozambique where both the incumbent 
FRELIMO and the main opposition RENAMO party actually increased their vote shares between 
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the first and second elections.  Therefore, an observer who only noted the increase in strength of 
opposition might erroneously conclude that the incumbent party was losing influence, rather than 
seeing that, in reality, the relative strength of the two parties with reference to each other actually 
remained the same over this time period as both increased their vote share in parliament by 
roughly the same proportion.    
 While establishing an exact numerical measure of party power at a given point in time is 
difficult, many indicators can be used in order to assess trends in the degree and direction of a 
party’s level of power compared to other parties.  Perhaps the most easily identified and 
quantified measure of increases or decreases in relative party strength is the percentage of votes 
each party received in legislative election.  In both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the different yet 
related measures developed to capture party strength based on trends in electoral data for time 
periods one and two will be explained.  However, a measure based purely on such data is limited 
because election results may obscure the true balance of power due to opposition party boycotts 
or electoral fraud in some states or districts.
32
  Thus, while this indicator will be used as a first 
cut in exploring the correlation between relative party strength and executive term limit 
outcomes in the large-n analyses, a host of other, more country-specific indicators (such as 
public opinion data regarding the extent to which citizens trust the incumbent and opposition 
parties,
33
 the presence/absence of corruption scandals within both parties,
34
 and the degree to 
which each party possesses national organizational capacity
35
) will be used to more robustly 
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assess the strength of parties during both time periods in the case studies of Zambia, Cote 
d’Ivoire and Uganda. 
 It should be noted that the idea of relative party strength employed here is different from 
the concept of political system institutionalization, which has been the focus of a number of 
recent studies of African party competition.
36
  An institutionalized party system implies a 
situation in which competition becomes regularized between enduring parties with stable roots in 
society
37
 such that the same group of recognized parties contests elections over time.  The notion 
of party strength here is different from institutionalization because it is not concerned with 
whether the same opposition party continually challenges the incumbent party or whether a new 
opposition party emerges every election cycle to contest elections.  What matters in the present 
analysis is whether in each election there is at least one opposition force that poses a credible 
threat of replacement (i.e. chance of capturing power) to the ruling party.  Only when there is a 
credible threat of replacement will executive term limit be adopted and/or upheld by the 
incumbent government. 
 
 
Mechanisms: Actor Preferences and Choice 
 How exactly does variation in the power of the incumbent party relative to opposition 
parties probabilistically influence the nature of executive constraints in African polities?  In 
order to link this variable to the divergent outcomes observed across sub-Saharan countries, it is 
necessary to uncover the causal mechanisms at play, which are best parsed out through an 
examination of the micro-foundations of the decision making process that actors engage in 
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surrounding the term limit question.  As will be demonstrated in the case study chapters 
(Chapters 3, 5 and 6), due to informal practices within African party systems (the non-
programmatic, patronage basis of most parties and the rarity of divided governments to name but 
a few), actors base their term limit choice on considerations of the best way to maximize their 
personal position given the idiosyncrasies of political competition in their polity.  As a result, a 
concern with the balance of power between parties in the run up to national elections get 
translated through mechanisms of threat of replacement and ease of switching parties as actors 
are variously looking for the best way to ensure their own re-election.  By specifying how 
perceptions of party strength work through these mechanisms to shape the preferences of each 
type of actor in the decision process, we can build an explanation of how rational choice logic 
interacts with structural realities to produce institutional outcomes.  The following chapters will 
explore how competing actor preferences, namely outcome and action preference, and the 
strategies available to the actors in a given context to mitigate the negative consequences of 
favoring one preference type over the other is the link that probabilistically connects perceptions 
of relative party strength to term limit outcomes across sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
 
Outcomes: Aggregate Decision 
 Once all actors determine what stance to take with regard to the status of executive term 
limits given their preferences and structures within which they are acting, their individual decisions 
combine with the decisions of all other relevant actors to produce an ultimate result.  Based on this 
result, term limits are either espoused or rejected in time period one and either upheld or violated in 
time period two.  In all African cases except one (Niger), sitting African presidents have not 
challenged these final verdicts.  This is especially significant in cases where presidents proposed 
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the abolition of term limits only to have their own parliaments reject the measure, as happened in 
Zambia, Malawi and Nigeria.    Such occurrences prompt optimism that an effective rule of law 
can be developed in sub-Saharan Africa despite the overwhelming history of executive dominance 
and impunity. 
 
Research Design 
My research combines statistical analysis with comparative case study investigation and 
employs multiple data sources, both of qualitative and quantitative nature. This multi-method 
approach allows for both the generation and testing hypotheses. In the analysis of term limit 
adoption (time period one), I use electoral data to compare the strength of the incumbent and 
opposition parties between countries where term limits were adopted and countries that retained 
unlimited eligibility for the executive before turning to other more qualitative measures of party 
strength (i.e. relative attendance at public rallies, extent of constituency bases, organizational 
capacity, resource availability and others) in the case studies of Zambia and Cote d’Ivoire (see 
Chapter 3).  In the analysis of term limit adherence (time period two), I undertake a more 
expansive quantitative evaluation through a ‘medium-n’ logit analysis to assess the level of 
correlation between a number of broad explanatory variables and variation in executive 
constraint outcomes (see Chapter 4) . These potential explanatory variables are analyzed against 
a measurement of relative party strength across the universe of relevant country cases, which 
includes 37 country/president cases in time period one and 26 country/president cases in time 
period two.
38
  This statistical analysis then drives the selection of the two in-depth country case 
studies of Uganda and Zambia that comprise the remained of the analysis of term limit adherence 
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(see Chapters 5 and 6).  In each case study, data from interviews with members of parliament, 
cabinet ministers, former presidents, civil society leaders, constitutional review commission 
chairpersons, journalists and more are combined with archival sources to refine the measurement 
of the relative party strength independent variable and flesh out the causal mechanisms of the 
argument in order to clarify the links between the level of electoral uncertainty and the nature of 
executive constraints.   
Finally, I return to another round of statistical analysis in order to assess the 
generalizability of the argument regarding relative party strength and actor preferences by testing 
the extent to which this argument is able to probabilistically explain the compliance/non-
compliance with executive term limits in other regions of the world where they have been tested 
in recent years, including North Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Central Asia.    
At its heart, this project espouses a structured contingency approach that draws on both 
rational and historical institutionalism and “seeks explicitly to relate structural constraints to the 
shaping of contingent choice.”39  A structured contingency framework does not see institutions 
and patterns as determining exactly what choices/actions an actor will undertake, but does view 
these structures as setting confining conditions that may either restrict or enhance particular 
choices over others.  Accordingly, if one knows the range of options available to a decision 
maker at a particular point in time (i.e. choice to vote to uphold or abolish term limits during the 
sitting of Parliament when the amendment is tabled), and the outcome of that decision, one 
should be able to trace back with the country case using path dependent logic to see how the 
attractiveness of each choice is a function of a particular set of structures that were put in place at 
a previous point in time, and vice versa; if the structural conditions can be determined a 
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posteriori, path dependent logic should lead to an understanding of the range of options available 
and the utility of each option .
40
  Accordingly, explicit attention will be paid to the micro-
foundations of the decision process that the political actors in the analysis engaged in during the 
debate over executive term limits in their countries and how that decision is shaped by patterns 
of party competition.   
 
 
Broader Themes 
In the course of explaining when and how executive term limit provisions are adopted 
and later effectively constrain presidential tenure throughout sub-Saharan Africa, this project 
speaks to a number of larger themes within comparative politics in addition to informing our 
understanding of institutional choice and strength: namely the rise of competitive authoritarian 
regimes, the balance between formal versus informal institutions in liberalizing contexts and the 
study of African politics.  While a full analysis of how the findings from this project inform these 
literatures will be undertaken in Chapter Seven, a brief discussion of each is presented below. 
 
Competitive Authoritarianism vs. Democracy 
 During the liberalization period of the early 1990s, scholars spoke of sub-Saharan 
Africa as beginning a great “transition to democracy,” which, they assumed, would follow a 
more or less linear progression until it culminated in a group of consolidated democracies 
(generally upon completion of two turn-overs in the ruling party).
41
  However, as progress 
towards democracy seems to have stalled in many African, Central Asian, Eastern European and 
other third wave countries, scholars adopted many new terms such as “hybrid democracy,” 
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“illiberal democracy”, “pseudo-democracy” and, perhaps most in vogue now, “competitive 
authoritarian regimes” to describe these countries in-limbo that “combine democratic and 
authoritarian elements.”42  Within the study of African politics, there is much disagreement as to 
whether competitive authoritarian regimes are a type of new, stable entity that will remain in 
equilibrium straddling the line between democracy and autocracy,
43
 if they are still on a steady 
(but slow) track towards democratization and eventual consolidation so long as the democratic 
elements of the society keep getting utilized and ingrained in society
44
 or if they are not a stable 
equilibrium at all due to their extensive fluctuations over time.
45
   By disaggregating and 
focusing on just one institution (term limits) that can be handled democratically by upholding 
them or handled in an authoritarian manner by abolishing them, perhaps we will be able to get a 
better sense of what structural conditions and actor preferences interact to affect a country’s level 
of “hybridity” (from a complete backslide into authoritarianism to a complete transition to 
democracy and everything in between.).   This query will also be taken up again in the 
Conclusion. 
 
Formal vs. Informal Institutions in the African Context 
On a broad level, this research project seeks to join the larger debate amongst Africanist 
scholars regarding how formal democratic institutions matter in the realm of African politics 
through an analysis of constitutionalism in specific. Drawing on the historical institutionalist 
tradition, formal institutions can be thought of as “procedures, routines, norms and conventions 
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embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy.”46 They are formal 
because they are (in theory) enforced through channels that are widely regarded as “official.”47  
Examples of formal democratic institutions include the electoral system, sub-national government 
structures, and the constitution, among others.
48
  These codified conventions are designed to 
promote good governance by countering elite temptations for politically opportunistic behavior, 
making leaders more accountable to citizens, and creating set procedures for policy formation.
49
  
They sit in contrast to informal institutions which are “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, 
that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels.”50  
Personal networks, clientelism, corruption, clans and mafias, civil society, traditional culture, 
and a variety of legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic norms have all been labeled as informal 
institutions by various scholars.
51
   
Over the past few years a debate has emerged among observers of African politics 
regarding the balance between formal and informal institutions across the continent.   While 
some scholars argue that formal institutions continue to play second fiddle to prior methods of 
ordering conduct in political life including neopatrimonial patronage networks, politics of 
exclusion, 
52
 prebendalist practices
53
 and ethnic factions,
54
 other scholars assert that constitutional 
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rules and other formal institutions are increasingly able to order political life in Africa by fostering 
true separation of powers, opening avenues for opposition parties, and promoting elections over 
coups as a means of power transfer.
55
   This project, which looks at the intersection between formal 
institutions,  such as constitutional rules and procedures, and informal institutions, such as party 
systems and patronage, demonstrates that the debate between formal and informal institutions 
should not be conceived as an either/or delineation.  Instead, if we can build an understanding of 
how structural conditions interact with informal institutions across a range of environments, we can 
produce a more nuanced view of this debate.  As with the other themes, this one will also be 
addressed in the final chapter. 
 
African Politics 
Through much of the post-colonial period, the nature of executive power in sub-Saharan 
Africa was a central theme in political research about the continent.  Seminal works such as 
Jackson and Rosenberg’s Personal Rule in Africa (1982), Young and Turner’s The Rise and 
Decline of the Zairian State (1985) and Widner’s The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From 
"Harambee!" to "Nyayo!" (1992) examined how personalistic leaders came to dominate their 
one-party states and rule uninterrupted for decades.  However, with the wave of liberalization in 
the early 1990s, the bulk of research in African politics turned to new subjects such as civil 
society,
56
 protest movements,
57
 warlords
58
 and more recently, African legislatures.
59
  This project 
aims to bring executive power back into focus by exploring to what extent African presidents are 
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still able to dominate politics in their countries and to what extent the changes wrought by 
political liberalization have created real constraints on executive discretion.  As such, it seeks to 
situate the current nature of presidential power within the larger political context of 21
st
 century 
Africa.   Insights regarding how we should understand African presidents in the current era based 
on from the findings of this research agenda will be discussed in the conclusion chapter. 
 
Plan of the Dissertation 
This study is primarily concerned with identifying the sources of institutional choice and 
enforcement in liberalizing states, and developing a systematic framework with which to 
ascertain the mechanisms that underlie such dynamics.  Chapter 2 presents the micro-foundations 
of the structured contingency approach used to evaluate the context in which decisions on term 
limits are made, the actors involved, their competing preferences and the pressures introduced by 
patterns in African party competition. Based on these factors, an argument regarding formation 
of their ultimate choice of executive constraints is constructed.  Chapter 2 also explains how the 
independent variable, relative party strength, is measured across cases. 
 Chapter 3 explores the adoption/non-adoption of term limits in time period one.  Drawing 
on interview data and archival materials from the period, the Zambia case is examined in order to 
flesh out how widespread electoral uncertainty during the moment of liberalization led to the 
adoption of executive term limits in most countries across the African continent.  The case of 
Cote d’Ivoire is also examined as an example of a country in which low electoral uncertainty due 
to the relative strength of Houphouët-Boigny’s PDCI party resulted in term limits not being 
adopted into the constitution during the 1990s. 
 Moving on to time period two, Chapter 4 presents a medium-n analysis of country cases 
in which at least one president has reached the end of his two-term limit in office.  The analysis 
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is employed to investigate whether relative party strength also probabilistically explains term 
limit outcomes in this time period or if another explanatory variable is at play.  Finding that 
relative party power is again indeed the more closely correlated, Chapters 5 and 6 present case 
studies of Uganda, where term limits were lifted and Zambia (with Ghana as a shadow case), 
where term limits were retained, but only after a contentious parliamentary vote in Zambia, 
respectively.   
 Finally, Chapter 7 assesses the argument developed to explain the adoption and 
adherence to executive term limits against the contravention of other executive constraints across 
Africa and against the outcomes of challenges to term limit laws in other liberalizing regions 
including Latin America and the Central Asian Republics.  The chapter concludes with some 
notes on how the findings from this study inform a number of larger debates in comparative 
politics. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DEVELOPING A PROBABALISTIC MODEL OF EXECUTIVE 
 CONSTRAINT CHOICE 
 
 The widespread adoption of executive term limits across sub-Saharan Africa in the early 
1990s and the subsequent variation in the ability of such limits to effectively regulate presidential 
tenure presents a pair of interesting empirical puzzles.  Why did a similar institutional amendment 
process across all countries in both time periods (presidential/cabinet proposal leading to a 
parliamentary vote) result in vastly similar outcomes in time period one but a clear split between 
outcomes in time period two?  Explaining these puzzles fully involves developing an approach that 
employs a micro-analytic examination of the decision process but is informed by an understanding 
of the macro-political context in which these decisions are being made. 
 This chapter constructs such an approach.  To unpack the process that determines the status 
of executive term limits across sub-Saharan Africa since 1990, I illustrate how the choice of 
whether to accede to and/or uphold term limit laws results from a collective decision made within 
the ruling party that is shaped by the dynamic interaction between immediate strategic concerns 
and the structural-historical context within which the actors are embedded.  As such, the approach 
takes into account both rational choice logic, which stresses the propensity of actors to act in their 
own self-interest, and the wisdom of historical institutionalism, which highlights the importance of 
understanding the strategic opportunities and constraints imposed upon actors by the larger 
historical political-institutional context within which they are operating.  The end result of this 
analysis is a probabilistic model of executive constraint selection that can account for both 
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adoption and non-adoption in the first time period and both adherence and contravention in the 
second time period.  In this way, this project aims to inform the discussion on what Laitin and 
Grief term “a central concern in political science today - viz. how to explain both institutional 
stability and change.”60   
The chapter opens by identifying the process and relevant actors involved in the decision 
on term limits in sub-Saharan African states.  Next, widespread patterns of party competition in 
sub-Saharan Africa (the structure in which decisions on term limits are made) in both the 
adoption/non-adoption and adherence/non-adherence phases will be described.  Following this, 
the preferences and corresponding strategies available to each set of actors given this party 
competition environment is explored, noting to the need to look at both outcome preferences and 
action preferences and the tensions that sometimes arise between them.  Then, the costs of these 
various strategies are assessed and are shown to vary depending on the perceived strength of the 
incumbent party relative to the opposition into the foreseeable future and the level of electoral 
competition and uncertainty this creates.  This variation, and the two perceptional mechanisms- 
the threat of replacement and the ease of switching parties- that the relative balance of power 
between parties creates in the minds of actors,  is argued to be the cause of the diverse outcomes 
of executive term limit choice in and between both time periods across sub-Saharan Africa. 
While it must be acknowledged here that environment within which decisions on term limits are 
made in time period one (largely during the turbulent transitions to multi-party democracy in the 
early 1990s) does differ in many ways from the environment within which decisions were made in 
time period two (generally during a more stable period marked by regularized elections), the model 
is flexible enough to accommodate this difference.  This is because it primarily examines ruling 
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party actors’ perceptions of the strength of their party vis-à-vis the opposition, and actors will base 
their decisions both on the content of their perceptions and also on the level of certainty they place 
in their perceptions depending on the source and quality of information available to them at the 
time.    To illustrate, the causal chain can be represented as follows: 
                                                             Patterns of party competition in SSA 
                                                                               
Perceptions of    threat of replacement     Ruling party MPs’    Indiv MP choice  Aggregate decision:         
relative power     ease of switching parties   1. Outcome preference    regarding executive    Exec. constrained 
between parties           (mechanisms)             2. Action preference       term limit clause      OR not-constrained 
                                
                                                                            
                                                                          Desire for re-election 
 
Throughout the sections of this chapter, the causal chain will be reconstructed by working 
backwards from the outcome and filling in the steps as key variables and mechanisms driving the 
outcome are identified in the text.  Since we know the observed variation in term adoption and 
enforcement among sub-Saharan cases (refer to Figure 1 in Chapter 1), we can begin the reverse 
reconstruction of the causal chain here by specifying the outcome of interest is whether the 
president of a given African country is legally constrained or not by a law dictating limitations 
on executive tenure:                                                                                                        
                                                                                                               Aggregate decision:             
                   Exec. Constrained 
                                                                                                                                                OR not-constrained 
 
 
The Process of Term Limit Choice 
 
 Most modern national constitutions allow for their own alteration through a specified 
amendment process whereby members of the legislative branch vote on whether to add or 
remove certain provisions from the document.  Sub-Saharan African constitutions (both pre- and 
post-1990s liberalization) are no different, and therefore, the proper legal way for African states 
35 
 
 
 
to include or eliminate a clause specifying limits on executive tenure in or from their 
constitutions is for MPs to debate and decide on the matter in Parliament.  In the sub-Saharan 
cases under study here, the vast majority of both term limit adoptions and term limit deletions 
were indeed accomplished through official votes in parliament. 
  In the adoption phase, in all but the few Francophone countries where sovereign 
national conferences were able to alter constitutions outside of the formal legislative channel 
(including Benin, Mali and others), bills proposing the adoption of executive term limits were 
put forth by executives and cabinets and ultimately approved by legislatures.  In the majority of 
cases, it was not the newly elected pro-democratic leaders who proposed such liberal changes to 
the constitution- rather, by and large, it was the old-guard authoritarian leaders who proposed 
these amendments and ensured their passage in the single-party dominated parliament just prior 
to the first multi-party elections.  Even more surprisingly, the idea to add term limits and other 
liberal reforms to the constitution was often made unilaterally by the ruling party, rather than as 
part of a negotiation with emerging opposition groups, as with the Round Table agreements in 
Eastern Europe and the pacted transitions in Latin America.  As will be discussed in Chapter 3, 
even in countries like Zambia where the opposition was in a position to negotiate some terms of 
the transition, adding executive term limits to the constitution was not a demand that was 
mentioned in opposition group manifestos or raised during meetings between the incumbent and 
opposition figures.  The cause of the widespread undertaking of this process of term limit 
adoption by more than thirty sub-Saharan African governments during the 1990s poses the 
theoretical puzzle of why and under what conditions long-standing leaders would acquiesce to 
limits being placed on their office. 
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Like the term limit adoption process, the term limit adherence/contravention process 
across sub-Saharan cases also generally proceeded through the formal-legal channels of a vote in 
parliament on a proposed constitutional amendment.  Virtually every contemporary sub-Saharan 
African constitution stipulates that an amendment to the document may be made following a 
two-thirds majority approval by the legislature.
61
  Accordingly, in all but one of the twelve cases 
where term limits were abolished,
62
 they were removed through the procedure specified by the 
constitution after amendment bills proposing their removal from the constitution was suggested 
by the cabinet.  Likewise, the three cases of failed term limit contravention were also attempted 
through a vote in Parliament, with the incumbent presidents respecting the parliament’s rejection 
of the amendment and stepping down following the failed vote.  Similar to the adoption phase, 
the decision to table the amendment was made unilaterally inside the ruling party, and most 
attempted term limit contraventions often occur shortly before presidential elections- in fact of 
the fourteen contravention attempts more than 70% occurred within 18 months of the 
forthcoming contest.  However, in contrast to the fifteen cases where executive term limits were 
challenged across sub-Saharan Africa, there have been twelve other sub-Saharan presidents who 
have reached the end of their second term and have simply stepped down without seeking to 
amend the term limit provision even though they could have initiated a similar process to seek a 
two-thirds parliamentary vote on the matter.    What drives this variation across cases?  A close 
look at the actors and their motivations within this amendment process that is situated within a 
larger political environment can help us in learning the answer. 
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The Actors 
 
 Before exploring the various actor preferences and how they adjudicate between conflicting 
preferences that arise when approaching decisions on executive constraints, it is necessary to first 
identify the distinct categories of actors involved in these decisions in sub-Saharan cases.  The first 
category of actor is the executive him or herself.  The executive is an actor in a decision on limits 
on executive power in three ways.  First, and perhaps obviously, the executive’s degree of power is 
the object of a decision on term limit laws or other legal constraints on the president’s office.  In 
this way, s/he is the only actor who is directly affected by the decision, meaning that the stakes are 
likely higher for the executive than for any of the other actors.  Second, the president is 
instrumental in proposing such an amendment to the constitution.  In sub-Saharan Africa, where 
the president is almost always of the same political party as the majority party in the legislature, an 
amendment of such consequence would never get to the floor of parliament if it did not have the 
president’s approval.  Therefore, the president is intimately involved in the first step (the 
“proposal” step) of the decision to alter presidential powers. 
 However, the executive is, ironically, the actor with the least power over the second step of 
the decision (the “voting” step) which is the official outcome of the decision on executive 
constraints.  This is due to the fact that, in most African democracies, constitutional matters are the 
sole purview of the legislature.  Therefore, the third way the executive is an actor in the voting step 
is as an indirect advocate or promoter of one of the outcome choices over another.  Yet, this 
indirect role should not be dismissed as unimportant, for African presidents are often quite forceful 
promoters of their preferred outcome and employ tactics ranging from promises of patronage 
payoffs to threats of professional or even personal harm to persuade legislators to vote a certain 
way.   
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The second class of actors are the cabinet members, ministers of state and other ruling 
party elite.  They are the only actors who (in general
63
) participate in both the proposal step and the 
voting step of the decision.  In the proposal step, they are generally consulted by the president 
about the idea to adopt or abolish executive term limits or other constraints.  During the voting 
step, they, as members of parliament, vote with their co-legislators to either favor or oppose the 
amendment that is tabled.  Even though cabinet members comprise a minority of parliament 
members, they, either individually or collectively, may enjoy a disproportionate amount of 
influence over the vote since they are “prominent actors.”64 As such, they may become a reference 
point for other rank and file party members who are debating which way to vote or they may try to 
use their elevated positions to influence the vote in any number of ways. 
The third and final category of actor is the rank and file members of parliament.   Though 
they are not generally privy to the proposal stage of the process, they are the most important actors 
in the voting stage since they are the ones whose combined votes determine the final outcome of 
the proposal on executive constraints.  During the term limit adoption phase (time period one in 
this study), rank and file MPs are generally all members of the sole legal party in power at the time.  
However, during the second time period under study when amendments to lift executive term 
limits are tabled, while  most sub-Saharan countries’  legislatures are still dominated by one party, 
there are usually some percentage of opposition party members sitting in Parliament who will be 
casting votes alongside of the members from the president’s party.   
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Beyond the elected politicians who are directly involved in the formal term limit decision, 
other actors such as citizens/voters, civil society groups, religious leaders, and opposition parties 
often participate in debates surrounding the decision and attempt to sway the main actors towards 
their own preferred outcome.  While these secondary actors are not discussed directly in this 
analysis, the theory presented here accounts for the ways in which these secondary actors can 
influence the primary actors’ decision calculus by incorporating the idea of action preferences into 
the model in later stages.  At this stage of the causal chain, however, knowing that the status of 
executive term limits in sub-Saharan countries is a result of an aggregate choice made 1) by 
individual political actors 2) through a formal process of the tabling and voting on a bill in 
Parliament that contains a clause adding or removing executive term limits allows us to fill in the 
preceding step in the chain: 
        Indiv. actor choice    Aggregate decision:             
                      regarding executive        Exec. constrained 
                                                                                                             term limit clause          OR not-constrained 
 
 
The Political Environment: Party Competition in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 Even though the titles of the actors mentioned above- executive, cabinet ministers, 
members of parliament- are common labels for specific types of political actors that can be found 
the world over in most electoral systems, it should not be assumed that these actors will always 
exhibit the same preferences and behaviors in the African context that they do in other regional 
contexts.   In both time periods under study here, the nature of political competition across the sub-
Saharan region significantly affects political actors’ preferences as well as the strategies and 
actions available to them, often in ways that are not observed in more established democracies.  In 
fact, Carbone warns that scholars who attempt to look at African parties “through the models 
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originally elaborated for the study of Western political parties [are] running the risk of 
overstretching the meaning of these models in the process of transferring them to emerging 
democracies.”65  This section will identify some of the overarching characteristics of African 
political parties and electoral competition within which the actors mentioned above are operating 
and must consider when they formulate their choice on the status of executive term limits in their 
national constitutions.  These characteristics include the following: 
1. The non-programmatic/ non-ideological nature of African political parties 
2. The clientelist basis for African party structures (as opposed to mass based) 
3. Difficulty faced by former politicians in finding employment/maintaining their livelihood  
4. The rarity of divided governments in sub-Saharan Africa 
5. The strong incumbent advantage and mixed electoral success of “successor” candidates 
 
  First, African political parties and party systems by and large do not play the role of mass-
based interest articulators and aggregators that parties often perform in other regional contexts.
66
  
Barring a few historical exceptions of successful socialist-leaning parties such as Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi in Tanzania and FRELIMO in Mozambique in the immediate post-colonial era,
67
 most 
African parties from independence until the present day can be described as “non-programmatic” 
or “non-ideological” in that they do not espouse or promote any overarching political policy 
stance or agenda and are not easily placed along the traditional left-right spectrum.  Due to what 
some have theorized to be the limited economic and political policy options available to African 
governments based on the conditionalities levied by donor states and organizations,
68
 sub-Saharan 
parties tend to fill their public pronouncements with vague platitudes promising economic 
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development and prosperity for all citizens without reference to specific policy prescriptions or 
ideological frameworks.  In fact, official party platforms tend to closely mirror each other,
69
 as did 
the platforms put forth by the NRM and FDC parties in the run-up to the 2006 presidential and 
parliamentary elections in Uganda, where it was widely rumored that the NRM simply copied the 
FDC platform nearly verbatim and released it as their own.
70
  As a result, individual politicians 
generally campaign on their ability to deliver good to their constituency while attempting to 
discredit their opponents’ ability to do the same.  This strategy has been underscored by the 
empirical reality that the few African parties that have campaigned on substantive and specific 
policy issues have not been successful at the polls.
71
   
The non-programmatic/non-ideological nature of parties in Africa is linked to the fact that 
party formation across the continent has not followed a similar trajectory as party development in 
other regions in terms of the types of parties that have emerged.  A distinct lack of many of the 
cross-cutting cleavages present in a plural polity and a shallow civil society south of the Sahara has 
greatly restricted the strategies by which parties could connect to the society.
72
  For example, 
Carbone reports a paucity of nationalist and religious parties across the continent,
73
 while Bienen 
and Herbst explain that the lack of class conflict historically across sub-Saharan Africa has meant a 
dearth of class-based parties.
74
  Furthermore, recent research by Erdmann and others suggest that 
the widespread notion that African parties are largely ethnically-based is misleading,
75
 as a closer 
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look at most parties that have been labeled as ethnic parties are in actuality better described as 
trans-ethnic or ethnic congress parties in the vein of the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), 
which are built as an ethnic elite coalition even if a certain ethnic group becomes more dominant 
within the party at different points in time.  Moreover, what on the surface looks like ethnic 
mobilization and voting is now often being re-classified as regional/local voting.
76
  
This non-programmatic/ non-ideological character of African parties and party systems has 
interesting consequences for electoral competition across sub-Saharan Africa.  Most notably, in a 
context where parties do not have clear programmatic or ideological identities, voters often have 
little basis on which to differentiate parties. Depending on the specific country context, this can 
lead to a situation in which voters have no reason to switch their vote to a seemingly similar party 
or, alternatively, where switching their vote is a low-cost action for citizens because it does not 
entail any ideological re-commitment on the part of the voter.  Similarly, African politicians are 
able to switch parties with a lot more ease than their counterparts in polities where transferring 
their allegiance from one party to another would necessitate a public renunciation of their former 
beliefs (which the electorate may not trust) and the espousal of a new, often seemingly opposite, 
ideology.  Finally, recent elections in countries all across sub-Saharan Africa have seen a dramatic 
rise in the number of parliamentary aspirants (and even incumbent MPs) running and winning as 
independent candidates.  The non-programmatic nature of parties and the resulting campaigns 
based on personal capabilities rather than policy platforms open the space for independent 
candidates in sub-Saharan Africa that is not available in regions featuring more historically-
structured ideological political competition.  
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If parties across sub-Saharan Africa have not developed to be vehicles that aggregate mass 
voter interests, what function do they serve?  Since the single-party era of the 1960-80s and into 
the multi-party era today, the modal African political party has existed to empower and enrich a 
small group of ruling party elites in the capital by providing them direct access to state resources.  
This is the second characteristic of African party systems that politicians must consider when 
voting on alterations to governance rules.  In order to promote political stability, leaders have used 
the form of the party to practice and routinize political clientelism.  Clientelism (primarily in the 
form of prebendalism
77
 rather than the more well-known practice of patronage) was and continues 
to be employed by leaders as a strategy to use state resources to forge alliances across different 
social elites in a young, instable and poorly integrated political system.
78
  Due to both the vast 
powers bestowed upon the president (who is almost always head of the party as well as head of 
state and government) in most African constitutions and informal practices of weak legislatures 
that have developed over time, presidents in the region enjoy a high degree of control over things 
like national budget allocations, ministerial appointments and candidate funding.  Accordingly, 
presidents use their control over the access and distribution of state resources and positions to 
reinforce their rule so that parties become little more than arenas for intra-elite accommodation 
in the context of presidential attempts to centralize power and wield it effectively.
79
  As such, 
most of the material gains from clientelism are limited to a small group of ruling party elite.  In 
order to achieve the enrichment of a small group of elite, party organizations across Africa are 
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designed to function much like private sector firms (but without a board of directors elected by 
shareholders to oversee operations) rather than public sector organizations. 
Evidence of this can be seen in the way in which the structures of African political parties 
have been developed.  Actual party organizations are rather thin, mostly consisting of the party 
leader-president at the top who distributes patronage to a small, tight-knit group of central elites 
directly under him. In fact, a recent survey of 200 African political parties in 15 African countries 
revealed that virtually all of the parties had “adopted centralized party structures, whereby the central or 
national office makes all major and minor decisions affecting the functioning of the political parties.” 80  
Any party links to the grassroots level, regional structures or periphery is ad hoc and consist 
mainly of opportunistic coalitions with local leaders who deliver voters, usually through 
intimidation, formed shortly before every election.81  As a result, Salih, in another study, finds that 
three-quarters of the sub-Saharan parties he studied had no offices at the local polling station level and 62 
per cent had no district or provincial coordinating offices.
82   There has been little effort by African 
party leaders to extend their structures beyond the central core because that would necessitate the 
transfer of resources away from the central party elite.  It is clear from randomized interviews with 
party leaders in countries as diverse as Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia that sub-Saharan 
parties are functioning as personal resource bases for party elite, as 85% of them reported that 
being a party leader had increased their wealth, prestige and social standing.
83
  
Since “proximity to the state has proved to be a central strategy for individual 
enrichment,”84 politicians strive to keep themselves in office any way that they can and in the 
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good graces of the ruling party.  The reason why being part of the political elite and within the 
clientelist network of the ruling party is so crucial is because there are limited opportunities for 
employment outside of the public sector for former members of government. This third 
characteristic of party competition across sub-Saharan Africa is important for all actors to 
consider when making decisions that could affect electoral outcomes.  Unlike in the United 
States where former Congressmen are coveted by lobbying and consulting firms, former sub-
Saharan African MPs and ministers have a difficult time finding employment because managers 
do not feel they would be able to give orders to a former MP 
85
 and because firms fear hiring 
someone who has fallen out of favor with the government for fear of retribution by the ruling 
party.  Even self-employed former MPs report having difficulty making a living out of office as 
their businesses are routinely shut out of government contracts and MPs who leave government 
on bad terms with the ruling party even report being audited and found in violation by tax 
authorities under orders from above.
86
  Thus, for many African politicians, retaining office is 
tantamount to preserving one’s livelihood or even freedom.  
Yet, it is not only members of parliament who fear losing their posts.  Presidents also 
prefer to retain their office in order to keep benefiting from access to state coffers and because of 
the history of former presidents being negatively targeted after they leave office.  For example, 
while former western heads of state are revered as “elder statesmen” and often make a better 
living after they leave office through paid speaking engagements, selling their memoirs and 
consultancy work, African executives rarely have profitable or productive retirements.  Rather, 
the few former African heads of state who have left office alive are more likely to find 
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themselves in jail (Diori of Niger), in exile (Nkrumah of Ghana, Mengistu of Ethiopia), on trial 
for human rights violations (Habre of Chad) or corruption (Chiluba in Zambia, Muluzi in 
Malawi) than on the international lecture circuit.  The stories of former Ugandan President 
Milton Obote being reduced to living in his garage because the roof of his house leaked
87
 
demonstrate just how far former African presidents can fall after they leave office, especially if 
their successor is not from the same party.  Therefore, retaining the presidency is the best way 
for these individuals to ensure their welfare, both financially and personally.    
One of the most surefire ways a sitting president can increase his chance of winning re-
election in a multi-party system is to retain incumbent advantage.  Incumbent advantage, the 
widely recognized phenomenon whereby officials currently holding an office are much more 
likely to win the next election than challengers for the position, is particularly strong in sub-
Saharan Africa.  In elections where incumbent presidents have face challengers, only one out of 
fourteen resulted in a turn-over of power between 1960-1989.
88
  Even after the widespread 
resumption of multi-party elections in the late 20
th
 century, between 1990 and 2007, only 
fourteen incumbent presidents (out of 100 elections) lost their seats to challengers, for an 86% 
re-election rate for incumbent candidates.
89
  This clear benefit to incumbent candidates is 
contrasted with the decidedly mixed fate of “successor candidates”- presidential candidates 
personally anointed by an outgoing president to run in their place.  While some successor 
candidates, such as Levy Mwanawasa in Zambia who was hand-picked by outgoing President 
Chiluba, do go on to win the presidency, a surprising number of successor candidates, including 
Uhuru Kenyatta in Kenya and John Atta Mills in Ghana, have lost their elections, resulting in a 
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turn-over of power in the presidency AND the legislature.  The overwhelming success of 
incumbent presidential candidates coupled with the decidedly mixed fortunes of successor 
candidates is the fourth noteworthy aspect of party competition that sets the stage for the 
analysis of executive term limit choice.   
At first glance, it would seem that only presidents’ electoral fortunes would be affected 
by changes to the executive term limit law in the constitution.  However, the extreme rarity of 
divided governments (where one party wins the presidency but another party obtains a plurality 
or majority of seats in the legislature) in sub-Saharan Africa means that the ability for an MP to 
retain her seat is inherently tied to her party’s ability to capture the presidency.  This is the fifth 
characteristic of African party competition that actors must consider during term limit debates.  
Bogaards observes that “whether concurrent or not, presidential and parliamentary elections in 
Africa as a rule return the same party to power.”90  A look at the evidence confirms Bogaards 
assertion- since the period of liberalization began in 1990, by the author’s count there have been 
138 legislative elections in the countries included in this analysis (African states where the 
president is directly elected).  Out of these 138 elections, the president’s party91 captured a 
majority (50%+1) of the seats in the legislature in 97 (or 70% of) elections.  This even tends to 
hold true when there is turn-over in the presidency:  in Ghana, the NDC retained a majority in 
the legislature throughout Rawlings tenure, but in 2000 when NPP’s Kufuor won the presidency, 
the NPP captured the parliamentary majority as well. Even in elections where the presidents’ 
parties do not manage to win a full majority, they have still won a plurality of seats in another 21 
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elections (15%).   Instances of true divided governments (where an opposition party captures a 
plurality or majority of seats in the legislature) are the rarest outcome and have only occurred in 
only 13 (9.4% of) elections.
92
   
The extreme rarity of divided or even minority governments across sub-Saharan Africa 
and the high probability that the party that captures the presidency will also win a majority of the 
seats creates a dynamic in which members of parliament view their chances for re-election as 
intrinsically tied to the ability of their party leader to win the presidency.  If a party wins 50, 60 
or even 70+% of the seats in the legislature on the coattails of a successful presidential candidate, 
the probability that any individual MP from that party will win a seat is much higher than in a 
situation where the legislative election results co-vary to a lesser extent with executive election 
results and divided governments are more common (as they are, for example, in the United 
States where, since 1900, 41% of elections have resulted in divided governments where the 
president’s party did not control one or both houses of Congress).93  This means that ruling party 
MPs will see it in their self-interest to raise the likelihood that their party’s presidential candidate 
will win future elections.   
 These five relevant historical patterns of party competition in sub-Saharan Africa shape 
the environment actors find themselves imbedded within when they face decisions regarding the 
design of the rules of the political game.  They all influence the extent to which actors wish to 
retain their positions in government and the strategies available to them to achieve this goal.  The 
historical-institutional space created by the unique aspects of party competition in sub-Saharan 
Africa and the extremely strong desire among African politicians to retain their offices can be 
represented in the causal chain as such: 
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                                                  Patterns of party competition in SSA 
                                       
    Indiv actor choice    Aggregate decision:             
                regarding executive         Exec. constrained 
                                                                                                         term limit clause         OR not-constrained 
                                  
                                                            Desire for re-election 
 
Actor Preferences 
The environment of party competition shapes elite actors’ preferences and subsequent 
strategies when they are faced with a decision on executive term limits.  In situations in which a 
group of actors is tasked with making a collective decision, such as passing a constitutional 
amendment, there are actually two types of preferences that each individual actor holds: 1) an 
outcome preference and 2) an action preference.
94
   An outcome preference is simply a matter of 
what end result the actor favors for his/her own ideological, strategic or pragmatic reasons.  This is 
what choice the actor would choose in a vacuum (or in a secret ballot) where there was no personal 
cost associated with choosing one outcome over another.  In terms of actors deciding on 
constitutional matters, their outcome preference is to adopt the constitutional language that they 
feel is most concomitant with a range of interests including their political convictions and values, 
their vision for the polity, the power of their branch of government and their personal political 
future without reference to how other stakeholders may think of and/or react to their choice.    
 The second type of preference, an action preference is, at its most basic, the behavioral 
stance towards the decision that each actor prefers to take in light of the consequence s/he expects 
to face from the various stake holders. As such, an actor’s action preference is rooted in his/her 
knowledge of where other stakeholders (the reference groups) stand on the issue and their ability to 
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exact punishment on those who take the opposite stand.
95
  In addition, each actor’s action 
preference is shaped by his/her individual threshold, which is the propensity of an actor to choose a 
course of action that deviates from the behavioral stance of the majority of the reference group.  As 
Ermakoff concisely wrote, “isolation carries a cost.”96  Is the actor willing to take a stance that is 
opposed by all other actors (an absolute threshold)?  If not, what proportion of actors must 
demonstrate a willingness to undertake one line of action before the actor in question will exhibit a 
similar behavioral stance (a relative threshold)?  Thus, with regards to an actor deciding on 
constitutional matters, his/her action preference is to be seen supporting the constitutional language 
that his/her reference groups support without concern for the effects the amendment might have on 
political outcomes in the future.  
 Often action preferences and outcome preferences are in line with each other.  If an actor is 
in favor of the outcome choice that is also supported by his/her reference groups, his/her action 
preference in voting for that option will directly lead to his/her outcome preference.  However, if 
the actor’s outcome preference differs from that of other stakeholders to which s/he is connected, 
s/he must decide whether to vote for his/her preferred outcome and run the risk of retaliation from 
one or more stakeholders, or whether to vote in a way that the others prefer and, thereby, act in 
direct opposition to his/her own preferred outcome.  In these situations, where action preferences 
and outcome preferences are diametrically opposed to each other, each actor must devise his/her 
own method of determining which preference to privilege. 
 The old truism “where you sit is where you stand” suggests that both outcome and action 
preferences will differ somewhat between the three categories of political actors- presidents, 
cabinet members, and parliamentarians- who are participants in term limit decisions in sub-Saharan 
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states.  How should the preferences of each of these actors be understood given the nature of 
African political competition described above?  The next section reveals the preferences of each 
class of actors in turn.   
 
The Preferences of the Executive 
Outcome Preferences 
As described previously, on the question of executive tenure, African presidents prefer to 
preserve their position as the executive in order to retain access to state resources as an avenue to 
personal enrichment and to avoid the uncertainty of retirement given the misfortunes former 
presidents have faced across the continent.  Beyond personal welfare considerations, presidents 
may also wish to retain office in order to carry out their policy preferences, for psychological 
motives related to feelings of self-importance, or for any other number of idiosyncratic reasons. 
Thus, the main outcome preference of the executive is for himself to remain in office 
indefinitely. 
Yet, if the costs of retaining office are too high, the president’s second order outcome is 
for himself to step down but provide for the possibility of the next presidential candidate from 
his party to be elected in competitive elections.  Within the framework of competitive elections, 
the current president would clearly prefer his party to retain power in subsequent elections at 
least for as long as he is alive. If the former president’s party retains the presidency and/or a 
majority in the legislature, it is more likely (but certainly does not guarantee
97
) that the former 
executive will not be persecuted in retirement.  However, even if the president’s party cannot 
win all elections into the foreseeable future, he can hope for some protection from prosecution as 
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long as the political system contains institutions that provide for competitive elections and 
turnover of the executive office.  This is due to the idea of reciprocity- if the new opposition 
party president fears he could lose power in the next election and be at the mercy of the former 
ruling party once they regain power, he’ll be more likely to set a precedent of revering former 
leaders rather than persecuting them.  Thus, the president’s second preference is to step down 
and for his party to engage in competitive election. 
The executive’s third preference, which is what he would like to avoid at all cost, is for 
his party to become non-competitive, meaning that an opposition party has a strong enough 
incumbent advantage to dominate elections into the foreseeable future.  With no party ties to 
offer protection and no competitive institutions to constrain the actions of an opposition 
successor or to give the president’s party a chance to regain power, the president is left open to 
any and all retribution the new national leader wishes to inflict upon his former political rival.  
This situation is absolutely unappealing to the president because it is the only circumstance that 
leaves him with no protection at all.   
This constellation of outcome preferences regarding executive tenure helps shape both 
the strategies available to the president and the perceived payoffs (which comprises both the 
costs and benefits) of those strategies in terms of choosing which institutions of executive 
constraints to champion for inclusion into their countries’ constitutions.  Focusing on executive 
term limits, the choices of strategy are clear cut:  Strategy I: Oppose the adoption or upholding of 
executive term limits or Strategy II: Favor the adoption or maintenance of executive term limits. 
When these two strategy choices are aligned with the preference ordering above, the result is as 
follows: 
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Preference 1: President retains office indefinitely     =     Strategy I: Oppose term limits                        
                      in non-competitive elections 
 
Preference 2: President/successor candidate competes =  Strategy II: Favor term limits  
                      in competitive elections 
 
Preference 3: President/successor candidate loses =  Strategy I: Oppose term limits 
                      in non-competitive elections   
 
Action Preferences 
 Distinct from his outcome preference, a president’s action preference in executive tenure 
debates is related to how other stakeholders perceive the behavioral stance he takes towards the 
idea of term limits.  By choosing to favor or oppose term limits, the president may face 
consequences from other actors who disagree with the president’s choice.  For example, a 
president who does not favor limits on executive tenure may fear losing donor funding from 
western governments that promote the creation of democratic institutions, losing the respect of 
presidential peers in the African Union, and/or disillusioning democratically-minded party 
members, military leaders and ordinary voters (who may later seek to violently overthrow him as 
happened to President Tandja in Niger and Ben Ali in Tunisia after they oversaw the abolition of 
term limits in their states).  Conversely, a president who favors term limits could face ire from 
his political party for giving up their incumbency advantage, and therefore weakening the party 
as a whole.  Thus, the president must weigh the costs of each action preference in and of itself 
while also assessing how each action preference lines up with the outcome preference he would 
like to obtain when deciding whether to endorse or reject particular constraints on executive 
power.  
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The Preferences of Cabinet Ministers 
Outcome Preferences 
The preference ordering of cabinet ministers and other party elite share some similarities 
with the president’s, but can also differ based on the position of each individual minister.  First 
and foremost, they would like to retain their powerful posts for as long as possible because 
ministerial positions in sub-Saharan Africa give the officeholder greater access to patronage.  
Patronage is not only a means of personal enrichment for cabinet ministers, but also aids in re-
election, for constituents view MPs who are also cabinet members as better able to benefit the 
constituency since ministers “have a hand in deciding where to allocate public resources, 
presumably in their home districts”98   Keeping their ministerial posts entails the cabinet 
members’ party maintaining its hold on power.  This is in line with the president’s top two 
preference from above- the current president remaining in office indefinitely or the incumbent 
party retaining the ability to win future competitive elections. 
 However, the exact ordering of these two preferences varies depending on the individual 
cabinet member and his/her perception of his/her own standing within the party hierarchy.  There 
may be some high ranking cabinet ministers who covet the presidency themselves, and therefore 
would prefer that the term limits be adopted/upheld (thereby foregoing incumbency advantage 
for their party) so that the current president must step down, thus opening the door for their own 
presidential bid.  Yet, other lower ranked cabinet members who do not command enough 
influence within the party to be a serious contender for the presidency may see his/her interests 
better served by the current president retaining the office into the future.  Reasons for this 
preference may include a sense by the minister that the incumbent president has a better chance 
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of winning future elections than a successor candidate from the party and a fear that a new 
president might undertake a cabinet reshuffle, which could leave some current ministers demoted 
without a cabinet post.  Thus, in terms of ordering preferences for the cabinet ministers, the 
preference for the president to remain in office indefinitely in non-competitive elections may be 
ranked above or below the preference for the party to engage in competitive elections based on 
their position within the party. 
No matter the ordering of their first two preferences, cabinet ministers share the 
president’s least preferred option of the party becoming non-competitive in future elections.   
In order to have the best chance of retaining their positions (or at least the chance to win them 
back in the medium term should they lose them in the short term), ministers would rather their 
party run in but lose competitive elections but retain the chance to win future elections rather 
than have their party become non-competitive with no chance of recouping power at the national 
level.  Therefore, in terms of strategy regarding both proposing a bill on executive term limits 
and voting on it in Parliament, the preference ordering of cabinet ministers is as follows: 
 
Preference 1 & 2: President retains office indefinitely     =     Strategy I: Oppose term limits                        
                              in non-competitive elections 
                                                                                 OR 
                             President/successor candidate competes =  Strategy II: Favor term limits  
                             in competitive elections 
 
Preference 3:        President/successor candidate loses =       Strategy I: Oppose term limits 
                             in non-competitive elections   
 
Action Preferences 
 The action preference choices facing cabinet members are distinctive from those facing 
presidents because they have different reference groups and thus encounter different constraints 
than the executive.  The cabinet member’s two primary reference groups are his/her fellow party 
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members (most notably the president himself) and his/her parliamentary constituents.  In terms 
of the party, a minister who does not agree with the president and other party members about the 
status of term limits may risk retribution from the president (i.e. losing his/her portfolio) and 
being ostracized by other ministers. In terms of the second reference group, his/her constituents, 
a cabinet member must consider how the majority of voters from his/her district view the 
question of term limits since constituents may choose to vote out of office parliamentarians who 
do not represent their views.  In instances where the views of the minister’s party and 
constituents diverge, he/she must decide how best to minimize their risk of punishment from one 
or both groups.  Strategies for this will be discussed below in the section on action preferences of 
members of parliament. 
 
Preferences of Rank and File Members of Parliament 
Outcome Preferences 
Theories of executive-legislative relations based on advanced democracies would posit 
that African parliamentarians should always desire to restrict presidential tenure in order to 
strengthen the power of the legislature vis-à-vis the power of the executive.  Yet, as the earlier 
discussion of the dynamics of sub-Saharan party competition demonstrated, the patronal nature 
of African parties and the rarity of divided governments prompt ruling party African MPs to 
view having a strong president as being more advantageous to their personal political career than 
being part of a strong legislature.  Therefore, in order to increase their own probability of 
retaining their seats (the first priority of all MPs) individual parliamentarians from the ruling 
party ultimately prefer the incumbent president to remain in power so their party can retain the 
incumbent advantage and thereby increase their own electoral chances.  While some MPs may 
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perceive that they would have a better chance of rising in the ranks to become a cabinet minister 
if another party elite (perhaps someone who is a personal friend or someone from their ethnic 
group, religious denomination, region or cousinage
99
) were to gain the presidency, this notion is 
often overshadowed by the fear that a change at the top of the patronage network could cause the 
whole network to collapse, thus resulting in the MP getting nothing and being worse off than she 
was under a president of another ethnicity/religion/group.   
Yet, there may be occasions where an incumbent president has lost so much popular 
support (due to corruption scandals, economic mismanagement or any number of other 
publically-known misdeeds) that an MP perceives that her party would be better served by giving 
up incumbency advantage and running a new candidate for president.  However, this is a 
dangerous preference to act upon precisely because of the possibility of being “decampaigned”100 
for displaying disloyalty to the incumbent leader.  In cases such as this, one new possibility 
exists that must be included in the preference ordering of MPs: switching parties. 
If a member of parliament perceives that she may have difficulty re-winning her seat 
under her current party banner (either because she is being decampaigned by the party or because 
popular opinion now favors an opposition party), in a multi-party system, the MP has the option 
of switching his/her party affiliation.
101
  How likely the MP is to win the election under a new 
party label is conditioned by many factors which will be discussed later in the following section 
of the chapter.  Yet, the point remains that an MP who is primarily worried about job security has 
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options other than remaining with the incumbent party, which can impact the choice of strategy 
an MP pursues with regards to the term limit question.  
 In terms of preference ordering, switching parties is certainly better for an MP than 
remaining a member of a non-competitive party that has no chance of re-capturing power.  Yet, 
switching parties can often, but not always, carry a higher cost to an MP than remaining with her 
original party in a competitive electoral environment.  Specifically, an MP who switches parties 
may win the next election, but if she loses and her former party goes on to retain power for many 
subsequent election cycles, it will have been a bad gamble, and visa-versa. Since it is not clear in 
the abstract which choice is preferable to the other, and with the understanding that the exact 
ordering will vary among MPs given their specific circumstances, preferring that their party 
engages in competitive elections and switching parties generally share the second preference 
order in the list below.   
It should be noted that in every country case, there may be some MPs (and cabinet 
ministers) whose outcome preference is more strongly shaped by personal democratic attitudes 
than by instrumental career aspirations.  These individuals may favor the adoption/upholding of 
term limits because of their strong belief in constitutionalism and their corresponding convictions 
regarding the efficacy of executive term limits for creating better governance in their countries in 
the long run.  Interview data demonstrates that, while many MPs expressed a feeling that 
rejecting executive term limits was not good for democracy, only a few indicated that they 
prioritized their ideological commitment to democracy above personal and profession gains 
when deciding on term limit issues.  Therefore, for the majority of MPs, the preference ordering 
is as such: 
Preference :           President retains office indefinitely     =     Strategy I: Oppose term limits                        
                              in non-competitive elections 
59 
 
 
 
                                                                                  
Preference 2 & 3:  President/successor candidate competes =  Strategy II: Favor term limits  
                               in competitive elections     
                                                                      OR 
                             Switch parties before next election =            Strategy II: Favor term limits 
 
Preference 4:        President/successor candidate loses =         Strategy I: Oppose term limits 
                             in non-competitive elections   
 
Action Preferences     
 
 Rank and file parliamentarians are not involved in the proposal stage of institutional 
choice, but they do comprise the majority of actors involved in the voting stage.  Therefore, it 
can be said that they, not the president, are the ones who ultimately determine the nature of 
executive constraints enshrined in the constitution.  The outcome of their collective vote on term 
limits is shaped not only by their outcome preferences listed above, but also by their action 
preference, which is to behave in a way which will garner them the most favor with (and thereby 
avoid punishment from) the  possible stakeholders, namely the president/party and constituents.   
Just as was the case with cabinet ministers, an MP may face being decampaigned by the party or 
may not be re-elected by voters if she votes against the preference of either of these important 
stakeholders.  However, there are potential ways to mitigate the severity of the punishment the 
other actors can inflict if the MP votes against their preferred outcome.  For example, 
coordinating their vote with other MPs is one tactic because it is easier for the president/party to 
punish one or two MPs who stray from the party line than it would be to punish dozens of MPs, 
especially if they were on the majority side of the parliamentary vote.  In addition, the ability to 
switch parties as discussed above lessens the threat of punishment since it means an MP can 
extricate him/herself from the threatening party (or separate herself from a party that loses favor 
with constituents over the term limit amendment) and still contest the next election under another 
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party.  Therefore, an MP’s action preference is contingent upon her perceptions of the costs and 
incentives of each choice based upon other MPs’ action preferences and the viability of other 
parties as electoral engines.   
 In summary, from the president down to individual MPs, each actor’s choice on whether 
or not to support a constitutional amendment that would change the status of executive term 
limits in their country is shaped by both their outcome and actions preferences (which 
themselves are conditioned by the larger historical-institutional environment in which the choice 
is being made).  In addition for all actors, the strategy that would achieve their first outcome 
preference (Strategy I: Oppose term limits) is also the strategy that could lead to realization of 
their lowest outcome preference, while choosing Strategy II: Favor term limits, would guarantee 
their second preference, but make the attainment of their top preference impossible.  Given these 
different preferences inherent in the decision on term limits and the two available strategies, how 
do actors ultimately decide to favor or oppose executive term limits?  The next section explores 
this question by continuing backwards along the causal chain. 
                                                Patterns of party competition in SSA 
                                       
              Ruling party actors’    Indiv MP choice    Aggregate decision:             
                1. Outcome preference     regarding executive      Exec. constrained 
                          2. Action preference         term limit clause      OR not-constrained 
                                
                                                                            
                                                                   Desire for re-election 
 
 
From Preferences to Choice: Perceptions of Party Strength and Electoral Uncertainty 
 How do actors translate their ordered preferences into decisions regarding what 
institutional choice strategy to follow, especially when their outcome and action preferences are 
in tension with each other?  How do they adjudicate between strategies when they risk facing 
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their worst case scenario if they choose the strategy necessary to achieve their preferred 
outcome? What cues do actors use to calculate the cost and benefits of each potential 
institutional arrangement on their own political survival?  This section describes how incumbent 
party actors in the various sub-Saharan country cases under study here base their decision on 
adopting/adhering to executive term limits on their perceptions of the relative strength of the 
incumbent party vis-à-vis the opposition and the level of electoral uncertainty this creates in the 
polity.   
 To preview the core argument, the main factor that distinguishes African countries that 
adopt and develop meaningful constraints on executive tenure from those in which presidents are 
able to avoid adopting or later circumvent the two-term limit is the perceived degree and 
direction of change in the incumbent party’s strength relative to opposition parties leading up to 
the time of the decision.  Incumbent party actors who perceive that their party’s power is on the 
rise relative to other parties to the extent that they feel confident their party will continue to 
dominate elections into the foreseeable future are likely to reject executive term limits.  
Rejecting term limits is the chosen strategy in these cases because they do not want to implement 
or retain any institutions that could threaten the current president who is at the apex of the 
delicate patronage network that is currently driving the success of the party organization.  
Conversely,  incumbent party actors who are uncertain about or perceive that their party’s power 
is in decline relative to opposition forces are likely to embrace executive term limits as an 
instrument to regulate political competition in an indeterminate future electoral environment as 
an outcome preference.  However, due to their action preference of not wanting to alienate 
themselves from the party, actors below the executive will only choose to retain term limits if 
they perceive that it is possible to switch parties to contest the next elections should they be 
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punished by their current party for disloyalty to the president.  These perception of the threat of 
replacement of their party by an opposition party and perception of the ease of switching parties 
held by the main actors therefore serve as the mechanisms that link relative party strength to term 
limit outcomes.    
 
Competition as a Constraint 
 Electoral competition is a widely recognized constraint in the domestic political arena.  
Scholars of both comparative and American politics have identified changing levels of 
competition in terms of relative party strength as being the cause of a range of diverse outcomes 
including the design of new electoral rules in the post-Soviet region,
102
 the granting or not of the 
power of the initiative to American voters in the Progressive Era
103
  and the probability of the 
emergence of self-enforcing constitutions in Latin America.
104
  In all of these studies, political 
power of elite actors was constrained in cases or periods where high levels of competition 
existed while power was left more unconstrained in times of low competition.  Yet, it is often 
unclear from the outset exactly what aspect(s) of competition drive observed institutional 
outcomes in these and other cases and what systematic measure of party competition can uncover 
the mechanisms at play.   
 Many of the methods used to assess levels of party competition in literature, including the 
incumbent party’s legislative seat share, the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP),105 
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party system openness,
106
 fragmentation,
107
 ideological polarization, electoral volatility and 
others, fall short of revealing exactly what aspects of party competition actually drive decisions 
on institutional design in the case of executive term limits in the African context.   Besides not 
correlating highly with term limit outcomes across Africa (see Chapter 4 for statistical tests of 
some of these measures), such measures can obscure actual competition since they are static and 
only take into account the reality at one snapshot in time rather than capturing dynamic 
trajectories of changing party competition over time.  Furthermore, these methods of assessing 
levels of party competition do not provide clear mechanisms of constraint as they measure 
“neither the viability of alternative governments nor the fragility of existing ones.”108  They 
cannot explain why, for example, an incumbent party that fears they could lose the presidency in 
the next election would uphold term limits when embracing the opposite strategy of abolishing 
term limits could lessen the probability of losing the executive office by giving their presidential 
candidate a leg up on the competition due to incumbency advantage.  Therefore, it is imperative 
to identify what aspect(s) of competition lead elites to choose institutional constraints and what 
indicators can best capture these aspects.   
 
Relative Strength of Parties in the Party System 
    The aspect of electoral competition that drives the outcomes of parliamentary votes on 
executive term limits across sub-Saharan Africa is the possibility it creates for the opposition to 
formulate alternative governments
109
 and win both presidential and parliamentary elections. As 
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noted earlier, African politicians are rational in the Shumperterian/Downsian sense and desire re-
election and promotion within government above all other goals.
110
  Due to the ways in which 
electoral fortunes of MPs are inherently linked to the success of their party’s presidential 
candidate, incumbent party elites strongly desire the re-election of their executive as part of a 
strategy for achieving re-election for themselves.  Especially in the non-programmatic 
environment of sub-Saharan African politics, the other often-cited goal of politicians and parties, 
namely to implement their policy preferences,
111
 does not rank highly in politicians’ preference 
list, thus leaving the preference for re-election paramount.  As a result, the aspect of party 
competition that most affects the calculations of political elite in the ruling party is the potential 
that another party or coalition of parties could become strong enough relative to the incumbent 
party to capture power and, consequently, obtain direct access to state resources.   
 They key component of this aspect of competition is that it is based upon the strength of 
the incumbent party and opposition parties relative to each other.  Here, party “strength” is 
meant to denote the extent to which a party can obtain the support of citizens in terms of votes 
during elections and backing in public opinion polls and other measures of citizen approval in 
between electoral contests.  While other small-n studies of term limit adherence contravention in 
sub-Saharan Africa have relied only on measures of the internal strength of incumbent parties,
112
 
the conclusions they reach do not hold up when tested against the larger universe of cases 
because they fail to take into account the nature of the opposition parties relative to the 
incumbent party in each country.  In order for an opposition to be a plausible ruling alternative, it 
must gain strength relative to the incumbent party, thereby shifting the nature of the party system 
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as a whole.  It is not enough for an opposition force to gain strength itself if the incumbent party 
is also gaining strength (in terms of additional votes or increases in public approval) at an equal 
rate at the same time.  In this case, the level of competition in the party system is not being 
altered substantially.  It is only when an opposition group or party is seen to be gaining strength 
over time relative to an incumbent party that is either losing strength or retaining its current level 
that the possibility for an opposition to formulate an alternative government becomes a real 
consequence of political competition.  Thus, the trajectory of relative party strength, including 
both the direction and degree of change
113
 over time in the power of both the incumbent and 
opposition parties is the key aspect of party competition that drives outcomes of term limit 
decision across sub-Saharan Africa.    
 Changes in relative party strength over time can alter the level of certainty in the 
competitive electoral arena.  In a polity where the incumbent party has continuously maintained 
a high degree of strength over the opposition for a long period of time, there is little uncertainty 
in the electoral arena since it is likely that the incumbent party will continue to dominate 
elections into the foreseeable future.  However, in a polity where the balance of power between 
the incumbent party and the opposition is becoming more balanced due to an increase in 
opposition strength, a decrease in the incumbent’s strength or a combination of both, the 
electoral arena becomes quite uncertain.  It is in these latter cases, when electoral competition 
not only makes it possible for the opposition to formulate an alternative government, but a 
relative balance of party strength makes the replacement of the incumbent president and ruling 
party by the opposition plausible, that institutional constraints on executive power are favored by 
elite actors.   Why exactly does the plausibility of being replaced cause incumbent party actors to 
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unilaterally impose constraints on executive office that they control?  To understand the 
dynamics inherent in this process, it is necessary to explore the mechanisms at play in the 
decision calculi of the relevant ruling party actors that will ultimately provide the link between 
the relative balance of strength between political parties (and the level of uncertainty this creates 
in the electoral arena) and the status of executive term limits in each country case. 
 
                                                      Patterns of party competition in SSA 
                                       
Perceptions of                                             Ruling party actors’     Indiv MP choice    Aggregate decision:               
relative power                       ???                      1. Outcome preference     regarding executive       Exec. constrained 
between parties                                                  2. Action preference         term limit clause        OR not-constrained 
                                
                                                                            
                                                                               Desire for re-election 
 
Mechanisms: Threat of Replacement and the Ease of Switching Parties  
 Simply introducing multi-party elections does not guarantee that parties will alter their 
behavior or preferences in a meaningful way.  As Grzymala-Busse writes, “for competition to 
constrain,… incumbents must worry about being replaced.”114   This is because electoral 
competition from a plausible ruling alternative creates incentives for incumbent parties to design, 
implement and uphold formal institutions that will aid them should they lose power rather than 
just retain institutions that only benefit them as the party in power.  This practice of political 
elites acquiescing to constraints on their power in the short term in order to increase the 
probability of their medium and long-term survival is a not a new story;
115
 however, the notion 
that this choice can be made unilaterally within an incumbent party due to their anticipation of 
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losing power and does not need to be enacted through negotiations with an opposition in which 
both parties are seeking mutually beneficial institutional rules is an interesting modification to 
this theory.
116
    
 Thus, in order for incumbent party political actors to enact constraints in anticipation of a 
possible electoral loss, they must perceive that their party is losing power relative to the 
opposition and believe this could affect their ability to win elections in the future.  Accordingly, 
the first mechanism that links the relative balance of strength in the party system and term limit 
decision outcomes is the perception of the threat of replacement among ruling party members.  If 
an actor feels certain that her party will win elections into the foreseeable future based on the 
strength of her party relative to all others, she will perceive a very low threat of replacement.  
Alternatively, an actor who is uncertain if her party will win the next few elections because her 
party has been losing strength relative to the opposition in the recent past, or because the relative 
balance of power in the party system is difficult to ascertain with any certainty, will perceive a 
high threat of replacement.  Actors’ perceptions of the possibility of replacement (based on 
trends they observe regarding shifts in relative party power) directly impact their preferences and 
strategies with regard to decisions on the design of the constitutional rules that structure electoral 
competition.   
 Specifically, actors’ perceptions of the threat of replacement drive their ultimate strategic 
choice associated with their outcome preferences on executive term limits in both time periods 
by aiding them in understanding the probability of various consequences occurring as a result of 
the selection of one strategy over the other.  If an actor perceives that there is a low threat of 
replacement because she views her party as possessing a relatively high and/or growing degree 
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of strength versus any opposition group into the foreseeable future, she will choose Strategy I 
(oppose term limits) because the probability of achieving her first preference is high and the risk 
of her last preference transpiring instead is low.  Yet, an actor who perceives that her incumbent 
party has lost or is in the process of losing strength vis-à-vis an opposition party is much more 
likely to embrace Strategy II (favor term limits) because the threat of replacement is high, 
meaning her last preference is a highly possible outcome, and she wants to keep her party 
competitive in the future even if the party should lose the presidency in the next election.  In this 
way, the actor who chooses Strategy II gives up the possibility of retaining the presidency into 
the foreseeable future in order to block an opposition’s party ability to capture incumbent 
advantage.  As such, she sees it in her and her party’s best interest to constrain their power in the 
short term in order to ensure her party remains a competitive force in the future.        
 Yet, since perceptions of the actual threat of replacement in future elections is necessarily 
based in part on subjective interpretations rather than objective indicators, it is likely that 
different actors will employ a diversity of cues to assess the likelihood of replacement.  As a 
result, ruling party actors may reach different conclusions regarding the severity of the 
replacement threat.  This is evident by the fact that votes on term limit amendments in parliament 
are at times not unanimous among ruling party MPs.  For example, in the voice vote in the 
Senate on the bill to remove the two-term limit from the Nigerian constitution in 2006, members 
of the ruling People’s Democratic Party could be heard on both the “aye” and “nay” sides.  
However, in most cases, a significant amount of information gathering and vote coordination 
takes place between MPs that leads to a harmonization of the strategy pursued by the majority of 
ruling party MPs and, as a result, a near unanimous vote on the term limit amendment in 
parliament.  Ermakoff finds that such information gathering and vote alignment occurs when 
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parliamentary bodies are tasked with making a controversial decision (especially one that 
diminishes the Parliament’s power vis-à-vis the executive) in an environment of uncertainty.117  
As ruling party actors gather information on relative party strength from sources such as their 
constituents and the media and share their perceptions of the threat of replacement and the 
probability of certain consequences arising from each potential strategy among each other, a 
group consensus begins to emerge within the party regarding the most beneficial strategy.  This 
is not to say, however, that the collective always reaches the correct conclusion about their 
party’s actual strength relative to the opposition.  One example in which it seems all ruling party 
actors misperceived their party’s strength is Senegal in 1998 when President Diouf and his Parti 
Socialiste du Sénégal (PS) abolished executive term limits only to lose control of both the 
presidency and the legislature to opposition candidate Abdoulaye Wade and his Parti 
Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) in 2000 and 2001 elections, respectively.   
 In cases where the president and his cabinet propose a term limit amendment (to either 
add or remove term limits from the constitution) and the parliament passes it, this is an indication 
that all three categories of actors perceived their party’s relative strength similarly.  This is the 
scenario for most country/president cases in time period one, and eleven country/president cases 
in time period two (see Figure 1 in Chapter 1 for country categorizations).  In these cases, all 
actors’ outcome preferences align with their action preferences, as both the cabinet and 
parliament achieve their desired term limit status while remaining loyal to their party (see the 
Zambia case study in Chapter 3 and the Uganda case study in Chapter 5).   In cases where the 
president and cabinet do not propose a term limit amendment due to their perception of the threat 
of replacement (4 country/president cases in time period one, 12 cases in time period two), it is 
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difficult to determine with certainty that the MPs from the ruling party have the same perception 
or whether they believe the party leadership is misperceiving the party’s relative strength, and 
therefore, probability of replacement since, in these cases, there is no Parliamentary vote on the 
matter to provide the relevant data.  However, anecdotal evidence from countries such as 
Mozambique and Kenya in time period two seems to suggest that, while a handful of MPs 
continued to call for the incumbent president to run again after the president had announced that 
he would step down, there has not been a case of wide-spread disagreement between the 
president/cabinet and rank and file party members among the cases under study here.  Therefore, 
with most MPs aligning their behavior with the stated policy of the party on the term limit issue, 
outcome and action preferences seem to converge in these cases (see the Cote d’Ivoire case study 
in Chapter 3). 
 Perhaps the most interesting cases are the ones in which the president/cabinet proposes to 
amend the status of term limits due to their perception of a low threat of replacement but the bill 
is subsequently defeated in Parliament, signaling that the members of parliament from the ruling 
party perceive the threat of replacement to be much higher than does the party leadership.  This 
scenario did not occur in any cases in time period one, but did occur in three cases- Zambia (see 
Chapter 6), Malawi and Nigeria- in time period two.  It is difficult to determine why exactly this 
mismatch in perceptions occurred and the answer is likely to be found in a combination of 
factors including updated information between the time the bill is proposed to the time it is voted 
upon, varying appetites for risk among party leaders and party members and other variables that 
may be idiosyncratic to the particular country case.  However, the more important question 
raised by these cases is why MPs choose to follow their outcome preference and vote against the 
party line due to their perceived threat of replacement rather than following their action 
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preference, which would have meant voting for the amendment the party leadership had 
proposed in order to remain within the good graces of the party.  After all, if they sense that their 
party’s power (and therefore their own chances for re-election) is in decline, why would they 
want to add insult to injury and anger their party as well? 
 The answer lies in a second mechanism that is shaped jointly by the relative party 
strength variable and the historical patterns of party competition in each country:  the perceived 
ease of switching parties.
118
  As mentioned previously, the lack of programmatic parties in most 
sub-Saharan African countries means that, in general, it should be comparatively easy for a 
politician to defect from one party and run under the banner of another without incurring the 
costs of changing their ideology.  However, this does not mean that switching parties is equally 
feasible in every African polity.  Two main factors affect the viability of this option for 
politicians.  The first stems directly from the balance of strength between the incumbent and 
ruling parties.  In countries where the incumbent party is strong relative to the opposition, 
switching parties is perceived as difficult by members of the ruling party precisely because their 
chances of winning an election under the banner of another party are slim due to the weakness of 
all other parties.  As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Uganda is a good case in point- the 
weakness of FDC and other opposition parties in relation so the dominance of the NRM made 
switching parties inherently difficult for NRM MPs.  However, in countries where one or more 
opposition parties is strong or gaining strength relative to the incumbent party, MPs and even 
some cabinet members may perceive that switching parties is a viable option because they have a 
realistic (and perhaps even good) chance of winning the next election running under a different 
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party.  Chapter 6 will show how the growing strength of opposition parties relative to the MMD 
made party-switching feasible for Zambian politicians during the “third term” debate there.   
 The other factor that shapes actors’ perception of the ease of switching parties, which 
relates to historical patterns of party competition in each country, is the presence or absence of 
particularistic barriers on joining parties in the polity.  While most parties across sub-Saharan 
Africa are non-programmatic in their policies, some parties root their patronage structures on 
linkages such as region, religion or other defined categories.  Such parties are difficult for 
politicians to switch into if they are not from the region or of the religion that anchors the party.  
A good example of such a party system is Malawi where the three main political parties are each 
widely perceived to represent different regions of the country- AFORD in the north, MCP in the 
central region and UDF in the south.  Defections from the ruling UDF party are quite rare in 
Malawi simply because a UDF MP from the south would gain little traction with voters if she ran 
on AFORD’s ticket.119  As a result, when the bill to remove term limits was tabled in Malawi, all 
95 UDF members of parliament voted for the bill
120
 even though it was clear based on the 
trajectory of past elections that the threat of replacement of their party by the MCP was growing 
stronger every year.  If UDF MPs had perceived that they could feasibly switch to MCP, 
AFORD or another emerging party, they likely would have voted against lifting term limits.  
Conversely, as Chapter 6 will explore in detail, an example of where a lack of particularistic 
barriers to switching parties did facilitate MPs following their outcome preference instead of 
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their action preference is Zambia in time period two.  In this case, MMD MPs were able to draw 
on their perceived ease of switching parties to justify following their outcome preference 
(preserving term limits) because their action preference (remaining in the good graces of the 
MMD leaders) was made less crucial by the fact that they could switch parties in the future if the 
MMD attempted to decampaign them for their dis-loyalty in the term limit vote.   
 To summarize the effects these two mechanisms have on term limit outcomes, it is 
possible to construct a table that categorizes countries based on their values with regard to 
actors’ perceptions of the threat of replacement and ease of switching parties (see Table 2.1).  
Only the country cases that are examined in depth in the case study chapters of the dissertation 
are included in the current table, but any sub-Saharan case could be categorized into one of the 
boxes based on relevant evidence: 
 
Table 2.1:  Categorizing Country Cases Regarding Threat of Replacement and Ease of     
                   Switching Parties 
 
 High perceived threat of 
replacement 
 
Low perceived threat of 
replacement 
High perceived ease of 
switching parties 
Malawi (time period 1) 
Uganda (time period 1) 
Zambia (time periods 1 & 2) 
 
Result:  Term limits favored 
 
Category not possible:  by 
definition, if no party is strong 
enough to challenge the 
incumbent party, there is no 
party an actor can switch to 
and have a reasonable chance 
of winning the next election. 
Low perceived ease of 
switching parties 
Malawi (time period 2) 
 
Result:  Mixed- outcome 
depends on the percentage of 
actors who privilege their 
outcome vs. action preference.   
Cote d’Ivoire (time period 1) 
Uganda (time period 2) 
 
Result:  Term limits rejected 
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With the identification of the two mechanisms that link the main independent variable of 
relative party strength to term limit outcomes, the causal argument chain can be completed: 
 
                                                      Patterns of party competition in SSA 
                                       
Perceptions of    threat of replacement         Ruling party actors’    Indiv MP choice     Aggregate decision:               
relative power      ease of switching parties      1. Outcome preference      regarding executive      Exec. constrained 
between parties        (mechanisms)                    2. Action preference          term limit clause        OR not-constrained 
                                
                                                                            
                                                                               Desire for re-election 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In short, in both the early-mid 1990s when sub-Saharan African countries were 
transitioning from single-party authoritarian regimes to multi-party dispensations and ten years 
later as the first presidents of the multi-party era began to reach the end of their second terms in 
office, variation in the relative strength of the incumbent party vis-à-vis opposition forces lead to 
the adoption or enforcement of executive term limits in some countries but the rejection or 
contravention of such limits in others.  Recent changes or trends in relative party strength viewed 
within the larger context of historical patterns of party completion in sub-Saharan Africa lead 
incumbent party elites to draw on their perceptions of the threat of replacement and ease of 
switching parties to decide whether to favor or reject a constitutional clause stipulating a limit on 
the number of times one person can serve as national president.  The perceptions of the threat of 
replacement impact actors’ outcome preference- the term limit status they hope is ultimately 
chosen by the legislature based on their personal and professional interests- by revealing to 
actors the risks and consequences associated with each term limit choice.  However, collective 
decisions such as these legislative votes on term limit laws also necessitate that actors form an 
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action preference- how they wish to be seen as behaving by the other relevant actors.  Due to this 
dimension of the decision, actors also draw upon their perception of the ease of switching parties 
in order to determine the likelihood they could run for and win re-election with another party in 
the event that their own party leadership or constituencies should punish them for following an 
outcome preference that deviates from their own preferred outcome.   
 One final note worth mentioning is that, even though the two time periods considered in 
this project can be examined separately from each other, linking them together clearly 
demonstrates how changes in the level of uncertainty in the electoral arena due to the balance of 
party strength plays a similar role over time in the design, enforcement and change of 
institutional constraints on political power, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.  During the transition to  
 
Figure 2.1: Levels of Uncertainty as the Link between Time Periods 1 and 2 
 
1990s- Transition/ Liberalization                       2000s- Democratic Consolidation/Backsliding 
 Certainty in the              Executive term               Continued certainty                 Executive terms  
 electoral arena               limits rejected                 in the electoral arena               remain unlimited 
                                       (Cote d’Ivoire)                                                                   (Cote d’Ivoire) 
 
 
Uncertainty in the             Executive term              Continued uncertainty           Executive term 
  Electoral arena                limits adopted                in the electoral arena              limits upheld 
                                       (Zambia, Uganda)                                                               (Zambia) 
                                         
 
 
                                                                                Certainty develops                     Executive term 
                                                                               in the electoral arena                limits overturned        
                                                                                                                                      (Uganda) 
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multi-party competition in time period one, the electoral arena was highly uncertain because it 
was very difficult for elites in most countries to predict how strong newly-formed opposition 
parties would be in head-to-head elections against long-term incumbents.  Due to this 
uncertainty, 36 out of the 40 sub-Saharan countries that fit the parameters of this study adopted 
executive term limits into their constitutions in order to hedge their bets, so to speak, and 
regulate future political competition in such a way that could allow them to re-capture the 
presidency in the long term if they lost it in the short term.  Ten years later, it was the fifteen 
countries that continued to experience high levels of uncertainty in the political arena, due to a 
continued or shifting balance of power within the party system, where term limits were upheld 
and the first presidents from the multi-party era stepped down from power.  However, in another 
group of eleven countries, the initial uncertainty of the transition period has given way to a party 
system that is dominated by one party to such an extent that it is clear that this party will 
continue to win elections into the foreseeable future.  In these countries, executive term limits 
have been lifted because the reason they were adopted in the first place (to protect a party in the 
event of replacement) no longer exists.  In this way, the institution of executive term limits 
cannot be described as exogenously regulating the behavior of political elites in the sub-Saharan 
African context in either time period.  Rather, in these cases, executive term limits are 
endogenous to and shaped by the political realities on the ground.   The linkages between the two 
time periods is depicted in the following flowchart, with reference to Uganda, Zambia, and Cote 
d’Ivoire the three main country case studies that will be explored in the subsequent chapters.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ADOPTING OR REJECTING CONSTRAINTS ON EXECUITVE POWER 
 
 
 After three decades of largely unchecked presidential rule, thirty-four African nations 
adopted executive term limits almost simultaneously in the early 1990s.  By and large, these 
limits were adopted not by newly-elected democratic governments following the first multi-party 
elections, but by incumbent single party regimes lead by executive who had been at the helm of 
the government for many years prior to the first electoral contests.  Why would such long-
standing presidents suddenly acquiesce to term limits being placed on their own office?  How did 
these governments come to choose the limits on executive power that they did?   Finally, why 
did a handful of governments resist adopting term limits despite the region-wide trend to 
incorporate them into liberalized constitutions? 
 Executive term limits were generally adopted by sub-Saharan African governments in the 
wake of their acquiescence to popular calls for multi-party elections.  At first glance, it may seem 
as if their implementation must be the result of a diffusion process in which the idea of term 
limits as an innovation was spread either to Africa from other liberalizing regions (Eastern 
Europe most notably) or between sub-Saharan countries themselves. Or, alternatively, one might 
surmise that the widespread adoption must have been driven by imposed foreign donor 
conditionalities that tied continued aid to democratic reforms.  However, just as it has been 
maintained that the protest movements that arose across sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s 
and the responses by incumbent governments to these protests were not primarily driven by a 
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diffusion process or other foreign interventions,
121
 this analysis will argue that the available 
evidence does not primarily support a diffusion hypothesis or a donor pressure thesis in the case 
of term limit adoption by sitting governments.  Rather, as the case studies in this chapter will 
demonstrate, the decision whether or not to implement restrictions on executive tenure were 
generally made within the ruling party itself irrespective of any outside pressures or influence in 
an attempt to structure political competition in such a way as to ensure their continued 
competitiveness in the new, uncertain, multi-party electoral environment, as described in the 
previous chapter.          
 To set the stage, this chapter will open with a brief history of the status of executive term 
limits as a feature of African constitutions since independence.  This will be followed by an 
examination of possible explanation for the widespread adoption of term limits for the first time 
by a number of African countries in the early 1990s, including arguments regarding diffusion 
processes, donor pressures and political pacting arguments.  Finding all of these hypotheses to be 
unsatisfying, an explanation will be forwarded that links variations in the strength of the 
authoritarian incumbent regime relative to the nascent opposition (and the potential threat of 
replacement this level of competition can engender) to different term limit adoption decisions. 
Finally, case studies of Zambia and Cote d’Ivoire will explore exactly how the relative balance 
of power between the incumbent and opposition parties drove elite actors to embrace term limits 
in Zambia but reject their implementation in Cote d’Ivoire.   
 
The History of Term Limit Adoption in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
The democratic constitutions adopted by African nations following independence in the 
1960s were largely modeled on European systems of governance and featured either a 
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parliamentary (former British colonies) or semi-presidential (former French colonies) 
arrangements.  As in the United Kingdom and the French Fifth Republic, these new African 
constitutions did not place a limit on the number of terms the national executive could serve.
122
  
Even after presidential or hybrid systems were widely embraced during the single-party regimes 
of the 1970 and 1980s, term limits were not part of the set of institutions that the vast majority of 
these regimes decided to promulgate within amended constitutions.  However, following the 
post-independence period, a time when many countries had long been ruled by one-party systems 
and domineering “presidents-for-life,” a wave of liberalization washed over sub-Saharan Africa 
in the early 1990s.  During this period, multi-party politics was restored to almost every country 
on the continent and more than thirty African states adopted executive term limits into their 
national constitutions.
123
  In fact, by 1994, of the thirty-seven constitutions in force across sub-
Saharan Africa, executive term limits featured in all but four
124
 (although this statistic includes 
countries that retained parliamentary systems but still implemented term limits, which are not 
part of the present study)
125
.  Currently, of the sub-Saharan countries with presidential systems of 
government, thirty-five have adopted term limits at some point in their recent constitutional 
histories, although some quite later than the early 1990s,
126
 while four have never adopted such 
limits and one (Comoros) has developed a unique “rotating presidency.”  See Table 3.1 below 
for the complete data list. 
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Table 3.1:  Term Limit Adoption by Country, Year and Leader 
 
Country 
 
 
 
 
Term Limit   
Adopted? 
Year  Adopted127 
 
President at time of term limit adoption            
(tenure in office) 
  
Congo-Brazzaville 
 
 
 
yes 1963;1992;2002 
Massamba-Debat (1963-68); transitional gov’t headed 
by Milongo (1991-92); Sassou Nguesso (97-present) 
 
 
Sierra Leone yes 1978; 1991 Stevens (1971-1985); Momoh (1985-1992) 
Nigeria yes 1979 Obasanjo (1976-1979) 
Tanzania yes 1984 Nyrerere (1964-1985) 
Liberia yes 1986 Doe (1980-1990) 
Benin yes 1990 National Conference 
Guinea yes 1990 Conte (1984- present) 
Mozambique yes 1990 Chissano (1986-2005) 
Sao Tome & Principe yes 1990 Pinto da Costa (1975-1991) 
Namibia yes  1990 Nujoma (1990-2005) 
Burkina Faso yes 1991; 2000 Compaoré (1987-present) 
Gabon yes 1991 National Conference 
Kenya yes 1991 Moi (1978 - 2002) 
Senegal yes 1991; 2001 Diouf (1981-2000);  Wade (2000- present) 
Zambia yes 1991 Kaunda (1964-1991); Chiluba(1991-2001) 
Rwanda yes 1991 Habyarimana (1973-1994) 
Angola yes 1992 dos Santos (1979-present) 
Burundi yes 1992 Buyoya (1987-1993) 
Djibouti yes 1992 Hassan Aptidon (1977 -1999) 
Ghana yes 1992 Rawlings (1981-2001) 
Madagascar yes 1992 Ratsiraka (1975 until 1993) 
Mali yes 1992 Transitional govt lead by Toure (1991- 92) 
Togo yes 1992 National Conference 
Cape Verde yes 1992 Monteiro (1991-2001) 
Seychelles yes 1993 Rene (1977-2004) 
CAR yes 1994; 2004 Patassé (1993-2003); Bozizé (2003-present) 
Malawi yes 1994 Banda (1961 to 1994) 
Uganda yes 1995 Museveni (1986-present) 
Cameroon yes* 1996 Biya (1982-present)) 
Chad yes* 1996 Deby (1990-present) 
Eritrea yes 1997 Afwerki (1993- present) 
Niger yes (late)* 1999 
Transitional Govt lead by Wanke (1999) 
((1999(President)/Mayaki (PM) (1999) 
Côte d’Ivoire yes (late)* 2000 Transitional Govt lead by Guéï (1999-2000) 
Congo- Kinshasa yes (late) 2005 Joseph Kabila (2001-present) 
Mauritania yes (late)* 2006 Transitional Govt lead by Vall (2005-2007) 
Comoros no (rotating prez) n/a  
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Equatorial Guinea no n/a  
The Gambia no n/a  
Guinea-Bissau no n/a  
Zimbabwe no n/a  
*Countries that held at least one multi-party election before adopting term limits. 
 
Generally, the constitutional amendments that introduced executive term limits into 
African polities stipulate that African presidents are limited to two five-year terms for a total of 
ten years in office.  However, there is some variation: the constitution of Seychelles specifies a 
three-term limit while Nigerian presidents may serve two terms of only four-year each, for 
example.  Upon completion of their final term in office, presidents are constitutionally mandated 
not to seek re-election and to step down from power once a successor is elected.  
A few interesting trends emerge from the data in Table 3.1 that are worth highlighting.  
First, there is significant clustering in the “year adopted” column around the early 1990s, with 
more than two-thirds of all term limit adoptions occurring between the years 1990-1994.  This 
begs the question as to why so many countries in the region would choose to adopt executive 
term limits all within the same narrow time period.  Was there something occurring in this period 
that made the adoption of term limits a strategy that made sense for so many countries 
independently of each other?   
Second, a comparison between the “year adopted” data and the tenure in office of the 
“president at the time of adoption” reveal that, in the majority of cases, term limits were adopted 
by sitting presidents, many of whom were members of the old-guard who had ruled since the 
nineteen-eighties, seventies or even sixties, rather than newly elected “democratic” leaders, 
transitional governments or national conferences.  At first, one might have presumed that such 
power-restricting measures would have been adopted by the new governments that came into 
power through multi-party elections rather than by the old autocrats who had already enjoyed the 
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fruits of long stays in power.  However, out of 35 instances of term limit adoption in sub-Saharan 
African between 1963 and the present, leaders who were newly elected under a multi-party 
system were at the helm in only four cases, interim or transition governments account for another 
five cases, sovereign national conferences implement term limits in three cases,  and the 
remaining 23 cases of term limit adoption occurred while the old-guard, big-men, autocrats were 
still in office before the reintroduction of multi-party politics had taken place.  Some of these 
leaders had already ruled their respective countries for decades including Banda, who had ruled 
Malawi for 30 years, Kaunda in Zambia, who was on his 27 year as president, and Moi, who had 
served as the Kenyan executive for thirteen years.  Why each of these men would, after all of this 
time, suddenly want to impose set term limits on their tenure in office is thus a source of 
curiosity.  
 
Assessing Possible Explanations 
Three arguments are often forwarded to explain the shape institutions take during a 
process of liberalization: 1) the force of political pacts; 2) the pressure applied by donor 
conditionalities; and 3) the power of diffusion.  There is evidence of the role that pact-making 
between incumbent military regimes and pro-democratic opposition forces played in determining 
the nature of the new political rules in 1970s Latin America and the role diffusion played in 
shaping the structure of post-communist governments in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s/early 
1990s.  Furthermore, documented shifts in the policies of international aid donors such as the 
United States, United Kingdom and the European Community in the early 1990s demonstrates 
that many donors explicitly aimed to encourage  liberal reforms in recipient countries, including 
many African nations.  However, evidence presented below demonstrates that none of these 
 83 
 
explanations can sufficiently account for the trend of term limit adoptions across sub-Saharan 
African in the first half of the 1990s.  
 
Pacts between Incumbent and Opposition Elites 
 First, pacts or roundtable agreements made between the weakened incumbent 
government and emerging opposition forces were essential features in transitions towards 
democracy in both Latin America and Eastern Europe.
128
  Pacts are defined as “explicit (though 
not always public) agreements between contending actors, which define the rules of governance 
on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those involved.”129  However, a lack 
of a pact-making process in most liberalizing African countries precludes this line of 
argumentation from proving satisfactory in the sub-Saharan context.  Decisions on the shape of 
constitutional reforms across Africa were generally undertaken either unilaterally within the 
incumbent party circles in eastern and southern Africa
130
 or by national conferences made up of a 
mix of opposition, civil society and government delegations that had declared themselves 
sovereign.
131
  Though in theory these national conferences brought together various interests to 
negotiate new political dispensations, the reality was that most conferences were either so 
controlled by the sitting government (i.e. Togo, Gabon, Guinea) or so dominated by civil society 
and opposition groups (Benin, Niger) that they cannot really be considered negotiations between 
sides but rather impositions of the more powerful actor over the weaker.  Even in countries like 
Zambia where there was some dialogue between the incumbent UNIP party and the nascent 
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MMD organization about constitutional reforms, available evidence suggests that the issue of 
term limits was not a priority for opposition parties
132
 and was, therefore, not the subject of 
negotiations.   In sum, a pacting explanations does not provide much analytical leverage for 
understanding the patterns of executive tenure constraint choices in sub-Saharan African cases.   
 
Donor Pressures 
Second, developed countries principally extend or withhold foreign aid to developing 
countries in order to influence the course of their political and economic progress.  Leaders in the 
heavily aid-reliant sub-Saharan African region have learned that western donor aid is often tied 
to conditionalities, and thus the logic goes that the meeting of these conditions will result in 
additional aid being extended.  This way of thinking about term limit adoption as incentive-
driven echoes the explanation Hyde forwards to explain why leaders invite election monitors to 
observe elections in which they plan to cheat.  In the case of inviting election observers, she 
finds that presidents largely acquiesced to this norm as “a strategic response… to maximize their 
share of international benefits.” 133   As the value of being recognized as a democratizing country 
increased (i.e. democratizing countries were thought to receive more international aid), leaders 
saw the incentive in invite observers. 
However, there is scant evidence of pressure being put on African leaders from foreign 
governmental donors, international organizations or NGOs regarding the matter of term limits in 
specific.  Economic conditionalities were the common driver of donor aid in the early 1990s as the 
liberalization movement began in sub-Saharan Africa.  In an interview in February 1990, Herman 
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Cohen, the then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs proclaimed that “we tie our 
aid essentially to economic policy in Africa.  That is priority number one…  Now in terms of 
democratization… this might be a part of our aid policy in the future but it is not at this point.”134   
To the extent that western donor conditionalities did became focused on issues of 
democracy and “good governance” later in the decade, donors were more likely to recommend 
general political liberalization rather than specific constitutional provisions such as laws on 
presidential tenure.  First hand analysis of United States Agency for International Development’s 
(USAID) “Democracy and Governance 1991 Policy” Statement demonstrates this clearly.  
USAID’s “Democracy Initiative,” unveiled in November 1991, was USAID’s master plan for 
democracy promotion during the immediate post-Cold War period, a period that saw a worldwide 
explosion of democratic reform from Eastern Europe to Africa to parts of Asia.  Already by 
November 1991, ten African countries had adopted term limits during the decade (that number 
jumps to 16 if the countries that adopted term limits in the 1960s-80s are included), suggesting that 
donor pressure did not play a role in these early adoptions.  Even in countries that had not yet 
adopted term limits by November 1991, there is little evidence that meeting donor conditionalities 
drove African countries to implement restrictions on executive tenure.   The “Democracy 
Initiative” identified four primary areas of focus for its democracy promotion work, the third of 
which, “Promoting Lawful Governance,” endorses the establishment of formal constraints on 
government officials.  However, the specific activities pursued by USAID under this program do 
not include the promotion of term limits as a strategy to constrain executive power.  Instead, the 
official activities sanctioned under the “Promoting Lawful Governance” program that aim to 
impose constraints on civil servants are as follows:  
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Accountability of the executive branch, including activities such as: 
· Support establishment of ombudsmen 
· Improve procedures for public review of administrative decisions and actions 
· Strengthen procedures for financial accountability 
· Improve measures to reduce corruption 
· Strengthen capacity of civil authorities to monitor and oversee military budgets     
  and systems
135
   
 
As written, the above policy points fall well short of advocating the espousal of specific 
institutional arrangements (such as term limits) and instead promote rather vague 
“improvements” to various oversight procedures.  This seems to be an intentional strategy by 
USAID as later in the 1991 Policy Statement there is an explicit declaration that:  
USAID's commitment to strengthening democratic political development does 
not imply any standardized institutional model. Many different institutional  
arrangements can sustain democratic practices and values, guarantee basic human  
rights and encourage good governance.
136
  
 
Since, as mentioned above, executive term limits are not required in a democratic system, linking 
the imposition of such limits to donor funding would especially contradict USAID’s policy not to 
advocate a certain democratic institutional design to recipient countries.   
In terms of the incentives side of foreign aid, a quick review of actual foreign donor 
disbursements to African recipient countries also provides no evidence that governments’ hope of 
receiving additional donor aid was a driving force behind the adoption of term limits in Africa.  
Annual data from the OECD Development Assistance Committee on total “official development 
assistance” from all OECD countries to the thirty-five sub-Saharan African states that have 
adopted executive term limits since 1990 demonstrates that there is little promise of financial 
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gain for countries that implement such restrictions on presidential tenure.
137
  Tracking the 
directional change in total donor funding between the year term limits were first adopted (t) and 
the following year (t+1), the OECD data reveals that 19 countries (54%) saw an increase in 
donor funding a year after adopting executive term limits while 16 countries (46%) actually saw 
a decrease in their funding (up to a $90 million loss as in Kenya).  In addition, some countries 
that to this day have not adopted executive term limits, such as The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and 
(early-Mugabe) Zimbabwe, saw similar patterns of rises and falls in their donor aid levels over 
time as did countries that had imposed term limits on their presidents.  In fact, in terms of 
precedent setting and “learning” by other leaders, of the three countries who were the earliest 
term limit adopters, two saw their funding fall the year after adopting such limits (Tanzania by 
$40 million and Liberia by $18 million) while one (Nigeria) saw its funding increase, but only by 
a relatively paltry $7 million.  Therefore, it can reasonably be concluded that it was not direct 
donor pressure or expectations of receiving additional aid in return for the adoption of term limits 
that convinced African leaders to adopt such constraints on their power.   
 
Diffusion Processes 
Finally, in order to explain the periodic spatial-temporal spreading of political 
phenomenon across countries such as waves of democracy or clusters of policy adoption, 
scholars often draw on the concept of diffusion. At first glance, a diffusion hypothesis certainly 
seems to be a plausible explanation for  the widespread assumption of executive term limits by 
sub-Saharan African states between the early to mid-1990s, and is thus worth exploring in some 
detail.  The exact meaning of diffusion is contested, with some defining it primarily in terms of 
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an outcome, such as “any pattern of successive adoptions of a policy”138 while others define it in 
terms of a process, including Strang’s early explanation of diffusion as “the process by which the 
prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for 
remaining non-adopters.”139  Combining these ideas, here diffusion will be understood as a set of 
mechanisms and processes that are related to “the spread of some innovation through direct or 
indirect channels across members of a social system”140 generally “within a fairly circumscribed 
period of time.”141  
Surprisingly, there have been few studies that have explored the diffusion of specific laws 
or constitutional clauses among third-wave liberalizers
142
 as the majority of diffusion research in 
this vein seems to focus on democracy writ large as the outcome of diffusion.
143
    As a result, 
there is little intellectual precedent for devising a falsifiable test to determine when the adoption 
of similar constitutional provisions can be attributed to a diffusion process or when it is better 
explained by other factors.  Indeed, writing about diffusion studies in general, Brinks and 
Coppedge lament that 
a theoretically sound and empirically well-elaborated test of diffusion is still a 
rare phenomenon in the literature on democratization.  Diffusion processes are 
notoriously difficult to pin down because it is hard to distinguish true diffusion  
from illusions of diffusion created by global trends, correlated disturbances, or  the     
regional clustering of domestic factors.
144
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Bunce and Wolchik address this dilemma by suggesting a two-pronged strategy for evaluating 
the salience of a diffusion explanation for an observed spreading of a political phenomenon 
across nearby sites.  They maintain that “central to claiming diffusion is the ability, first, to 
demonstrate that similar innovations appear in staggered fashion in multiple locales, and, second, 
to explain how and why international transmission occurred.”145  To these two steps, I add a 
third, which is to consider the counterfactual- how would domestic actors have behaved in the 
absence of the occurrence of the phenomenon in nearby polities?  When assessed through these 
three criteria, diffusion seems to play some role in the choice of the exact language of the term 
limit clause in some sub-Saharan constitutions, but does not pass the bar in terms of proof that 
the decision to implement term limits was driven by diffusion rather than being a sensible 
response to similar domestic conditions in a number of countries.
146
   
 Following Bunce and Wolchik’s first test for diffusion, it is necessary to observe the 
extent of the spatial-temporal clustering of term limit clauses as an innovation.  As Table 1 
demonstrates, between 1990-1997, a total of twenty-seven of the forty countries included in the 
sample considered here first implemented such constraints on executive tenure (with twenty 
adoptions occurring between 1990-1992 alone,) joining the five African states that had 
implemented term limits prior to 1990.  Spatially, term limits were adopted in every sub-region 
of the continent- Francophone West Africa, Anglophone East and Southern Africa, tropical 
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Central Africa, so it certainly was not contained regionally.  However, term limits cannot really 
be considered a new “innovation” in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s.  Available 
constitutional data suggests that term limits were already an available policy choice to African 
governments before the period of liberalization as five sub-Saharan African countries had 
already decided to include term limits in their constitutions prior to 1990.  Yet, these were not 
the only countries that had considered such limits prior to liberalization.  The recommendations 
that the 1972 Chona Constitutional Review Commission submitted to the UNIP government in 
Zambia based on the Commissioners’ consultation with citizens included a suggestion to limit 
the Zambian president to two-terms of five years.
147
  Even though the UNIP government decided 
to reject that recommendation at the time, the fact that such a measure was publically debated 
and included in the Chona Commission report demonstrates that the idea of executive term limits 
was not a new concept in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s.   
 In addition to these standard spatial-temporal outcome observations, studies of the spread 
of specific constitutional laws have the advantage of being able to also compare the exact 
content, both in terms of the exact parameters of the law and the language of the clause as 
written in the constitution, of the innovation being disseminated.  In terms of the parameters of 
executive term limit laws, all but one African country that adopted executive term limits chose a 
two-term cap on the presidency (Seychelles has a three-term limit).   While the diffusion of the 
idea of implementing executive term limits between countries does not necessarily mean that a 
receiving country will embrace the exact same text of the clause in the sending country’s 
constitution, the presence of direct plagiarism of other state’s term limit provision would bolster 
the argument in favor of a diffusion process in terms of a diffusion of language of term limit 
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clauses.  Appendix A provides the clause in each country’s constitution that stipulates the 
restrictions on presidential tenure.  A comparison between the various clauses in terms of similar 
word occurrence and ordering shows and interesting divergence:  while there are a few exact 
duplicates (i.e. Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville; Mali and Djibouti) and many close matches in 
term limit clauses amongst francophone countries, there are no exact matches and fewer close 
matches among Anglophone and Lusophone states.   More specifically, without fail, all 
francophone countries begin their term limit clauses with the words “Le Président de la 
République est élu… (The President of the Republic is elected…), and use either the phrase 
“renouvelable une (seule) fois” (renewable (only) once) or “rééligible une fois” (re-eligible once) 
to set the limit (note that both phases focus on one re-election).  Alternatively, Anglophone and 
Lusophone countries begin their term limit clauses in a myriad of different ways and are split on 
whether they convey the two-term limit by specify one re-election like their francophone cousins 
(Mozambique), stipulate a maximum tenure of two terms  (Namibia, Ghana), or instruct that 
candidates are not eligible for a third term (Cape Verde, Sao Tome & Principe).   
Thus, the textual evidence lends more support to a diffusion of text thesis among 
Francophone states than between Francophone and Anglophone or among Anglophone 
countries.  This makes sense considering the method by which term limits were added to the 
constitution in these two groups of countries.  Term limits were added to constitutions in many 
francophone countries by sovereign national conferences, whereas in Anglophone countries they 
were, by and large, authored within the incumbent party cabinets.  Since the francophone 
conferences were populated by a diverse mix of civil society groups, opposition leaders and 
government representatives, the constitutional language adopted was necessarily more general in 
order to satisfy a range of interests, while the Anglophone clauses were much more likely to 
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idiosyncratically reflect the interests of the party.
148
  Furthermore, as novice political leaders, 
national conference delegates were more likely to look to neighboring country’s constitutions for 
precise language whereas cabinet members were likely more comfortable drafting their own 
language without needing to borrow from others.   
Yet, just because there is some evidence of borrowing of constitutional language between 
a sub-set of African countries, the second and third criterion for diffusion must be explored in 
order to determine whether the idea to implement term limits in these 27 country cases can be 
attributed to a diffusion hypothesis.  Bunce and Wolchik’s second test for diffusion calls on the 
researcher to explain how and why international transmission occurred- namely identify the 
mechanisms through which the innovation was spread horizontally from one site to another and 
assess the receptivity or proneness to import of later adopters to prior adopters.  Many 
mechanisms often cited in diffusion studies (competition, coercion, emulation for perceived 
payoffs from the sender, and structural isomorphism) do not make sense in the case of the spread 
of executive term limit laws across sub-Saharan Africa as the adoption of such limits in one 
country is of little consequence to neighboring states either positively or negatively.  Nor is there 
an influential “first case” that should drive mimicry- Namibia was the first country to adopt term 
limits in 1990, but it’s situation (newly emerged from civil war) and its lack of economic or other 
influence over other states in the region do not provide any compelling reason for other countries 
to follow suit independent of their own domestic conditions.   In addition, little evidence exists 
for the diffusion of term limit laws through transnational networks, another regularly cited 
mechanism for diffusion.  The implementation of limits on presidential tenure was not a specific 
demand made by nascent opposition forces, citizen protesters or international donors, all of 
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whom were more focused on larger and more immediate goals like legalization of opposition 
parties and the holding of multi-party elections than on the nitty-gritty of constitutional language.  
Thus, no such network of international civil society leaders or opposition figures who shared 
practices of advocating for term limits with others abroad existed in sub-Saharan Africa.  In 
addition, there was not likely to be explicit talk of the idea of implementing term limits between 
governments and sitting presidents.  The overarching doctrine of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU), the main transnational body that linked governments across the continent in the 
early 1990s, was one of non-intervention in the affairs of other states and the upholding of 
sovereign boundaries.   As such, there is no documentary evidence of presidents strategizing 
about domestic constitutional amendments even as many executives were beginning to grapple 
with how to manage liberalization within their own countries simultaneously.  Therefore, it 
appears that these cases lack a direct exchange of some sort between actors that are central to the 
way in which diffusion operates in practice.  
The only standard mechanism of diffusion that could possibly explain the widespread and 
nearly simultaneous adoption of term limits among many sub-Saharan states is “learning,” which 
operates through a receiver looking to others to gather information about conditions of 
implementation and the costs/benefits of adopting a certain law or policy.
149
  Did African 
governments learn from others about some benefit of embracing term limits?  As the interview 
data from Zambia that will be presented more fully in the next section demonstrates, both former 
President Kaunda himself and Patrick Mvunga, the head of the 1991 Constitutional Review 
Commission maintain that the decision to adopt term limits in Zambia was not conditioned in 
any way by other African countries experience with such constraints.  Mvunga asserts that the 
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idea of restricting the number of terms a president can serve came from the Zambian population 
during both the previous CRC in 1972 and during his commission’s consultations in 1991.  
Kaunda also corroborates that the term limits were “proposed by our experts [the Mvunga 
Commission], and brought to the central meeting of the party”150 in a fully internal process.   
Evidence from later adopters seems to suggest that what learning did go on was centered 
more on gathering information about the real uncertainty of the political terrain during the 
liberalization process in general rather than learning about the advantages and/or drawbacks of 
the espousal of specific constitutional provisions in response.  For example, one observer of the 
Kenyan transition remarks that, in 1992: 
the KANU controlled parliament had amended the constitution to impose a presidential two-
term limit for anyone in the future. Given that his brother president, Kenneth Kaunda, had 
lost in Zambia, it appeared at the time as if Moi would certainly lose the expected election. 
The two- term limit, therefore, was meant for future presidents, not for Moi, so that no one 
else would be allowed to serve as long as Moi had served.
151
  
 
This recounting of the decision by the KANU government to amend the constitution to add a 
term limit provision implies that, while Kenya learned from Zambia that incumbent leaders were 
in grave danger of losing their office, the decision to employ term limits as a way to minimize 
the danger to KANU of an opposition victory in the upcoming polls was a decision made purely 
within Kenya due to domestic circumstances without reference to the recent adoption of term 
limit provisions by other states.    
 Finally, the third approach for determining whether diffusion has taken place is to 
conduct a counterfactual reasoning exercise.  Since diffusion “implies that governments are 
making choices that they would not make if left to their own devices,”152 we can ask what other 
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possible choices governments could have made in order to achieve the same outcome that 
enacting term limits produced in the absence of international diffusion.  If there were other 
feasible choices, but all governments chose to adopt term limits instead, this would be evidence 
for a diffusion thesis.  Just as in the Kenyan case mentioned above, the pattern in the timing of 
the adoption of term limits by incumbent governments, on average just a few months prior to the 
first multi-party elections, suggests that incumbent governments implemented term limits in 
order guard against the monopolization of executive power by new opposition parties in the new 
multi-party era and the future marginalization of their own party.  Are there other constitutional 
rules governments could have enacted or other actions they could have chosen instead of a two 
term limit that would have produced the same effect? 
 One standard method for constraining executive power and tenure in general within a 
political systems is the implementation of a parliamentary form of government where the 
executive prime minister is elected by the parliament and can be dismissed from office following 
a no confidence vote.  However, this was not a feasible option for African incumbent 
governments in the early 1990s for two important reasons.  First, while parliamentarism had 
perhaps a greater potential for constraining executive power and tenure than the single-party 
presidential systems in place across Africa at the time, by no means could it be guaranteed.  In an 
example from sub-Saharan Africa, Botswana had sustained a parliamentary system since 
independence in 1966, but the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) had dominated the parliament 
since the first elections and the first two presidents had retained the confidence of the legislature 
and remained in office for fourteen and eighteen years, respectively.  Therefore, in the early 
1990s, incumbent governments saw that adopting a parliamentary system of government was not 
a fail-safe way to restrict future presidents from retaining office indefinitely or to increase their 
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own party’s chances of re-capturing the presidency in the medium-term should they lose it in the 
short-term.            
 Second, switching from a presidential to a parliamentary system of government was not 
the most practicable option for incumbent governments who had neither the will nor the time to 
significantly overhaul their national constitutions.  As Bratton and van de Walle explain 
“incumbents generally try to maintain the status quo, adhering as closely as possible to the tailor-
made set of… rules that have served them well in the past, countenancing change only to the 
extent they believe it improves their chances of holding onto power.”153  As such, incumbent 
governments found it much more reasonable to simply add term limits to existing presidential 
system rather than alter the entire political system to a parliamentary regime.   
 Apart from inaugurating a parliamentary regime, another way incumbent leaders could 
have attempted to limit opposition power and bolster their own electoral chances in the multi-
party era was to continually rig elections.  However, this was also not the most feasible option 
either as the protest movements that had led to the need to enact constitutional reforms in the 
first place would have likely have reacted very strongly a rigged election.  Furthermore, if only 
one election was not sufficiently rigged and the opposition managed to capture the presidency, 
the old incumbent party, once out of office, would lose the ability to rig future elections, thus 
paving the way for potential unlimited opposition wins in the future.  As a result, it is difficult to 
identify any counterfactual scenario in which African governments would have chosen another 
method of regulating executive power and tenure in the future other than presidential term limits.  
Rather, it seems that the widespread introduction of term limits can best be characterized as a 
common sense response to shared domestic conditions (namely the uncertainty of newly-
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instituted electoral competition) in a number of countries in the region.  Put simply, it was a 
decision made in concert but independently by sitting governments due to rapidly changing 
circumstances in the political environment. The following section will present the argument for 
this explanation and will be followed by the two country case studies which will reinforce the 
validity of the argument.     
 
The Argument:  Relative Strength of the Ruling Party vis-à-vis the Opposition 
 The probabilistic model of executive constraint selection presented in Chapter 2 can 
account for the patterns of both adoption and non-adoption of term limits across sub-Saharan 
Africa in the first half 1990s.  Restrictions on executive tenure had a high probability of being 
implemented in countries in which the transition to multi-party politics created a great deal of 
uncertainty in the electoral arena for the party currently in government.  Where the ruling party 
sensed it was losing power relative to an increasingly viable opposition, based on both a perception 
of a high threat of replacement in a future election and a high probability that ruling MPs could 
switch to a new party and still win elections, the ruling regime would move to adopt term limits, 
often first decided in the cabinet and then ratified in a vote in the legislature.  Implementing such a 
rule would help to ensure that, should the incumbent party lose the next election, the opposition 
will not be able to retain the presidency indefinitely.  However, in the handful of countries where 
the ruling party did not feel that they were in danger of losing power vis-à-vis the opposition based 
on their own calculations given the situation in the country, the regime forwent amending the 
constitution to include a provision on limited executive tenure.  In this way, the decision to adopt 
or not adopt term limits in new democracies can be seen as being an endogenous reflection of 
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domestic the balance of power present within a polity at the time of constitution-
writing/amending.   
 
Assessing Relative Party Strength 
 Constructing an empirical measure that captures the relative strength of incumbent and 
opposition parties in the run up to the first multi-party elections in the 1990s across cases is tricky 
because the standard measures of party competition (for example, the effective number of political 
parties, fragmentation, and others) cannot be calculated in this instance precisely because there is 
no prior electoral data from the single-party regimes that can be employed in such calculations.  
This lack of prior information mirrors the challenge facing incumbent parties of this era- they also 
had scant clear and reliable information upon which to make their decision regarding term limit 
adoption.  Given this limitation, one strategy is to use the results from the first elections following 
the re-introduction of multi-party politics in sub-Saharan Africa (the elections held soon after term 
limits were adopted in the majority of countries) to gauge the strength of the incumbent and 
opposition parties in the early 1990s.  While this, in effect, assesses the strength of the parties after 
term limit adoption rather than prior to it, the short amount of time that elapsed between term limit 
adoption and the first multi-party elections in most countries means that electoral returns should 
fairly accurately reflect the balance of power between incumbent and challenger parties 
preceding/at the time of the implementation of executive term limits.  The hypothesis here is that 
the stronger the opposition’s electoral showing (reflecting a relatively strong opposition vis-à-vis 
and incumbent), the more likely the country should have been to adopt term limits.   
In order to examine this hypothesis, Table 3.2 reveals 1) the date of term limit adoption, 2) 
date of the first multi-party election held after 1989,  3) countries in which the opposition candidate 
who secured the most votes in the presidential election came within 20 percentage points of the 
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incumbent president 4) countries in which the opposition party that secured the most votes in the 
legislative election came within 20 percentage points of the incumbent party 5) whether or not the 
election resulted in a turnover of power of the presidency and 6) whether or not term limits were 
adopted before the first multi-party elections.    Despite a few incumbent parties who clearly over- 
or under-estimated their electoral strength relative to the opposition (i.e. Cameroon and Namibia, 
respectively), by and large, ruling parties accurately perceived their relative strength vis-à-vis the 
opposition (as reflected in vote and seat shares won in the first multiparty election results) and 
decided on term limits accordingly.   
In the countries where the ruling party felt they were not susceptible to replacement and 
thus did not adopt term limits prior to the first multi-party contests in the early 1990s,
154
 the sitting 
presidents polled an average of 61% in the elections, with some such as Houphouet-Boigny of 
Cote d’Ivoire and Mugabe of Zimbabwe winning over 80% of the vote, while their parties fared 
even better, winning an average of 71% of the seats in the legislative elections.  This is in contrast 
to parties that did implement term limits prior to the first multi-party elections
155
 due to their 
doubts about their chances of success.  In this set of countries, sitting presidents only polled an 
average of 48% in non-boycotted elections,
156
 with some, such as Hasting Banda in Malawi, 
Didier Ratsiraka in Madagascar and Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia actually confirming their party’s  
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Table 3.2: Relative Party Strength (as Indicated by Electoral Results) and Term Limit   
                  Adoption 
 
 
 
        Country 
Date term 
limits 
adopted 
into 
constitu-
tion 
Date of 
first 
multiparty 
election in 
the 1990s 
Opposition 
candidate polls 
within 20% of 
incumbent vote 
share in 
Presidential 
election
157
 
Opposition 
party polls 
within 20% of 
incumbent seat 
share in 
Legislative 
election 
Turnover: 
 
Incumbent 
party loses 
presidential 
election 
Term 
Limits 
adopted 
before 
first 
election? 
Cameroon* n/a Oct 1992 X   no 
Central African Rep* n/a Oct 1993 X X X no 
Cote d’Ivoire* n/a Oct 1990    no 
Equatorial Guinea n/a Feb 1996    no 
The Gambia n/a Apr 1992    no 
Guinea-Bissau n/a Jan 1992 X   no 
Mauritania* n/a Jan 1992    no 
Zimbabwe n/a Mar 1990     
       
Namibia Feb 1990 Dec 1994    yes 
Sao Tome & Principe Sep 1990 Mar 1991 
Incumbent presi-
dent does not run 
X 
 yes 
Mozambique Nov 1990 Oct 1994 X X  yes 
Benin Dec 1990 Mar 1991 X 
Incumb party 
doesn’t run  
X 
yes 
Guinea Dec 1990 Dec 1993    yes 
Gabon Mar 1991 Dec 1993    yes 
Zambia Aug 1991 Nov 1991 X X X yes 
Senegal Sep 1991 Feb 1993    yes 
Burkina Faso Jun 1991 Dec 1991 Boycotted by opp   yes 
Mali Jan  1992 Apr 1992 
Incumbent presi-
dent does not run 
Incumb party 
doesn’t run 
 yes 
Congo-Brazzaville Mar 1992 Aug 1992 X X X yes 
Burundi Mar 1992 Jun 1993 X X X yes 
Ghana Apr 1992 Nov 1992  Boycotted by opp  yes 
Djibouti Sep 1992 May 1993  Boycotted by opp  yes 
Angola Aug 1992 Sep 1992 X   yes 
Madagascar Aug 1992 Nov 1992 X X X yes 
Kenya Aug 1992 Dec 1992 X   yes 
Togo Oct 1992 Aug 1993 Boycotted by opp X  yes 
Niger Jan 1993 Feb 1993 X X X yes 
Seychelles Jun 1993 Jul 1993    yes 
Malawi May 1994 May 1994 X X X yes 
Uganda Sep 1995 May 1996  No-party system  yes 
Chad Mar 1996 Jun 1996    yes 
Congo-Kinshasa Jun 2006 Jul 2006 X   yes 
*  Countries that adopted term limits at a later date after the first multi-party elections. Furthermore, evidence from CAR suggests 
that Kolingba was pressured by international donors to hold elections before a constitutional review could be completed.  
Therefore, it is possible that Kolingba wanted to adopt term limits but did not have the time to do so before the election. 
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worst fears and losing the presidency all together.  Furthermore, in these same countries, ruling 
parties who feared replacement a won an average of 47% of seats in non-boycotted legislative 
elections, further demonstrating their correct perceptions of their vulnerability.  Overall, elections 
were much closer in the countries where the incumbent president and party perceived a real 
challenge to their power and moved to mitigate the danger from this possibility by adopting term 
limits.  It is noteworthy that in the three countries were term limits were not adopted prior to multi-
party elections yet the opposition presidential candidate polled within 20 points of the incumbent 
(Cameroon, CAR and Guinea-Bissau), amendments to add executive term limits were tabled in 
each parliament prior to the second election.
158
  The fact that incumbent parties who had not 
implemented term limits in advance of the first elections quickly adopted them before the next 
election only in the cases where the ruling party had come close to losing the presidency the first 
time around (or did lose in the case of CAR) further suggests that it is the level of competitiveness 
within the party system that determines when incumbent parties do or do not acquiesce to term 
limits on executive tenure. 
Beyond using traditional electorally-based measures to capture levels of party 
competitiveness, finding one or a set of variables that accurately reflects relative levels of party 
strength across sub-Saharan cases during liberalization is difficult.  This is because the 
combination of factors that shape relative party strength in one country may not be the same factors 
that determine party strength in another.  For example, while ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and 
FRELIMO in Mozambique drew strength from their extensive party structures and loyalty of 
members constructed during their days as liberation movements,
159
  incumbent parties in Kenya 
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and Guinea were able to retain power largely due to a fragmented opposition.  Other country-
specific factors such as the nature of ethnic cleavages, the content of political protests (i.e. were 
protesters calling for liberalization within the ruling regime or calling for the end of the regime 
itself), the degree of control the incumbent has over the military, the nature of the electoral system 
and the levels of trust voters are willing to place in opposition forces can also combine with each 
other in various patterns to play a roll.  Therefore, attempting to measure the extent of the threat of 
replacement facing the incumbent party using single-dimension variables such as the frequency of 
political protest and the number of opposition parties would likely do more to obscure rather than 
elucidate the puzzle of term limit adoption.
 160
    
Thus, in the remainder of the chapter, specific sources of ruling parties’ perceptions of their 
strength and the strength of nascent opposition parties will be explored through cases studies of 
Zambia and Cote d’Ivoire.  These in-depth investigations of the two countries in the 1990-1991 
period aim to flesh out the underlying mechanisms at play in patterns of term limit adoption by 
exploring questions such as:  How did ruling parties assess their likelihood of remaining in power 
into foreseeable future in the new multi-party era? and Why were executive term limits the chosen 
response of those parties who did come to have a fear of replacement?   During the analysis, 
factors such as the ruling party’s handing of the economic crisis, the constituency linkages parties 
were able to build, the degree of internal reform undertaken by the incumbent party, the resources 
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As the forthcoming case study of Cote d’Ivoire will demonstrate, the protests that did occur, while demanding of 
expanded political liberalization, were not anti-incumbent in nature. Across the board the correlation between 
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at the disposal of nascent opposition parties and other elements that impact relative party strength 
will be compared across the two cases. 
Cote d’Ivoire and Zambia shared a very similar post-independence trajectory up until 1991.  
Both were continuously ruled from independence in the early 1960s up until 1990 by the same 
“benign dictator” president and party, Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence Party 
(UNIP) in Zambia and Felix Houphouet-Boingy’s Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire - 
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (PDCI-RDA) in Cote d’Ivoire.  As a result, both 
countries experienced a level of political stability throughout the first thirty years of 
independence that was rare in a region plagued by military coups and destabilizing power 
struggles.  Both countries built the basis of almost their entire economy on just one export, 
copper in Zambia, cocoa in Cote d’Ivoire, meaning that both were left highly susceptible to 
fluctuations in prices for these good on the world market.  Both countries had taken on structural 
adjustment programs during the 1980s and were in dire economic straits by the end of the 
decade.  Finally, both countries were well connected to others in their region.  Through the 1970s 
and 80s Kaunda in Zambia had supported many liberation movements-come-elected 
governments in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe, thus engendering strong links 
with many Southern African neighbors.  At the same time, Cote d’Ivoire’s bustling seaport 
capital of Abidjan has often been considered the “Manhattan of Francophone Africa” and acted 
as a hub for the sub-region.  As part of the CFA zone, it was linked to other countries of the 
region by a common currency while French publications like Jeune Afrique kept Ivoirians up to 
date with developments across West Africa.   
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Yet, despite their similar post-independence trajectories, and despite the similarly high 
levels of economic and political protest that rocked each country in the early 1990s,
161
  Kaunda’s 
government in Zambia adopted term limits prior to the return to multi-party elections in 1991 
whereas Houphouet-Boingy’s party chose to contest the 1990 elections with the traditional 
provisions for unlimited re-election of the executive still on the books.  The following detailed 
analyses of each case show that the cause of this divergence lies in the different levels of relative 
power the old ruling parties carried into the multi-party era and the differing level of uncertainty 
this created in the electoral arena in each state.  
 
The Case of Zambia   
 Zambia is a suitable case to explore because it is an “average” case of term limit 
adoption.  It was the eighth African country to embrace executive term limits following the start 
of the third wave of democratization in the region in 1989 and the fourteenth country overall to 
ever adopt term limits in sub-Saharan Africa.  This means that Zambia is a relative mid-point 
adopter and thus free from the added pressure late adopters may have felt to keep up with a well-
established trend, but was not braving uncharted territory since a handful of other countries and 
incumbents had already acceded to term limitations by the time President Kaunda oversaw their 
inclusion in the Zambia constitution in August of 1991.  It is also a country in which the decision 
to amend the constitution to add term limits was under the control of the incumbent and his party 
(which occurred in the majority of cases, as mentioned above) rather than the change emanating 
from a sovereign national conference or a transitional government (as occurred in a minority of 
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cases).   Finally, even though international aid and economic variables were shown to be non-
causal variables above, Zambia is quite average on these indicators as well, ranking 16
th 
highest 
out of 46 sub-Saharan African states in GDP per capita in 1989 (the year prior to the beginning 
of political liberalization across the continent) and ranked 25
th
 out of 46 in official development 
assistance and international aid received in the same year.
162
    
 Zambia’s independence constitution of 1964 was negotiated at Lancaster House in 
London between the outgoing colonial authority and independence movement leaders and 
ratified, not by a Zambian body, but by the British Parliament in July of 1964.  This initial 
document provided for a government that was a “variant of the Westminster System”163 whereby 
the president was both head of state and head of government, all cabinet ministers were drawn 
from among the members of Parliament and the President could dissolve parliament, but such an 
act would simultaneously put an end to his own term in office.  However, besides this, there were 
no restrictions on presidential tenure in the independence constitution.   Since UNIP held the 
majority in Parliament following the January 1964 elections, Kaunda, the party leader (in his 
post as Prime Minister under the former Colonial constitution) became the first president of 
Zambia upon independence on October 24, 1964.    
The multi-party independence constitution did not last for long, however.  UNIP, citing 
rising ethnic tensions, moved to copy other African countries such as Tanzania and Ghana by 
implementing a one-party state.  In 1972, President Kaunda appointed the National Commission 
on the Establishment of a One Party Participatory Democracy under the chairmanship of then-
Vice President Mainza Chona.  The Commission’s terms of reference were to recommend a new 
national constitution for the one-party state after gathering submissions from citizens across the 
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country.  Among the many proposals they put forth, the Chona Commission recommended the 
establishment of a limit in the consecutive number of terms a President could serve, saying: 
 
WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND— 
(1) that the term of office for a President be five years; and 
(2) that a President be eligible to stand for a second term of five years after which he shall 
not be eligible to stand as President for a period of at least five years; thereafter he shall 
be eligible to stand for a new term of five years.
164
 
 
However, in the white paper response to the Chona Commission Report, the UNIP government 
rejected the idea of implementing limits on successive terms for the executive, saying that 
“whether a man or woman should be allowed to serve his or her country in a high office should 
be left entirely to the people to decide.”165  Subsequently, in December of 1972, the National 
Assembly (minus the opposition parliamentarians who walked out in protest) voted 78 to zero in 
favor of the new one-party constitution that did not contain a clause on presidential tenure.   
 By the late 1980s, President Kaunda was facing tough times.  Fallen copper values, rising 
maize meal prices, and faltering state-run enterprises were all contributing to an economic crisis 
felt throughout the country.  Over his nearly three decades in office, Kaunda had steered a 
country that was relatively prosperous at independence into an acute financial catastrophe.  An 
IMF structural adjustment program implemented in 1983 could not contain the precipitous 
decline in the Zambian economy.    Along with economic crisis also came a political crisis of 
legitimacy
166
 as “ordinary people… concluded that the politics of present leadership, far from 
offering any prospect for relief from underdevelopment, had deepened it immensely.
167
 A failed 
coup attempt in July 1990 demonstrated just how unpopular Kaunda had become as there were 
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celebrations on the streets of Lusaka when the coup-plotters announced (erroneously) over the 
radio that they had overthrown the president.
168
  Inspired by the mass protests that were toppling 
governments across Eastern Europe at the time,
169
 calls for political and economic reform began 
in Zambia first in Copperbelt Province (the seat of the Zambian copper and mineral industry) and 
then spread to other urban centers.   
This growing unrest, combined with the fact that the liberation struggles that Kaunda had 
supported across southern Africa had all been won and “going by what was taking place 
elsewhere in the world,”170 eventually lead Kaunda and UNIP to hold a vote in Parliament on the 
question of legalizing opposition parties.  The vote passed unanimously in December of 1990.  
Furthermore, in September of 1990 Kaunda established the Mvunga Constitutional Review 
Commission and charged them with proposing ways in which the constitution should be altered 
to accommodate the new multi-party dispensation.   The commission was composed largely of 
internal UNIP members, Mvunga himself being the then-Solicitor General in the UNIP 
government.  Along with suggesting amendments to the provisions on freedom of association 
and other articles relevant to political parties, the Mvunga commission also recommended other 
changes to the constitution, including the adoption of a limit of two terms of five years on 
presidential tenure.  The head of the Commission, Professor Mvunga himself, maintains that the 
idea to limit the terms of the president came directly from the Zambian citizenry during 
consultations with first the Chona Commission in 1972 and later his own Commission in 1991.  
“The people saw a merit in limiting [presidential terms]…  Someone gets tired in office, and so 
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there is a need for others to contribute to national development.”171  Thus, the proposal that UNIP 
accede to executive term limits in the constitution became one of many recommendations made by 
the Mvunga Commission in its final report to the government.  President Kaunda corroborates the 
fact the discussion within the UNIP central committee about limiting executive tenure was 
initiated when the committee was reviewing the Mvunga Commission report, saying “our 
lawyers [the Mvunga Commission] proposed [adding term limits to the constitution] and brought 
it to the central committee of the party…”172   
President Kaunda’s initial statement may at first make it seem as if UNIP adopted 
executive term limits simply because the Mvunga Commission members recommended such 
action.  However, if the UNIP government had wanted to disallow the adoption of executive 
term limits at this temporal juncture, it could have rejected this proposal in their white paper 
response to the Mvunga commission just as they rejected a number of other suggestions made by 
the commission (including recommendations that the parliament be able to override a 
presidential veto and that laws regarding police detention powers be curtailed) and then ensured 
that the UNIP-dominated parliament voted against any amendments to the clause on presidential 
tenure.  After all, as mentioned above, Kaunda’s administration had rejected a similar 
proposition to forbid a president from running for more than two consecutive terms put forward 
by the Chona constitutional review commission in 1972.
173
  Thus, it was not for lack of avenues 
to oppose the Mvunga commission’s proposition on term limits that lead UNIP to adopt term 
limits in 1991.  
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Furthermore, there was little pressure from the opposition MMD to add a term limit 
provision to the revised constitution.  The MMD was very vocal in its support for certain 
political reforms such as the re-legalization of opposition parties, requiring ministers to be 
appointed from the ranks of the National Assembly, the provision for foreign election monitors 
to observe the 1991 polls and restricting presidential declarations of martial law.  Yet, the 
implementation of term limits was not among the reforms called for by the MMD.  Nowhere in 
the written declarations of the MMD or any of its predecessor bodies (i.e. the “Resolutions” 
publicized by the July 1990 National Conference on the Multi-party Option
174
) is a limited tenure 
for the executive proposed by the movement.  Thus, while there is no evidence that the MMD 
objected to the two-terms of five years clause when it first appeared in the draft of the new 
constitution as approved by UNIP, a case cannot be made that UNIP chose to embrace term 
limits in response to pressure to do so from the MMD like it had given into many other MMD 
demands mentioned above during the transition period.    
Nor did the UNIP government implement term limits or other democratic reforms due to 
international influences.  Kaunda maintains that he did not feel pressure from donor countries or 
international organizations on the specific issue of executive term limits.
175
  Rather, changes in 
the domestic political environment in the 1990-1991 time period lead various actors within the 
UNIP government to reassess their preferences on executive constraints, which resulted in the 
formal adoption of presidential term limits into the constitution by the Parliament in late August 
of 1991. 
The legalization of opposition parties in October of 1990, and the electoral uncertainty 
that resulted, was the change in the domestic political environment that eventually lead to the 
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adoption of executive term limits by the UNIP government.  The competition inherent in multi-
party elections meant that the threat to Kaunda and the UNIP elites’ continued power was no 
longer from within the party but rather from outside.  In the event that the emerging Movement 
for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) or another newly formed opposition party won the first multi-
party election in Zambia in 1991, UNIP did not want this party to enjoy unlimited incumbency 
advantage.  Eliminating such an advantage would make it easier for UNIP to re-capture power 
ten years later and re-assert their ideological policies and also to regain control over the spoils of 
power.   
Speaking with then-President Kaunda it is clear that he personally was nervous about 
exactly who might gain the top seat in the Zambia government.  Specifically, Kaunda worried 
that “those who might come in the future might have some strange ideas.”176  Such people should 
not have the ability to retain power indefinitely.  Therefore, he maintains that “we [UNIP] had to 
trade ourselves”177- potentially restrict Kaunda’s tenure as president in order to also limit another 
party’s tenure at the top.  Such a move was necessary in order “to protect against selfish people”178 
who might abuse the office of the presidency for their own personal gains.  Kaunda’s sentiment 
that term limits were necessary because it was highly possible UNIP could lose power in the 
foreseeable future was reportedly shared by most party members.  The proposal was discussed at 
both the central committee level and the national council level with little debate.  Mvunga recalls 
that “everyone agreed quickly.  There was no organized resistance within UNIP to the two term 
restriction...  There were two attempted military coups before this, so in that kind of scenario, the 
party was very sensitive”179 to its own growing unpopularity and the very real threat of 
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replacement.   The only debates regarding executive tenure that did go on within UNIP were over 
whether the executive’s term should be five years or seven years (Kaunda himself at first pushed 
for seven years but the majority in the cabinet endorsed five) and whether they limits should begin 
in 1991 or be retroactive, which would outlaw Kaunda from standing in the next election (the party 
decide on the former).   Thus, when the draft constitution was put before the National Assembly in 
August of 1991, parliamentarians overwhelmingly approved the two term limit in order to protect 
UNIPs chance of regaining the presidency in the increasingly likely chance that Kaunda would 
lose to Chiluba in the October elections. 
This explanation of why his UNIP government came to allow term limits to be added to 
the Zambian constitution demonstrates an acute awareness within UNIP of the trade-offs 
between holding power across various time horizons. Kaunda’s government was willing to give 
up the possibility of retaining the presidency indefinitely for the long-term in order to maximize 
the chance of being able to gain power in the medium term if it is lost in the short term.  At the 
time when the UNIP government accepted the Mvunga commission’s recommendation that the 
executive’s tenure be limited two terms of five years it was not yet known who would win the 
1991 presidential election.  Kaunda was standing on the UNIP ticket and thus had the 
opportunity to win the vote and retain the presidency.  In this case, the decision to adopt term 
limits would thus mean that Kaunda had limited himself.  Yet, this scenario was, it appears, more 
acceptable to the UNIP inner circle than leaving presidential tenure open and having the MMD 
win the presidency and then be able to keep hold of the incumbency advantage indefinitely. In 
other words, UNIP thought it better to protect the possibility of alternating power with other 
parties through limited terms than to take the gamble of either losing or winning power that is 
practically unlimited (due to the strength of incumbency advantage) in the long-term.  UNIP 
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members came to this decision because of their perceptions of the growing weakness of the party 
and the increasing strength of the MMD, as documented below. 
 
Growing weakness of UNIP 
As described above, Zambia was certainly not immune from the popular protests calling 
for multi-party politics that swept a majority of countries in sub-Saharan African in the last 
decade of the 20
th
 century.  However, unlike in Cote d’Ivoire and a number of other countries in 
the region where ruling parties were able to weather the transition well, the protests in Zambia 
quickly took on a decidedly anti-UNIP flavor.  Kaunda and UNIP’s mishandling of the economic 
crisis, their failure to build enduring linkages with major constituencies and their inability to 
liberalize internally to the degree demanded by certain members all contributed to UNIPs 
increasingly weakened state by the early 1990s.   
 First, UNIP’s management of the growing economic crisis throughout the 1970s-1980s 
created a situation in which all sectors of the population felt they were bearing the brunt of the 
subsequent austerity measures.  The party repeatedly demonstrated a lack of commitment to 
structural adjustment policies and international financial institutions often cancelled the 
programs when the Zambian government failed to implement the agreed upon reform targets.
180
  
As the government’s schizophrenic approach to reforms provided no relief, citizens began to 
blame UNIP for the crisis, and the protests quickly went from pure economic grievances to 
political grievances and calls for a multi-party system.  Soon massive pro-multi-party rallies as 
large as 200,000 people broke out in Lusaka, which Africa Confidential noted were the “first 
political demonstrations in Africa which have rallied crowds of similar size to those which 
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gathered in Leipzig and Prague to sweep away one-party states in Eastern Europe.”181   
Meanwhile, attendance at UNIP rallies was so minimal in comparison that the party cancelled 
them in order to stave off embarrassment. When citizens started returning their UNIP 
membership cards by the thousands at the suggestion of multi-party movement leaders, it became 
increasingly clear to Kaunda and the UNIP leadership that they faced a high threat of 
replacement from the MMD.      
       Second, UNIP did not succeed in building a large enough constituency base that would 
remain loyal to the party even in times of crisis.  During their time in power, UNIP pursued a 
strategy of power accumulation that Riedl defines as “modernization” which entails an “attempt 
to neutralize traditional elites and replace them with new state-centered organizations.”182  In 
contrast to a strategy of incorporation, which encourages traditional elites to stay loyal to the 
ruling regime during a democratic transition (as in Senegal and Ghana), a strategy of 
modernization causes traditional elites to be more prone to defect at the onset of liberalization 
because they feel marginalized by an elite who has eschewed them in favor of groupings that link 
citizens directly to the party-state such as unions, commercial farmers, business associations and 
others (as in Benin and Zambia).  However, since these interest groups are all primarily 
concerned with economic matters, once the economic crisis hit Zambia, these groups also chose 
to defect from the ruling regime.  As Riedl maintains, UNIP’s modernization strategy actually 
laid “the foundations for the opposition movement, creating the trade union that provided 
financial resources, a national communication infrastructure and a cohesive agenda to what 
would become leaders of the opposition.”183  As a result of defections of both the traditional elite 
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and the modern economic interests, by the early 1990s UNIP was left with virtually no 
constituency outside of its home base of Eastern Province to support the party in upcoming 
multiparty elections. 
 
 Finally, UNIPs failure to reform itself to become a more participatory body meant that it 
became too rigid an organization to make the necessary changes to retain membership in the 
multi-party era.  As one then-UNIP member observed “a lot of MMD people were former UNIP 
members.  Many felt that participation was curtailed by the one-party structure.  If there had not 
been resistance to demands for democratization within UNIP, MMD would never have been 
formed.”184  In fact, in the wake of the opening to multipartyism, the UNIP old guard seemed 
only to tighten control over party activities- holding secret meetings, launching Kaunda’s 
presidential campaign before the 1991 UNIP extraordinary congress (where the party’s candidate 
for the upcoming election would be officially chosen) and placing of “long serving military men 
and intelligence officers” on the election campaign management committee to “keep tabs on the 
young recruits whose loyalty to Kaunda may not be total.”185  While a few of the old guard, such 
as Grey Zulu, were cut from the party’s Central Committee at the party congress, most of the 
posts still went to party veterans rather than young reformers.  UNIPs inability to transform itself 
from inside made winning back popular support very difficult as “everything from potholes, 
shortages of medicines and other basics and corruption [were] now being blamed on UNIP and 
the lack of change in its leadership.”186    
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Growing Strength of the MMD 
 As UNIP’s power was deteriorating, the overwhelming crowds drawn to MMD rallies 
signaled that the opposition movement’s popular appeal was on the rise relative to the 
authoritarian incumbent party.  A few key factors relating to the foundations of the MMD helped 
the party to quickly win widespread support from the population whereas other opposition 
movements and parties that did not have such foundations, such as the FPI in Cote d’Ivoire, were 
unable to draw popular favor. 
First, the MMD was able to gain popular legitimacy because it was built on structures 
that were already very familiar to large constituencies in the country such as mineworkers unions 
and business associations.  By building their political movement on the back of the urbanized 
and well organized unions in both Lusaka and the Copperbelt, the MMD was able to use union 
infrastructure and resources to provide “an ideology that appealed to the workers, financial 
resources and communication channels independent of the state, and experienced leadership that 
had gained a national following due to their bargaining experience speaking for the masses.”187  
In addition, the participation of many Zambian church mother bodies in the multi-party struggle 
(and their implicit endorsement of the MMD) helped build trust for the new party among rural 
Zambians.   
Second, the MMD was also able to gain much popular support because the party was 
seen as being successful in constructing a broad-based multi-ethnic coalition.
188
  While Chiluba 
himself was a Bemba from Luapula Province, the party leadership was not at all confined to 
Bembas but comprised all of the country’s ethnic groups and regions including Lozis from 
Western Province (Arthur Wina), Tonga from Southern Province (Vernon Mwaanga), groups 
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from Eastern Province (Newstead Zimba), and Lenje from Copperbelt Province (Levy 
Mwanawasa) among others. Due to its broad leadership base, the MMD was viewed by voters as 
a national party, not one that favored any particular regional interest over another.   
Finally, the fact that the opposition in Zambia coalesced into one main party rather than 
many small parties also contributed to its strength relative to UNIP.  Given the party’s multi-
ethnic character discussed above, the fact that the MMD was able to serve as a big umbrella and 
incorporate all pro-multiparty sentiments was key to the party’s success.  This cohesion meant 
that the opposition was able to put up just one presidential candidate to challenge Kaunda rather 
than multiple opposition parties splitting the anti-incumbent vote between them.  This is not to 
say that there were no divisions within the MMD- on the contrary, differences in priorities and 
preferred strategies between the various factions of the party (i.e. unions, business, intellectuals) 
began to emerge during the campaign and later resulted in defections from the MMD during 
Chiluba’s first term in office.   However, the initial coalescence of all pro-multi-party/anti-UNIP 
forces into on organization in the 1990-1991 period greatly contributed to the MMD’s ability to 
capture both the presidency and the majority in the National Assembly in the 1991 elections. 
 
Executive Term Limits in Zambia 
In response to the UNIP’s perception of its own weakness relative to the MMD’s growing 
ability to attract popular support in the early 1990s, the party decided to adopt executive term 
limits into the revised constitution.  As a result, when the new constitution was promulgated on 
August 24
th
 1991, Article 35 on the Tenure of the Office of the President stated that: 
         (1) Subject to clause (2) and (4) every President shall hold office for a period of five 
          years. (2) After the commencement of this Constitution no person who holds or has 
          held office as President for two terms of five years each, shall be eligible for reelection 
          to that office. (3) For the purposes of clause (2) the period of two terms of five 
          years each shall be computed from the commencement of this Constitution. 
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In addition to imposing term limits on the president, the new constitution also repealed the 
executive’s power to impose martial law and introduced a requirement that presidential 
appointments to posts such as the Attorney General and judges be ratified by the National 
Assembly,
189
 further demonstrating UNIP’s nervousness about another party abusing executive 
power in the future.  Had UNIP not faced a very real threat of replacement from the nascent 
opposition, there would not have been a reason for all levels of the party to approve their 
addition to the Constitution.  Such a scenario did play out in other African countries, including 
Cote d’Ivoire, which is an interesting case to explore as a comparison.  
 
The Case of Côte d’Ivoire 
 In many ways, Cote d’Ivoire looked similar to Zambia in 1990.  A faltering economy, a 
political scene dominated by a “founding father” president, and much protest activity in the 
streets of the capital Abidjan.  Among standard economic and aid indicators, Cote d’Ivoire fared 
similarly to Zambia, ranking 13
th highest (next to Zambia’s 16th) out of 46 sub-Saharan African 
states in GDP per capita in 1989 (the year prior to the beginning of political liberalization across 
the continent) and ranked 32
nd
 out of 46 (Zambia ranked 25
th
) in official development assistance 
and international aid received in the same year.
190
  Liberalization in Cote d’Ivoire also began 
relatively early in the decade, just as in Zambia.  Yet, despite both countries legalizing 
opposition parties in 1990, the PDCI-RDA resisted the subsequent adoption of term limits that 
occurred in Zambia.  At the time of Cote d’Ivoire scheduled presidential elections in late October 
of 1990, a fair number of its West African neighbors had adopted or were in the process of 
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approving constitutions containing a two-term limit on the executive.  Prior to the 1990s wave of 
liberalization, neighboring Liberia had implemented executive term limits in 1986 and nearby 
Sierra Leone had had them in force since 1978.  Continuing the trend, Sao Tome and Principe, 
and island nation southeast of Cote d’Ivoire promulgated a constitution containing a limit on 
executive tenure in September 1990 while both Benin and Gabon had draft constitutions 
circulating by the spring of 1990 that included a two-term limit for the president.  Therefore, 
even though Cote d’Ivoire was one of the first countries to hold multi-party elections in the 
1990s, the idea of limiting the executive to “two times five years” in office was already a well-
known institution in the region.  Yet, the PDCI-RDA chose not to include presidential term 
limits in the Ivorian constitution prior to President Houphouet-Boigny facing challenger Laurent 
Gbagbo in the 28 October contest, nor did the party implement term limits before the 1995 
elections even after Houphouet-Boingy’s death.   
 Upon gaining independence from France in 1960, the National Assembly of Côte 
d’Ivoire adopted the country’s first constitution on October 31st.  This constitution, largely a 
verbatim replica of the 1958 constitution of the Fifth Republic of France, provides for a strong 
president who is eligible for re-election indefinitely.
191
  Félix Houphouët-Boigny, already head 
of government prior to independence, was elected President under the new constitution in 
November 1960.  Even though technically the 1960 constitution did provide for the existence of 
multiple political parties (see Article 7, an article that remained in force during the entire life of 
the constitution until 2000), Houphouët-Boigny’s Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire-African 
Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA) party operated as a de facto single party state from the very 
beginning and thus came to completely dominate political life in the small west African nation 
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up through the 1980s.  Between 1960 and 1985 both Houphouët-Boigny’ and the PDCI-RDA 
swept every presidential and national assembly election with 100% of the vote and oversaw a 
period of relative political stability in a region marred by military coups and short-lived regimes. 
 The economic policies adopted by the PDCI-RDA at independence, which included a 
heavy focus on the development of the agricultural sector for export and liberal foreign 
investment laws, produced double digit growth rates through much of the 1960s and 1970s and 
precipitated an impressive increase in the country's gross domestic product (GDP) from 145 
billion CFA francs in 1960 to 1,750 billion by 1978.    With the earnings from cocoa, coffee
192
 
and other exports supplemented by funds obtained through international loans, the Ivorian 
government constructed an expansive and highly technocratic state apparatus that notably 
included parastatal agencies such as the Caisse de stabilisation et de soutien des prix des produits 
agricoles (Agricultural marketing board, CSSPPA) that controlled the country’s crop market.   By 
setting legal producer prices for key crops (which reached a high of 400 CFA francs per kilogram of 
both cocoa and coffee in in 1986193) and using surpluses in boom years to build a “stabilization fund” 
to balance bust years, the CSSPPA guaranteed small scale farmers the opportunity to sell their 
products to the government at consistent and fair market prices.  Through this effective state 
machinery, Côte d’Ivoire was able to do what many other African states dependent on primary 
exports were not able to manage, namely “control the conditions for both the expansion and 
extraction of revenue from the peasant and mercantile economy.”194  All of this lead observers to 
label Côte d’Ivoire a “development miracle” and elevated the country to a middle income country 
status- an economic oasis in a literal desert of low income neighbors.   
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Yet, this Ivorian development miracle began to collapse in the early 1980s as prices for 
both cocoa and coffee plummeted on the world market.  With the disappearance of government 
export revenues, the government began to default on its foreign debt, private sector companies 
reliant on state contracts went bankrupt and the banking system was thrown into disarray due to a 
liquidity crisis.  Faced with a severe balance of payments deficit, Côte d’Ivoire became one of 
the first sub-Saharan African countries to undertake a structural adjustment program (SAP) 
offered by the World Bank and the IMF in 1981.  Despite calls by international financers to 
implement government spending reductions as part of the SAP, Houphouet-Boigny retained the 
400 CFA francs/kg producer price for cocoa and coffee through July 1989 because of his 
“historic obligation to the cocoa farmers,”195 a move that preserved much popular support for 
himself and the party in the rural areas of the country.  However, by mid-1989 the government 
faced bankruptcy and had to negotiate a fourth SAP with the IMF which demanded steep cuts in 
the producer price for cocoa and coffee (down to 200 and 100 CFA francs/kg respectively from 
the previous 400)
196
 plus an up to 40% cut in public sector employee wages.
197
 
As in Zambia, the economic crisis and the subsequent austerity measures soon 
precipitated popular demonstrations in Abidjan.  As Crook maintains, “it was the implementation 
of the latter provisions [cuts in public sector wages] rather than the attack on farmers’ incomes 
which triggered the political crisis.”198  Throughout early 1990, public employees in many 
sectors from education, utilities, security and transportation threatened to strike if wages were 
reduced, while student organizations staged marches and the head of the and the Union Générale 
des Travailleurs de Côte d'Ivoire (UGTCI), the main labor union in the country, refused to 
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pledge the loyalty of the union members to the government’s plan.  While the demands of the 
protesters remained largely economic in nature, some, such as the student’s demand for the 
resignation of Minister of Higher Education Balla Keita and the implementation of a multi-party 
system,
199
 evolved to have a political dimension as well.   
Houphouet-Boigny reacted fairly quickly to respond to the popular unrest by 
implementing new economic and political reforms.  On the economic front, in April he appointed 
Alassane Ouattara, then the governor of the Banque centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, 
first as the Chairman of the Interministerial Committee for Coordination of the Stabilization and 
Economic Recovery Program and later as Prime Minister.  As such, Ouattara’s “chief task was to 
redirect the burden of economic readjustment towards the private sector, particularly to those 
owning private property.”200  Political reforms followed later that same month when the political 
bureau of the PDCI-RDA recommended that opposition parties be allowed to register for and 
compete in the 1990 elections.  While quelling popular unrest was clearly one impetus for 
Houphouet-Boingy’s reversal on his long-held preference for single party rule, Widner contends 
that he also decided to embrace multi-partyism for a number of strategic and preventative 
reasons.  First, he aimed to channel the discontent of some political elites out of the PDCI-RDA 
structures “and to pit dissatisfied members of the organizational bourgeoisie against one another, 
diffusing the attack against the Houphouet state.”201  Secondly, based on France’s role in 
promoting the switch to multi-party democracy in nearby Benin, Houphouet-Boigny intuited that 
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maintaining the single party state could jeopardize Cote d’Ivoire’s ability to continue to borrow 
much needed funds from France to weather the economic crisis.
202
  
 Interestingly, opening up to multi-party politics was simpler in Cote d’Ivoire than 
Zambia and most other sub-Saharan states because, as mentioned earlier, Cote d’Ivoire was only 
a de facto one-party state- the constitution in force at the time actually provided for the existence 
of multiple parties under Article 7.  Therefore, no constitutional amendment was needed in order 
to enact the change; an announcement from the President was all that was required.  Therefore, it 
was not necessary in Cote d’Ivoire for the government to initiate a formal constitutional review 
or for citizens to demand a national conference to re-write the constitution to conform to a multi-
party dispensation.
203
  As a result, there was virtually no national debate over other possible 
changes to the political rules of the game such as electoral laws, provisions to detangle the ruling 
party apparatus from government structures, and limitations on executive power (notably term 
limits) as there had been in most other African countries in the lead up to the first multi-party 
elections.
204
  Thus, when Houphouet-Boigny swept the presidential elections in with 82% of the 
vote over Ivorian Popular Front’s Laurent Gbagbo’s 18%205 in October and the PDCI-RDA 
captured 163 out of 175 seats in the legislative elections in November, most of the old rules still 
applied.   
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Despite the introduction of political competition to the PDCI-RDA in elections, adding 
executive term limits to the constitution was never seriously considered in Cote d’Ivoire in the 
early 1990s.  The reason, as Widner asserts, is that “it was reasonably certain that the incumbent 
party and its candidate for president would win the contest.”206  Far from being worried about a 
possible electoral defeat, the main concern within the PDCI-RDA in 1990 was who would be an 
anointed successor of the aging Houphouet-Boigny in the event that he did not live through his 
next five year term!  Based on all available accounts, placing restrictions on executive tenure was 
not an idea that was raised or actively debated within the political bureau or other party organs 
during the PDCI-RDA’s time in power.  It was not until years later, after the military coup in 
1999, that the interim government of General Robert Guei added a two-term limit on the 
executive to the Ivorian constitution in 2000.   
What lead the PDCI-RDA regime to feel so certain that the party would retain the 
presidency that they were not compelled to adopt executive term limits as a preventative measure 
like the UNIP in Zambia and countless other incumbent African parties during the period of 
liberalization?  After all, Cote d’Ivoire was facing similar levels of economic difficulty, domestic 
pressures and popular protests that caused a great deal of uncertainty in so many of its sub-
Saharan neighbors.  Furthermore, adopting term limits would have been particularly low cost for 
the 85 year old Houphouet-Boigny whose failing health implied that it was unlikely he would 
survive one let alone two additional five year terms in office.  Therefore, it is striking that 
Houphouet-Boigny and the PDCI-RDA felt secure enough in future their hold on power (even if 
the popular Houphouet-Boigny would no longer at the helm) to forego implementing restrictions 
on executive tenure in case of an opposition win.  Available evidence suggests that the answer 
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lies in a combination of the continued widespread popular support for the party, Houphouet-
Boingy’s strategic handling of the economic crisis and the weakness of opposition forces in the 
country.  
 
Strength of the PDCI-RDA 
Despite being in power since 1960, the PDCI-RDA had been able to retain high levels of 
public support throughout the decades by re-inventing itself at key moments, appealing to 
important constituencies, and maintaining high levels of economic prosperity and political 
stability relative to other countries in the West African region.  Through the liberalization period 
Houphouet-Boigny, warmly referred to as “Le Vieux” (Old Man) by citizens, enjoyed 
“continued popularity… [and] genuine support, unlike much of the old discredited political 
class”207 in other countries.   He and the party were able to retain much popular support due to a 
particular combination of key policies and strategies implemented both in the past and during the 
ongoing economic crisis.   
First, the government’s decision to maintain producer prices for both cocoa and coffee at 
400 CFA francs/kg until 1989 delayed the onset of real effects of the economic crisis for workers 
in the agricultural sector only a year before the 1990 elections.  Most farmers had only suffered 
cuts in their profits for one main planting season, and were thus not yet overly disillusioned with 
the PDCI-RDA government.  For its part, the party’s public pronouncements on the cocoa and 
coffee market crash, including “vehement condemnation of Western ‘speculators’ and fulsome 
praise for local growers helped minimize popular dissatisfaction”208 among the largest sector of 
Ivorian society.  This is not to say that there was not any discontent among farmers in Cote 
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d’Ivoire- to the contrary, there were scattered demonstrations by cocoa and coffee farmers 
protesting cuts in payments in 1989-1990.  However, the goal of these protests were generally to 
persuade the PDCI-RDA to adjust their crop pricing policies and stopped short of advocating 
political reforms or an end to PDCI-RDA rule.  Thus, it was evident to Houphouet-Boigny and 
the party that they retained much popular support in the rural agricultural regions of the country, 
namely the East, South-East, South, Center-west and South-west regions of Côte d’Ivoire.   In 
addition to farmers, many other groups who staged protests over growing financial hardships 
likewise kept their demands economic, not political.  For example, although some students began 
to call for the resignation of Houphouet-Boigny and the institution of multi-party democracy 
during the late February 1990 protests, most students queried were “adamant that their protest 
concerns poor conditions at the university and is not political.”209 
Second, the PDCI-RDA had long had a policy of encouraging citizens of nearby 
countries to emigrate to Cote d’Ivoire to work in the cocoa and coffee plantations. Seeing such 
high number of immigrants from Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Senegal and other neighboring 
countries who flowed into Cote d’Ivoire every year made “Ivoirians themselves… aware that 
conditions in other countries are less desirable, thereby encouraging them to adapt and adjust to 
the less favourable aspects of their own regime.”210  In addition, émigrés, who were estimated to 
comprise between one-quarter to one-third of the Ivorian population by the mid-1980s
211
 were 
afforded the right to vote in Cote d’Ivoire.   Since these foreign populations widely viewed the 
PDCI-RDA as their benefactor, the party could widely count on their electoral support even in 
                                                 
209
 Bourke, Gerald.  1990.  “Cote d’Ivoire:  Students on the March” West Africa.  5-11 March 1990, p. 364.  
However, later student protests in March 1990 seem to have become more political in nature when many protesters 
carried placards denouncing the PDCI-RDA  (“Dateline: Cote d’Ivoire” West Africa.  19-25 March 1990, p. 470.) 
210
Toungara, Jeanne Maddox.  1990.  “The Apotheosis of Cote d'Ivoire's Nana Houphouet-Boigny.” Journal of  
     Modern African Studies, Vol. 28, p. 41. 
211
 Ministere de l'economie et de finances, Direction de la statistique, 1984. “Population de la C6te d'Ivoire.”  
     Abidjan: Government Printing Office. 
 126 
 
multi-party elections as a “civic thank-offering by the immigrants to Houphouet-Boigny for his 
hospitality.”212 
Third, much of the good will that Houphouet-Boigny and the PDCI-RDA retained was 
due to the government’s handling of the various groups with economic grievances.  The PDCI-
RDA had a long history, sine 1969, of staging “journées de dialogue” (days of dialogue), 
gatherings at which grievances from individuals and organizations could be presented directly to 
the President and government/party officials, whenever “the President wishes to explain an 
important local or domestic policy that may have generated widespread anxiety.”213  Historically, 
these participatory meetings have helped diffuse tensions, as the aggrieved constituents, “having 
been given an occasion to voice their frustrations, retreat and consolidate their support for the 
President.”214  Houphouet-Boigny and the PDCI-RDA once again employed a series of journées 
de dialogue over the 1989-1990 period, meeting with farmers, teachers’ union officials,215 army 
officers,
216
 and other groups to demonstrate to all that the government was committed to 
addressing their concerns.   At one of the largest gatherings in September 1989, after hearing 
from 23 different groups and individuals about their perceptions of the government’s 
mismanagement of the economy, the President responded by reshuffling his cabinet to flush out 
ministers seen as ineffective or corrupt, promising to set up a national committee to address the 
grievances raised
217
 and vowing make the party more responsive to the population.  By and 
large, these gatherings helped to reinforce the legitimacy of Houphouet-Boingy’s authority 
among voters, with Jeune Afrique remarking after the September 1989 meetings that the tense 
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dialogues progressed “sans jamais se departir du respect, pour ne pas dire du culte quasi-divin 
rendu au 'vieux'” (without ever losing respect, if not quasi-divine worship for the ‘old man’).218 
 Finally, the series of reforms undertaken by the PDCI-RDA following the September 
1989 dialogues up through the run-up to the election in October 1990 helped the PDCI-RDA 
retain popular legitimacy by continuing a trend of re-making the party to address key citizen 
concerns about party officials and functions.  Beginning in 1980, when cocoa and coffee prices 
first started to fall on the world market, Houphouet-Boigny had initiated a series of reforms to 
implement more democratic practices and expanded avenues for participation within the party in 
response to growing citizen frustrations with the “old guard” of the party. For example, at the 
PDCI-RDA’s national congress in 1980, National Assembly elections rules were changed from a 
system where voters simply voted for a pre-approved list of party candidates to a system where 
individuals were elected by popular vote in a competitive contest among multiple PDCI-RDA 
candidates, while in 1985, the creation of village committees and numerous other local-level 
political positions vastly increased the participatory nature of the one-party system.  Toungara 
reports that, in the years before the wave of democratization in the 1990s, these gradual reforms 
had afforded the President a “surge of popularity” and showed that both he and the party were 
“desirous and capable of mobilizing mass support.”219  
Similarly, the additional reforms undertaken during the 1989-1990 period helped to 
assuage the population that the PDCI-RDA could continue to be responsive to citizen desires 
more so than could any of the new opposition forces.  Among the reforms enacted in the months 
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before the 1990 elections were the naming of a technocratic and neutral outsider, Ouattara,
220
 to 
engineer an economic recovery program, the appointing of younger cadres to important positions 
in the party leadership and the endorsing of many new candidates in the upcoming elections at 
the party congress in early October.  As a result, only three of the thirty sitting ministers in 1989 
stood for re-election in 1990 in an attempt by the party to show that it was rooting out elderly 
cadres who were seen as corrupt and inefficient by many Ivoirians.
221
   As Faure observed, these 
reforms within the PDIC-RDA “proved particularly successful, effectively cutting the ground 
from under the feet of the opposition”222 by disproving the opposition’s platform that the party 
was too dominated by the old guard to re-invent itself in the multi-party environment.   
In all, the PDCI-RDA was not compelled to adopt executive term limits into the 
constitution prior to the 1990 election (or the 1995 election when Henri Konan Bédié was the 
PDCI-RDA flag bearer following Houphouet-Boingy’s death in 1993) because they felt that the 
party retained high levels of support amongst the population and also because the party had 
managed to remain in total control of electoral resources, including a supportive government 
administration and media.  Due to these factors, party members were therefore confident they 
would win elections into the foreseeable future.  The fact that PDCI-RDA rallies during this 
period attracted more than double the number of participants as opposition party rallies (many of 
whom were likely people “simply curious about the new political conditions,”223 not necessarily 
supporters of opposition groups) seems to provide clear evidence that this perception was indeed 
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correct.  The strength of the PDCI-RDA was also a function of the weakness of the collective 
opposition, which is analyzed below.   
 
Weakness of the Opposition 
It is difficult to determine whether the nascent opposition parties in Cote d’Ivoire were 
not able to win support because the PDCI-RDA remained strong or if the or if the PDCI-RDA 
was able to maintain the upper hand because the opposition itself was inherently weak.   Most 
likely, it is a combination of both situations reinforcing each other in a cyclical way that created 
the circumscribed position of the opposition parties in Cote d’Ivoire in the early 1990s.  Despite 
the twenty-one registered opposition parties putting their weight behind a single presidential 
candidate, the Front Populaire Ivoirien’s (FPI) Laurent Gbagbo, they were not able to unseat 
Houphouet-Boigny in the 1990 elections.  While the fact that the October presidential elections 
were held only six months after opposition parties were effectively recognized by the 
government likely played a role in Gbagbo’s decisive defeat,  since the FPI was given little time 
to organize and mount an effective campaign, other factors inherent to the opposition itself also 
contributed to the electoral outcome.   
 First, opposition parties found it difficult to gain legitimacy in the eyes of voters.  After 
Gbagbo, a history lecturer at the University of Abidjan and a vocal participant in the Ivorian 
teachers union, first formed the FPI in 1982, he was called by many in Cote d’Ivoire a “betrayer” 
and “power hungry” and lacked any type of national, social or political base within the 
country.
224
  Even after opposition parties were officially recognized in 1990, it was difficult for 
these nascent organizations to win the trust of citizens. One researcher found that  
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leaders of most of the major "democratic left" parties noted in interviews [that] convincing                       
rural voters to cast their ballots for a different party was also a difficult task. Said one USD 
[Union des Socio-Démocrates] organizer, "In the villages, once the chief decides an issue, his 
opinion carries, sans debate.    That is the system. To establish democratic debate, we need to 
first sensitize people to a different way of discussing community problems.
225
 
 
This experience of Ivoirian opposition parties stands in contrast to the experience the MMD in 
Zambia where both rural and urban voters were all too eager to break from the ruling party and 
vote for the opposition in the first multi-party elections.  In addition, just being able to reach 
potential voters in the countryside was doubly difficult for opposition parties in Cote d’Ivoire 
than for their fellow new parties across the continent due to the sheer expense of transport.  
During the 1989-1990 time period, gasoline prices in the country had sky rocketed and “a liter of 
petrol cost more in Cote D’Ivoire than it did almost anywhere else in the world.”226  This made 
campaigning in rural areas nearly impossible for opposition parties, a fact that is demonstrated 
by Widner’s finding that villagers in a rural area in which she was doing research in August of 
1990 (just three months before the presidential election) had never even encountered a member 
of an opposition party.
227
   
 Second, unlike in Zambia where the opposition coalesced into just one new party, the 
opposition in Cote d’Ivoire was fragmented, which some observers maintain weakened the 
opposition’s chance of posing a credible challenge to the PDCI-RDA in the 1990 elections.  
Widner argues that the fact that some degree of outside-the-party opposition was tolerated by the 
PDCI-RDA during the single-party era (for example, Gbagbo, already a well-known figure for 
years before the elections, authored many political tracts that were available in the country) 
“meant that even before the legalization of parties in 1990, there were at least six contenders for 
power. Predictably, the opening up of political life in early 1990 gave rise to extreme 
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fragmentation.”228  Even though all opposition parties did manage to rally behind just one 
presidential candidate at the last minute, the fact that nineteen parties ran separate candidates in 
the legislative elections created a situation in which the opposition “presented themselves in a 
totally uncoordinated fashion--  indeed, in many constituencies opposition candidates spent more 
energy arguing among themselves than criticising the PDCI.  This inevitably split support for the 
opposition,”229 who may have fared better if they had formed an alliance.  This is not to say that 
all sub-Saharan countries in which the opposition was fragmented in the first multi-party election 
lead to an easy victory for the old ruling party; in fact, in countries such as Malawi, Benin, 
Congo-Brazzaville, long-time leaders and their parties lost power in elections that were contested 
by four, thirteen and sixteen parties, respectively.  However, just as in Cameroon and Kenya, the 
fracturing of the opposition in Cote d’Ivoire was likely part of the reason for the PDCI-RDA’s 
easy electoral victory in the first multi-party election.   As Widner maintains, the fragmentation 
of the opposition meant “certain victory for the president and his party.  Elections in 1990 posed 
no threat.”230  Even opposition candidates seemed to sense this by election time as 110 of the 600 
candidates originally registered for the legislative elections in November 1990 defected from 
opposition parties in the weeks prior to the contest.
231
   
 Finally, the most widely recognized opposition party in Cote d’Ivoire in 1990, Gbagbo’s 
FPI, had difficulty mounting at credible threat of replacement to the PDCI-RDA because of its 
reputation for being a ethno-regional party and for being willing to engage in violence in order to 
capture state power.  Both of these images alienated large segments of Ivorian voters, thus 
making it difficult for the FPI to construct a national base of support.  By choosing to attempt to 
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discredit the PDCI-RDA regime by claiming it had historically favored the interests of a few large 
Ivorian groups, namely the Baoule (Houphouet-Boingy’s ethnic group), northerners and foreign 
migrants,
232
 the FPI inadvertently painted itself as a champion of center-west (Gbagbo’s home  Bete 
region), south-east and south-west regional interests and anti-immigrant.   In his analysis of this electoral 
strategy, Crook opines that  
     There was no way that the FPI could build a winning national coalition of interests or create a   
     'national' identity by appealing only to particular ethno-regional minorities and attacking the rest  
     of the population. Even in the multi-ethnic cocoa areas of the far south west, where the economic   
     grievances of farmers as a class group might have formed a basis for a serious challenge to the 
     regime, the FPI was let down by its 'Bete' image.
233
 
 
This “Bete image” was particularly non-attractive to voters of other ethnicities because it has 
been reported that many Ivoirians have a tendency to view Betes as aggressive, “physical” and 
even “violent.”234  This led many citizens to perceive the FPI itself, whose leadership in the early 
1990s was largely Bete, and their seemingly xenophobic nationalist campaign platform as 
“encouraging cultural antagonisms”235 rather than promoting national unity.  As such, the FPI 
failed to build a national base and in the 1990 elections and only managed to capture the majority 
of votes in its home-bases of the center-west and some southern prefectures in both the 
presidential and legislative contests.  
 
Executive Term Limits in Cote d’Ivoire 
 Due to the PDCI-RDA’s perception of its own strength and the opposition’s weakness in 
attracting popular support in the early to mid-1990s, executive term limits were never adopted 
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during either Houphouet-Boingy’s or Bedie’s times in office.236  With few citizens calling for a 
re-drawing of the political rules prior to the 1990 election (and the opposition FPI party’s 
insistence that the concept of a National Conference to amend the constitution was “depasse”237), 
the PDCI-RDA was able to keep all of the advantageous laws of the old regime on the books into 
the multi-party era.  It was not until 2000, after Cote d’Ivoire suffered a coup and a transitional 
government was established under General Guéï that the 1960 constitution was finally redrawn 
by a broadly-representative Constitutional and Electoral Consultative Commission (CCCE).
238
  
The CCCE recommended that executive term limits be adopted due to the uncertainty on the part 
of all political groups as to what the balance of power in the country would look like in the post-
coup era.  Therefore, all were in favor of implementing restrictions on presidential tenure in 
order to ensure that their preferred party would have the opportunity to compete for power on a 
level playing field in the medium to long term even if they lost the October 2000 elections.    
 
Conclusion 
 The previous analysis has argued that the pattern of term limit adoption/non-adoption that 
took place during the period of liberalization in the 1990s across sub-Saharan Africa can be 
explained by variation in the balance of power between sitting governments and nascent 
opposition forces in the country at the time.  In countries where the uncertainty introduced by the 
return to democratic multi-party politics enabled new opposition parties to pose a serious threat 
of replacement to the incumbent party, as in Zambia and the majority of African countries, 
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governments chose to implement executive term limits in order to ensure that no opposition party 
that won a future election could enjoy unlimited incumbent advantage.  Alternatively, in 
countries like Cote d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe and a handful of others, the sitting governments sensed 
they were strong enough relative to the opposition to win all elections into the foreseeable future 
and thus did not need to adopt term limits because there was no risk at their party being 
disadvantaged by and opposition with unlimited presidential terms.  In this way, at the time of 
adoption, executive term limits can be seen as being endogenous institutions that are shaped by 
the political realities on the ground.  This finding reflects the growing sentiment in political 
science that formal institutions do not just shape political behavior but are themselves shaped by 
underlying factors such as the balance of power between actors at the time of initial institutional 
design and implementation.  Yet, this leads to a second question regarding whether a later 
change in the initial conditions that drove term limit adoption should lead to a re-consideration 
term limit laws or whether, once adopted, term limit laws remain in force even if the underlying 
balance of power shifts.  The remaining chapters probe this question in detail.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ENFORCING INSTITUTIONS OF CONSTRAINT: ASSESSING EXPLANATIONS  
 
  
 The previous chapter explored the causes of widespread inclusion of term limit clauses 
into new or amended constitutions across sub-Saharan Africa in the early-mid 1990s due to the 
heightened uncertainty in many countries during the transition to multi-party politics.  However, 
just because term limits are adopted by a polity does not automatically mean they will be upheld, 
enforced or generally be able to successfully regulate executive tenure.  For as Posner and Young 
maintain, “although every African country has a constitution as well as a body of laws and 
administrative procedures that place formal limits on executive power, the long-held consensus 
among observers is that these rules play very little role in actually constraining leaders’ 
behavior.”239  Have the term limit rules implemented during the period of liberalization proved to 
be effective in subsequently constraining executive tenure across the continent? 
 The outcome has been decidedly mixed.  As the first cohort of sub-Saharan African 
presidents elected under new multi-party systems reach the end of their constitutionally mandated 
two terms in office, a two-pronged trend has emerged amongst African polities.  Some of these 
sitting presidents have attempted to amend their national constitutions for the purpose of 
circumventing these very term limits. In fact, of the twenty-six presidents who have reached the 
end of their second term in office, eleven have successfully cajoled their legislatures to lift term 
limits.  However, the other fifteen have either lost their bid to abolish term limits or simply 
stepped down without incident.  
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 Why are some presidents constrained by the constitutional two term limit on executive 
tenure while others are able to circumvent the very same provision in their countries' 
constitutions?  Is there a particular set of conditions that are present in all countries where term 
limits have been upheld that is absent in the states where term limits were lifted?  Does he level 
of electoral uncertainty created by the relative power of the incumbent vis-a-vis the opposition 
that lead to term limit adoption in time period one also impact term limit enforcement and 
stability in time period two, or are there different variables at play?  Overall, attempts at term 
limit abrogation and other breaches of constitutional rules raise the puzzle over why constitution 
rules, once adopted, seem to be effective arbiters of executive power in Africa in some contexts 
but not others.  As Elkins has written, “A profitable research program would be one dedicated to 
understanding the conditional impact of constitutions better.”240 
 This chapter intends to answer Elkins’ call by examining the variation in term limit 
adherence across sub-Saharan Africa.  Untangling this puzzle will extend our understanding of 
the limits of constitutionalism in polities where the “rules of the political game are still in 
contestation,”241 as they are in many third wave democracies that underwent a period of 
liberalization in the 1990s.  Indeed, term limit abolition is not just an African phenomenon; 
leaders from other developing electoral democracies such as Chavez in Venezuela, Nazarbayev in 
Kazakhstan, Rajapaksa in Sri Lanka, Akaev in Kyrgyzstan, Uribe in Colombia, Lukashenko of 
Belarus, Saleh in Yemen and Rakhmonov in Tajikistan among others have all found ways to rid their 
constitutions of limits on executive tenure in recent years.  Thus, the aim of this chapter is to use 
quantitative data to assess a number of different explanatory variables forwarded in the literature 
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on constitutional enforcement as a first step toward uncovering the causal story of variations in 
term limit adherence across the continent.   
  The chapter will open with the identification of sub-Saharan African countries in which a 
president has reached the end of the second term in office and divide them into two groups of 
cases:  one group of countries in which term limits did successfully constrain the executive and 
the president stepped down from office as the constitution stipulated, and the other group of 
countries in which the parliament voted to lift the term limit clause from the constitution, thereby 
opening the door for the incumbent president to run for a third term.  Often, in cases where term 
limits were overturned, they were abolished less than ten years after they were first adopted with 
the blessing of the very same president who oversaw their contravention.  This will be followed 
by an exploration of a number of possible explanations for this variation in term limit adherence.  
These variables, including level of democracy, relative dependence on donor aid, electoral 
system rules, and others are assessed against the universe of country/president cases in the region 
for correlation with term limit outcomes.  Given the medium-n sample size and the dichotomous 
dependent variable, a pairwise correlation calculating significance levels for each variable will 
be undertaken first in order to pinpoint the variables that correspond the most closely to the 
pattern of term limit enforcement outcomes.  This step will be followed by a logistic regression 
analysis to further assess significance levels for a smaller set of variable while holding all others 
constant to measure the strength and direction of the linear relationship between these possible 
explanatory variables and the outcome of term limit adherence.  The relatively small-n universe 
of cases available for this statistical analysis means that the results are, at best, merely 
suggestive.  Yet, at the same time, the strength of the results given the limited number of 
observations does signal that the analysis is capturing meaningful relationships between the 
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variables. In the end, the results of both stages of the analysis point to the competitiveness of the 
party system in each polity as being a strong predictor of variation in term limit adherence across 
sub-Saharan Africa while also finding that the trend has a geographic/colonial power component 
as well, with most term limit contraventions occurring among francophone West African states.  
  
Term Limit Adherence and Contravention Across Sub-Saharan Africa:  Taking Stock 
 
 Of the thirty-seven African countries with presidential systems included in this study 
that adopted term limit provisions in during the wave of liberalization in the 1990s, to date 
twenty-six African executives from twenty-four countries have reached the end of their 
constitutionally mandated tenure.  Of these twenty-six, fourteen of those have campaigned to have 
term limits abolished so they could run indefinitely.  Eleven have been successful in achieving this 
goal and are now serving their third term (or even a fourth term for some, like Yoweri Museveni of 
Uganda who won his fourth election in February 2011) while three failed in this endeavor.  Yet, 
the other twelve African leaders who have reached the end of their second term have bucked this 
trend all together and have quietly stepped down in compliance with their national constitutions.  
Table 4.1 (below) details these president/country categorizations. 
 Term limit contravention in sub-Saharan Africa has taken one of two forms, which Maltz 
terms “hard contravention” and “soft contravention.”242  Hard contravention is when executive 
term limits are totally eliminated from the national constitution, leaving no restraint on presidential 
tenure for anyone who may hold the office in the future.  The majority of cases of term limit 
contravention in this analysis are instances of hard contravention.  However, Namibia under 
Nujoma engaged in soft contravention, meaning that term limits are not eliminated from the  
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  Gideon Maltz. 2007.  “The Case for Presidential Term Limits,” Journal of Democracy, 18: 128–42. 
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Table 4.1:  Trends in Term Limit Adherence Across Sub-Saharan Africa 
                    Constitution contains a two-term limit on the presidency (37 countries) 
 
Two terms not yet 
served by any 
president 
(12 countries) 
        
Two term limit reached by at least one president (26 presidents) 
No attempt to amend      
constitution to lift 
term limit 
(12 presidents) 
Attempt to amend constitution to lift term limits 
(14 presidents) 
Attempt not successful 
(3 presidents) 
Attempt successful 
(11 presidents) 
  
Burundi 
C.A.R. 
Comoros 
Congo-Brazzaville 
Cote d’Ivoire 
DRC 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Mauritania 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sudan 
 
 
Kérékou (Benin) 
Monteiro(Cape Verde) 
Rawlings (Ghana) 
Kufuor (Ghana) 
Moi (Kenya) 
Konare (Mali) 
Chissano    
   (Mozambique) 
Trovoada (Sao Tome  
   & Principe) 
Rene (Seychelles)  
Kabbah (Sierra Leone) 
Mwinyi (Tanzania) 
Mkapa (Tanzania) 
 
Muluzi (Malawi)  
Obasanjo (Nigeria) 
Chiluba (Zambia) 
 
 
Compaoré (Burkina  
   Faso)     
Biya (Cameroon) 
Deby (Chad) 
Guelleh (Djibouti) 
Bongo (Gabon) 
Conté (Guinea) 
Nujoma (Namibia) 
Tandja (Niger) 
Diouf (Senegal) 
Eyadema (Togo) 
Museveni (Uganda) 
 
 
Figure adapted from Vencovsky, David. 2007. “Presidential Term Limits in Africa” in Conflict Trends, Issue 2: 15-21  
 
constitution completely, but the incumbent president is empowered to run for additional terms in 
office past the original two due to special circumstances, in this case one extra term for Nujoma 
only.
243
     
It is clear that abolishing term limits is not simply an ideological policy preference 
implemented by new governments who enter into power after term limits are first adopted as ten of 
the fourteen
244
 presidents who attempted to have term limits abolished from their countries’ 
                                                 
243
 Another example of soft contravention occurred in Burkina Faso.  While term limits were totally abolished in 
1997 under President Compaore, they were reintroduced after the 2000 elections.  However, shortly before the 2005 
elections the constitutional court ruled that, while Compaore had already served two terms in office, he was allowed 
to run again because the clock had effectively been “re-set” with the new 2000 constitution.   He went on to win re-
election in 2005 and 2010. 
244
 The four exceptions are Muluzi (Malawi), Chiluba (Zambia), Tandja (Niger) and Guelleh (Djibouti) 
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constitutions were the very same leaders who oversaw the initial adoption of the term limit 
provisions ten years earlier.  In addition, in all but one of the fourteen cases in which term limits 
laws were challenged (Niger being the exception)
245
, the final decision regarding the lifting or 
retaining of limits on executive tenure was accomplished through the appropriate formal legal 
channel of a constitutional amendment vote in Parliament.  In each case, the government would 
table the bill advocating the removal of the term limit clause from the constitution, 
parliamentarians would debate its merits and then the Speaker would call a vote.  In almost all sub-
Saharan countries, a two-thirds majority is needed to amend the constitution. Therefore, just as 
with the adoption of the two-term rule, members of parliament were ultimately the key actors in 
the decision whether to adhere to or contravene presidential term limits.   
 What accounts for this variation in term limit adherence across the continent?  In the 
remainder of this chapter, a quantitative analysis will be undertaken in order to begin exploring a 
number of possible explanations drawn from the literature on constitutionalism to see if a suitable 
answer can be found.  
 
Methodology 
 Before delving into the assessment of possible explanatory variables, a discussion about 
the data, statistical methods and variables to be employed in the quantitative portion of the 
dissertation is in order.  As mentioned above, the number of relevant country/president cases in 
the dataset currently stands at 26 (although that number will, over time, increase incrementally as 
additional African presidents reach the end of their second term in office).  The advantage of this 
dataset is that is captures the full universe of cases of sub-Saharan African presidents who have 
                                                 
245
  In Niger, after a constitutional court ruling made clear that altering Article 36, which sets a two term limit for the 
executive, would be unconstitutional, President Tandja dissolved the parliament and lifted term limits by decree. 
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reached the end of their constitutionally mandated tenure in office, thereby making the analysis 
more comprehensive than one that relies on a sample of the full population.  However, the 
medium-n size of the sample makes quantitative assessment less precise than a large-n analysis 
due to a smaller confidence level, as it is more likely that variable correlation is merely due to 
chance.   
At first glance, it seems that the n could be increased substantially by disaggregating the 
26 cases into president/year observations, thereby turning one ten-year presidential tenure into 
ten observations rather than just one observation in order to set up a hazard model type of 
analysis.   However, there are methodological reasons why increasing the n in this way does not 
notably improve the analysis.  First, dividing each case into president/year observations implies 
an assumption that term limits are equally likely to be lifted in any year of a given president’s 
tenure, whether it be his first year or ninth year in office.  However, in reality, term limits are 
much more likely to be lifted toward the end of a President’s tenure than toward the beginning.  
In the fourteen cases where term limit contravention was attempted, over 70% of those attempts 
occurred within 18 months of the end of the president’s second term, and 100% of the attempts 
occurred in during the president’s second term. Even in the twelve countries where term limit 
abolition was not attempted, third-term debates were common only during the second half of the 
president’s final term in office.  This implies that reaching the end of a second term in office is a 
critical juncture that drives the timing of term limit debates and abolition attempts.  Before the 
conclusion of a president’s second term, there is no need to consider lifting term limits, and no 
attempt will be made even if the variables and conditions that ultimately explain successful term 
limit contravention are already in place.  As a result, the number of cases under analysis will be 
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left at twenty-six, with each case representing a sub-Saharan African president who reaches the 
conclusion of his or her second
246
 constitutionally-mandated term in office.  
In order to assess a range of possible explanatory variables against the term limit 
adherence outcome, two statistical tests will be employed in this analysis.  First, a simple 
difference of means analysis (two-tailed t-test) will be performed in order to assess which 
variables have mean values that differ significantly between the two clusters of term limit 
upholders and contraveners and to reject any that do not meet this condition.  Next, a logistic 
regression will be performed in order to establish the relationship between term limit adherence 
and this smaller group of predictor variables in order to gauge the level of significance of each 
possible explanatory variable when all other variables are held constant.  Conventional wisdom 
holds that the number of predictor variables in the model should be kept to a minimum when the 
number of observations is small.  Accordingly, only the variables that were found to have the 
strongest relationship with term limit outcomes in the difference of means analysis will be 
included in the logistic model.  Logistic regression is appropriate in this case because the 
dependent variable of term limit adherence is a binary category.   
 
Variable rationale, sources and coding 
 The institutional literature on third wave democratizers offers a few different possible 
explanations for the variation in constitutional strength and enforcement in nascent democracies.  
The aim of the statistical analysis in this chapter is to determine if any of these explanations 
provide traction in understanding the variation in executive term limit law adherence across sub-
Saharan Africa.   This section introduces both the dependent variable of term limit adherence and 
                                                 
246
 Or, in the case of the Seychelles, the third term in office as the constitution of the Seychelles mandates a three 
term limit for the executive. 
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a number of possible independent explanatory and control variables and discusses data sources 
and coding of each. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Executive Term Limit Adherence-  The dependent variable in this analysis, executive term limit 
adherence, indicates whether a sitting president who has reached the end of his or her second 
constitutionally-mandated term in office steps down in accordance with term limit laws or 
contravenes this law in a way that allows the president to seek additional terms in office.  As 
mentioned above, contravention can take hard (total abolition of executive term limits) or soft 
(only the current incumbent is allowed to run for additional term(s) due to special circumstances) 
forms.  However, for this analysis, both hard and soft contraventions are treated similarly as a 
case of non-adherence to executive tenure provisions enshrined in the constitution.  Relatedly, a 
failed contravention attempt (where official action, such as the tabling of a constitutional 
amendment before the legislature, was taken towards the lifting of executive term limits but term 
limits were ultimately retained) are counted among the group of term limit adherents.   
 A country is classified as being a case in which executive term limits have been 
contravened when an official amendment to the constitution is made removing or altering the 
established restriction on presidential tenure.  These cases will be assigned a value of 0 in the 
quantitative analysis.  Alternatively, instances in which a president steps down at the conclusion 
of his or her second term in office and is replaced by the winner of the subsequent presidential 
elections are assigned a value of 1.         
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Independent Variables:  
1. Years Incumbent in Power-  Starting with individual-level traits of the incumbent president 
himself, one possible explanatory variable that touches upon the will and ability of the 
incumbent president to influence changes to constitutional rules is the length of time the 
incumbent president has already served in office.  In their study of leadership duration, Bienen 
and van de Walle found that the longer a leader remained in power, the better his chances were 
of retaining power and concluded that “leaders who stay in power for relatively long periods exit 
non-constitutionally or die of natural causes much more often than they are removed 
constitutionally”.247   While there are many dynamics that contribute to leadership duration, in 
this analysis, the leadership duration variable is used to capture two possible factors that could 
impact term limit outcomes: 1) the degree of influence and control a president has over the 
legislature, policymaking and day-to-day politics in his country more generally and 2) whether 
the leader came to power before or after the re-introduction of multiparty politics in the early 
1990s.  The assumption is that a president who has been in office many years has had more time 
to develop a tighter control over political decisions and is also less committed to democratic 
rules since he ascended to power during the single-party authoritarian era.  Alternatively, leaders 
who have had less time to build networks of political influence and  who were elected 
democratically under an amended constitution that already had in place a two-term limit on the 
executive would be more likely to willingly step down at the conclusion of their second term.  
Thus, the hypothesis is that the longer the incumbent president has been in power, the more 
likely that term limits will be contravened.   
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 Bienen, Henry and Nicolas van de Walle. 1991. Of Time and Power: Leadership Duration in the Modern World.   
     Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. p. 103 
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 The data on the years in office of each African president in the sample was calculated by 
the author based on the original date of election of the incumbent president as reported in Africa 
South of the Sahara, various years
248
 until either the year the president left office (for cases term 
limit adherence) or the year that term limits were abolished (for cases of term limit 
contravention).  
 
2.  Economic Performance under the Incumbent-    One simple answer to the question of why 
some presidents are able to get executive term limits abolished and others are not could be that 
success is based on variations in voters’ perceptions of the incumbent president’s performance.  
A president who enjoys widespread support should, theoretically, have an easier time getting the 
rules bent in his favor than a president who does not have a high approval rating.  Unfortunately, 
there is no good measure of presidential approval that spans the universe of sub-Saharan African 
cases included in this analysis.  However, one (imperfect but measureable) proxy for this 
variable is the degree of economic growth the country has experienced during the incumbent 
presidents term in office.  In a study on incumbent re-election fortunes, Brender and Drazen find 
that in developing countries “economic growth over the leader's term has a positive effect on the 
probability of reelection…”249 which mirrors evidence from the World Values Survey that finds 
that high levels of economic growth is the most important policy priority for citizens of 
developing countries.
250
  Assuming that the same logic should hold for presidents pushing for a 
third term as for presidents running for re-election to a second term, the hypothesis is that 
executive term limits are more likely to be lifted in sub-Saharan countries that have experienced 
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 Europa Publications Limited. 1990-2010. Africa South of the Sahara. London: Europa Publications Ltd. 
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 Brender, Adi, and Allan Drazen. 2008. "How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection  
      Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries." American Economic Review, 98, 5: 2208 
250
 Inglehart, Ronald, et al. 2004. World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, 1999–2001. Ann Arbor, MI:  
     Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.  As cited in Brender and Drazen, 2008. 
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higher levels of economic growth over the president’s previous term in office than countries that 
have experienced little to no growth or economic decline.   
 In order to build a metric of economic growth that is linked with recent presidential 
performance, the measure of the annual percentage growth rate of GDP for each country (based 
on constant 2000 U.S. dollars) is averaged over the years encompassing the incumbent 
president’s second term in office.  The “GDP growth (annual %)” indicator from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators database is employed in order to ensure a uniform measure of 
growth across sub-Saharan countries.   
 
3. Aid as percentage of GNI-   Moving from individual presidential-level variables to macro-
level data, the next possible explanation for variation in term limit adherence is differences in 
current levels of aid dependency across African countries.   Observers of African politics such as 
Richard Joseph have hypothesized that constitutional provisions are often not upheld in the 
developing world because the rules were only adopted in the first place by governments with 
little intent to enforce them in order to win favor with international donors.
251
   This logic holds 
that governments will implement constraining institutions such as executive term limits in time 
period one when the costs of doing so are low (because they do not come into force until eight to 
ten years down the line) but the benefits of doing so are high in terms of reaping additional 
international assistance.  Yet, once the incumbent president reaches the end of his second term, 
these façade institutions are easily scrapped, except perhaps in countries that are extremely aid-
dependent.  High aid dependency could induce a country to uphold constitutional rules in order 
to retain their high levels of donor funding.  Thus, levels of official development assistance 
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 Joseph, Richard. 1999.  “Africa, 1990-1997: From Abertura to Closure.” in L. Diamond and. M. Plattner (eds.),  
      Democratization in Africa, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  pp 3-18. 
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(ODA) to each sub-Saharan African case will be the first variable that will be analyzed for its 
correlation with term limit outcomes.  The hypothesis is that the higher a country’s aid as a 
percentage of GNI ratio, the more likely that country will be to retain and enforce executive term 
limits.  
 For this analysis, the value used to assess the relationship between aid and term limit 
outcomes in each sub-Saharan African country is calculated by taking the average net ODA as a 
percentage of GNI each state receives over the three years before the attempt to lift term limits 
(where they were breached) or the three years before president reaches the end of his second 
term (where term limits were upheld).  Included in ODA are all disbursements of loans and 
grants by both bilateral donors and multilateral institutions.  The source of the data on each 
country’s yearly aid is based on the “Net ODA received (% of GNI)” indicator from the World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) database. 
 
4. Level of Democracy-   Some scholars have postulated that constitutionalism is likely to be 
stronger in countries that are more democratic overall.  In an “all good things go together 
mentality,” Diamond and Morlino posit that different dimensions of democracy, such as 
competition, participation, responsiveness, rule of law, accountability and others tend to co-vary 
and that “where we find democracies very weak on some dimensions, such as freedom and the 
rule of law, they tend to be noticeably deficient on others as well.”252  Therefore, the overall level 
of democracy of each sub-Saharan state (with regards to the respect for individual political rights 
and liberties in specific) is the second potential explanatory variable that will be assessed against 
the dependent variable of term limit adherence.  The hypothesis is that countries that rate higher 
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on other aspects of democracy, such as the respect for individual political rights and liberties, are 
also more likely to respect and uphold constitutional provisions such as executive term limit 
laws.   
One common measure of the level of democracy that is widely used by many scholars of 
comparative politics is the annual Freedom House survey ratings.
253
  For this analysis, the 
inverse of the Freedom House rating of each country in the year prior to when term limits are 
lifted or the incumbent president steps down will be used to assess the relationship between level 
of democracy and executive term limit adherence.  Freedom House designations are based on 
two numerical ratings—one for political rights and one for civil liberties—based on a 1 to 7 scale 
(1 being the most free and 7 the least free). These two scores are then combined to form a 2-14 
scale with a lower score indicating a higher level of democracy in terms of the provision of 
political rights and liberties.254  The inverse of these scores255 will be used here in order to make the 
variable move in the same direction as its hypothesized relationship to the independent variable (i.e. 
higher levels of democracy lead to higher probability of term limit adherence), which will in term 
make reading the outputs of the statistical test more intuitive.  
 
5. Incumbent Party Seat Share in the Legislature:  After investigating both micro and macro-
level variables, a number of mid-level variables related to institutions and political processes 
with African polities also warrant attention.  As mentioned previously, in all but one of the sub-
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 Polity IV is another widely used comparative measure of the level of democracy across the globe.  However, for 
this analysis, Freedom House is more appropriate because Polity scores are partially based on a measure of 
“executive constraint” which too closely mirrors the dependent variable under study here to be an independent 
measure of the level of democracy across country cases. 
254
 For a more detailed discussion of the methodology used  to rate each country, see the “Methodology” section of 
the 2009 Freedom in the World publication: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=354&year=2009 
255
 A scale of 2-14 is still used, but lower scores now indicate lower levels of democracy.  For example, a country 
that scores a 5 on the Freedom House scale will be coded as an 11 here, signaling a medium-high level of 
democracy. 
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Saharan country cases in which executive term limits were lifted that are included in this study, 
term limits were eliminated from the constitution through the proper formal channels of a vote 
on a constitutional amendment in the country’s parliament.  As a result, exploring differences in 
the conduct of this vote could offer a possible explanation to explain the variation in term limit 
adherence.  Most African constitutions stipulate that amending the constitution requires an 
affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the members of parliament.  Therefore, one potential 
explanation for why some countries retained executive term limits while others lifted them could 
be that term limits are much more likely to be lifted in countries where the president's party has 
more than a two-thirds majority in the legislature during the president's second term in office/ at 
the time of the vote on the amendment.  Having such a majority from the past election would 
seemingly make lifting term limits quite easy for an incumbent president because it can be 
hypothesized that ruling party MPs want to give their party the incumbent advantage in the next 
presidential election. 
 The percentage of seats held by the president’s party during his/her second term in office 
is calculated by the author based on returns from the previous election as reported in Africa 
South of the Sahara, various years.
256
  The number of seats won by the president’s party was 
divided by the total number of seats in the legislature in order to calculate the incumbent party 
seats share percentage.   
 
6. Free and Fair Elections-  Lifting term limits is a risky proposition for a ruling party because, 
should they lose the  next election, an opposition party could effectively have an incumbent 
advantage in all presidential elections in the future.  However, if a party has the ability to rig or 
otherwise advantage itself in elections to increase their odds of winning, the potential threat of 
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 Europa Publications Limited. 1990-2010. Africa South of the Sahara. London: Europa Publications Ltd. 
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the opposition benefiting from a repeal of term limits diminishes. Therefore, one possible 
explanation for the variation in term limit adherence is that only those parties that are willing and 
able to conduct non-free and fair elections will lift term limits while those who do not/cannot 
manipulate electoral outcomes will keep them in place.    
 Two possible indicators can be used to assess the relationship between free and fair 
elections and term limit outcomes.  One way is to use a measure of the fairness of the previous 
presidential election (the election in which the incumbent president won his second term) in 
order to capture variation in ruling parties’ ability to manipulate elections in the past.  This 
indicator reflects the information the ruling party has regarding its capacity to disadvantage the 
opposition in previous electoral contests.  Yet, since in most cases the last election would have 
taken place five years prior and many conditional factors could have changed in the meantime, 
the ability to rig a previous election may not be a good indicator of a party’s capability to 
manipulate the third election.  Alternatively, one way to address this concern is to use instead a 
measure of the fairness of the third election itself- the election in which the incumbent runs for a 
third term (in countries where term limits are lifted) or in which a successor candidate runs (in 
countries where term limits are retained).  This indicator allows for the measurement of the 
actual “third term election” and is therefore more precise in capturing the parties’ ability to 
manipulate electoral procedures or results in the time period under study.  However, since parties 
must make a decision to uphold or lift term limits generally between six to eighteen months prior 
to the third election, the party’s capacity to conduct non-free and fair elections is not fully known 
when the term limit question is put to the legislature.  Since both ways of measuring this 
indicator have advantages as well as drawbacks, both will be included in the initial difference of 
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means test in order to determine which has a clearer relationship to patterns of term limit 
adherence.   
 For both measures, Lindberg’s four-point scale of African elections from 1989-2007 will 
be used to code country cases.  In answer to the question “Were the elections essentially judged 
free and fair?” Lindberg codes countries as 0 =“No” when no elections have been held or those 
held have been wholly unfair; 1=“Irregular” when there were serious defects that influenced the 
results; 2= “Yes, irregularities not significant” when there were deficiencies but they did not 
affect the result; and 3=“Yes” when elections were free and fair.257 
            
7. Electoral system-  While there have been some studies carried out by observers of African 
politics that aim to explain the success or failure of certain African presidents in winning a “third 
term” through a constitutional amendment,258 they are limited in their explanatory power because 
they tend to be single-country or small-N comparative studies that do not provide sufficient 
variation on the dependent variable.  The previous study that takes the most rigorous approach to 
explaining variation in term limit adherence is VonDoepp's survey of third term debates in 
Namibia, Zambia and Malawi.
259
   Drawing on the differences between the incumbent ruling 
parties in Namibia (where term limits were lifted) and Zambia and Malawi (where presidents 
attempted but failed to abrogate such limits) in terms of the internal habits of dissent and unity in 
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each country’s ruling party, VonDoepp asserts that term limits were lifted where the ruling party 
displayed cohesion during the term limit debate, while term limits were kept in place where 
ruling parties or coalitions fractured over the issue.  He points to differences in the “exogenous 
institutional structures,” namely different types of electoral systems- proportional representation 
(PR) in Namibia, plurality or first-past-the-post (FPTP) in both Zambia and Malawi- as one main 
cause of the greater cohesion of the ruling party in Namibia over those in the other two countries.  
He argues that members of parliament who are elected through proportional representation are 
more likely to vote along with the president and central party organization's preferences because 
their parties have more control over their re-election due to the system of party-list rankings than 
do parties in FPTP systems.  Therefore, the hypothesis is that, when extrapolated to the larger set 
of sub-Saharan country cases, states with primarily PR electoral systems will be more likely to 
see term limits lifted than states with FPTP systems.  
Once again, the type of electoral system in place in each country during the incumbent 
president’s second term in office will be verified through reference to Africa South of the Sahara, 
various years.
260
  In the statistical analysis, the electoral system types will be analyzed as a 
dummy variable with 0= All PR and the mixed systems in which two-thirds or more of seats are 
decided through PR,
261
 1= all FPTP and the mixed systems in which less than  one-third of the 
seats are won through PR.
262
  This is done instead of using a three level categorical variable (i.e. 
PR, mixed, FPTP) due to the vast differences between the proportion of MPs elected through PR 
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 The only exception is Mali which has a two-round majority electoral system but employs closed lists nominated 
by parties.  Thus, in terms of the party’s control over the selection and ranking of candidates, the part of PR that von 
Doepp identifies as key in these cases, Mali acts like a PR system and will be classified as such 
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vs. FPTH in mixed systems and the impact these differences are hypothesized to have on MP 
decision making given the logic of von Doepp’s argument.  For example, to compare two mixed 
systems, in Guinea only 38 (33%) National Assembly members are elected by plurality vote in 
single-member constituencies while 76 (67%) members are elected through a closed-list 
proportional representation, whereas in the Seychelles, the balance is reversed with 25 (73.5%) 
members elected by plurality and only 9 (26.5%) members are elected by proportional 
representation.  Therefore, in terms of von Doepp’s logic of PR systems leading to a greater 
probability of term limit contravention due to MPs being more beholden to the voting the party 
line in PR systems, Guinea should be expected to act more like a PR system and Seychelles more 
like a FPTP system, and are classified as such in the analysis. 
 
8. Competitiveness within the Party System -  While von Doepp’s study concentrates on patterns 
of unity and dissent just within the incumbent party, the finding from the first part of this 
dissertation, (that parties in power adopt executive term limits during periods of high electoral 
uncertainty in order to regulate party competition in the future,) suggests the need to include a 
variable that captures the degree of electoral competition between the incumbent and opposition 
parties in the political system in the second half of the analysis.  This logic would suggest that, if 
perceptions that the strength of the incumbent party relative to the opposition was uncertain or in 
decline (meaning the incumbent party was unsure of its chances of winning the next election) 
drove the adoption of term limits, a continued high level of electoral competition could act as an 
incentive to keep these limits in place.  Correspondingly, if the incumbent party perceived that it 
was much stronger than any opposition party (meaning that it was clear that the incumbent party 
would win any election into the foreseeable future), this could cause ruling parties to re-evaluate 
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their need to regulate competition in this way.  However, this logic assumes that incentive 
structures remain the same over time, which might not be a sound assumption since it entails 
comparing a time of political transition in time period one to a time of more routine political 
practice in this second time period.  In fact, one could imagine a reversal of incentives in time 
period two, where incumbent parties that are uncertain if they will win the next election choose 
to lift executive term limits in order to increase their chance of winning through retaining the 
incumbency advantage, whereas parties that are certain to win the next election have little 
incentive to alter term limit rules since it will not directly aid anyone but the president and may 
even damage the party’s reputation domestically if they tamper with the constitution.263   
Therefore, two hypotheses relate to the party system competitiveness variable:  1) Term 
limits are more likely to be lifted in electoral environment characterized by decreased 
competitiveness due to the fact that the original reason for adopting term limits (uncertainty in 
the electoral arena) has disappeared; 2) term limits are more likely to be lifted in cases where the 
electoral arena remains or becomes increasingly competitive because the incumbent party wants 
to retain incumbent advantage to increase its chances of winning the next election.  In order to 
capture and compare the level of competition between the president’s party and opposition 
parties in each sub-Saharan African country during the time period under study in this part of the 
analysis, a measure of party system competitiveness will be assessed against term limit outcomes 
to test the relationship between the two. 
                                                 
263
 Evidence suggests that some African ruling parties have altered their constitutions in other ways to increase their 
chances of winning in an increasingly competitive environment.  For example ruling parties in the DRC and  The 
Gambia, among others, have eliminated the need for an absolute majority (over 50%) to win the presidential election 
in favor of a simple majority rule based on the logic that their candidate has a better chance of winning the first 
round of the election (against a split field of opposition candidates) than winning in a second round run-off when 
pitted against only one opposition candidate.   
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, over time political scientists have proposed various ways to 
measure the competitiveness of party systems, each of which have their strengths and 
shortcomings when applied to the African context.
 264
  For example, one of the most common 
party system measurements employed in political science is the “effective number of political 
parties” (ENPP) based on the calculation scheme developed by Laakso and Taagepera.265  
However, in non-institutionalized party systems, which encapsulates the vast majority of sub-
Saharan African systems, ENPP calculations often distort the realities on the ground, as a 
comparison between the ENPP measures for the second elections after democratization in Gabon 
and Mozambique demonstrate.  For both countries, the ENPP based on election results were 
nearly identical- 1.95 in Gabon, 2.00 in Mozambique.  Yet, underneath these similar ENPP 
values are very different levels of party competition.  In the 1996 legislative election in Gabon, 
thirteen parties won seats in the legislatures, but the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) party 
won 70% of those seats with the other 12 parties only winning a handful of seats each.  
Alternatively in the 1999 Mozambique election, only two parties won seats in the legislature 
with the ruling FRELIMO party winning 53% of the seats with the opposition RENAMO party 
capturing the remaining 47%.  Thus, even though their similar ENPP calculations would suggest 
that the party systems in Gabon and Mozambique comprise a similar level of competition, in 
reality these ENPP measures mask the stark differences between Gabon’s non-competitive 
system and Mozambique’s highly competitive electoral environment.   
Similarly, other standard measures that scholars have used to approximate the level of 
competitiveness among parties, including polarization, party system openness and volatility, are 
                                                 
264
 For a review see Bogaards, Matthijs. 2004. “Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in  
Africa,” in the European Journal of Political Research ,Vol. 43:173-97  
265
  Laakso, M. and R. Taagepera. 1979.  “Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West  
Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 12,1:3-27. 
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not reliable measures when attempting to analyze the non-ideological and non-institutionalized 
party systems of sub-Saharan Africa.  Even Sartori’s classic party system typology for fluid 
polities (which classifies party systems in emerging democracies as dominant-authoritarian, 
dominant, non-dominant or pulverized) is not the optimal measurement scheme for use here 
since it conflates electoral competition (one party needs to win over 50% of seats to be 
“dominant”) and free and fair elections in order to establish the line between dominant and 
dominant-authoritarian systems).  Since the free and fair quality of elections is being analyzed as 
a separate variable in this study, a different party system classification method that only 
measures electoral competition must be developed that is better able to capture the realities of 
African party contestation.
266
 
To construct a measure of the level of party competition that both accounts for Africa’s 
non-institutionalized party systems and reflects the information that is available to incumbent 
parties at the time they decide to uphold or contravene term limit laws, two criteria are essential.  
First, the measure must capture the electoral strength of the incumbent party and opposition 
parties vis-à-vis each other.  Many studies of the competitiveness within party systems across 
Africa only look at the percentage of seats or votes won by the winning party.
267
  However, this 
can be a misleading basis for such as measure since a party that captures 55% of the vote in a 
two-party system where the other party garners 45% is a much more competitive system than 
one in which the ruling party wins 55% of the vote but six other smaller parties each win less 
than ten percent of the remaining votes.  Second, most measures of competitiveness such as 
                                                 
266
 When ENPP measures for each country are analyzed in a logit regression with Aid as % of GNI, Level of 
Democracy (Freedom House scores), colonial power and free and fair elections variables, ENPP is found to not be 
significant (with a correlation coefficient of 0.267).  
267
 See for example Mozaffar, Shaheen and James R. Scarritt. 2005.  “The Puzzle of African Party Systems,” Party 
Politics, 11(4): 399-421 and  Van de Walle, N. & Butler, K.S. 1999. “Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa’s 
Illiberal Democracies.” Cambridge Review of International Studies 13(1): 14-28. 
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ENPP only assess the relationship between parties at a single point in time, or at most, measure 
changes between two elections.  However, in reality, political decision makers draw on their 
observation of trends over longer periods of time regarding changes in both the direction and 
degree of party strength to form a more dynamic assessment of party competition within their 
polities.  Taking into account trends in competitiveness over time is also essential when studying 
sub-Saharan African party systems because, due to the frequent occurrence of election boycotts 
by the opposition, only looking at the results of a single election can present a distorted picture of 
the true level of competition between the incumbent party and possible challengers.   
To meet the two criteria outlined above, a measure of the level of electoral 
competitiveness will be developed that classifies countries based on changes in the margin of 
victory in vote shares between the incumbent party and the opposition party that garners the most 
votes in legislative elections over the span of three electoral competitions (generally beginning 
with the first multi-party election in the country in the early-mid 1990s and ending with what 
was or would have been the nearest legislative election to that country’s incumbent president’s 
third term election).
268
   The margin of victory (MoV) is calculated by subtracting the percentage 
of votes
269
 won by the second place party from the percentage of votes won by the first place 
party in each of the three electoral contests.  Based on the trends in changes in the margin of 
victory over time, each country is then classified into one of four categories:  
 
                                                 
268
 Many African countries hold elections for the presidency the legislature concomitantly, which made determining 
which three elections to include in the analysis simple.  For those countries in which presidential and legislative 
elections are staggered, the first legislative election included is the multi-party election that is closest in date to the 
election in which the president under study is first elected in a multi-party election, be that before (i.e. Namibia) or 
after (i.e. Burkina Faso) the presidential election.   
269
 For the majority of cases, the vote shares won by each party are publically available.  However, for the countries 
where vote share data is not available, seat share data was used instead to calculate the margin of victory. 
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   Non-competitive:  The incumbent party has enjoyed a MoV greater than 40%
270
 in each of the     
   first three multiparty elections.   
 
   Less Competitive: The MoV is in all three elections has been between 15-40% in favor of the  
   president’s party, no turnover in control of the Legislature. 
 
   Semi-Competitive (Trending Down): An opposition party has come within 15% of the  
   president’s Party’s MoV in at least one early legislative election,271 but the margin of victory  
   has grown in recent elections such that elections have become less competitive over time.  Yet,  
   the opposition’s previous strength provides a potential basis for future competition 
 
   Competitive (Trending Up): Opposition parties have come within 15% of the incumbent party    
   in at least one recent election and may have even taken over the legislative majority in some  
   cases in second or third elections.  Elections have grown more competitive over time. 
 
For the statistical analysis, these four categories will be coded as 0= Non-competitive, 1= Less 
Competitive, 2= Semi-competitive and 3= Competitive.  Data on the vote shares secured by each 
party in the 74 sub-Saharan elections across the 26 countries included in this study were 
collected from various sources including Nohlen et al’s Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook,272 
the African Elections Database,
273
 the Interparliamentary Union (IPU) election archives
274
 and 
the Election Guide of the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES).
275
  
 
9.  Colonial Power-  Generally treated as a control variable, a quick look at the map of sub-Sub-
Saharan Africa seems to suggest that the majority of countries in which term limits are lifted are 
concentrated in West Africa, which is primarily populated by former French colonial holdings.  
                                                 
270
 Forty percent was chosen as the cut-off between the Non-competitive and Less Competitive categories because, 
in all the cases included in the dataset, no African party has won a majority in the legislature that lost by a margin of 
over 40% in the previous election, making it (at least for now) a seemingly insurmountable obstacle.    
271
 This category can include countries like Togo where an opposition party won a slim 1.2%  majority in the first 
multi-party election but since then has been defeated by large margins of well over 40% by the incumbent presidents 
party in subsequent elections.  
272
 Nohlen, D., M. Krennerich, and B. Thibaut. 1999. Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
273
 http://africanelections.tripod.com 
274
 www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports 
275
 www.ifes.org/eguide/elecguide.htm. 
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Therefore, to test whether this visual observance is in reality statistically supported, a colonial 
power variable will be included in the analysis.  The notion that a political outcome could be 
driven by the contrasting experiences with colonialism and the legacies these divergent practices 
have left is not a new one in studies of sub-Saharan Africa.  In the decades since the end of 
colonialism (which lasted until the late 1950s in West Africa through to the early 1980s in some 
southern African nations) many scholars of African history and politics have ascribed differences 
in factors as wide-ranging as infrastructure development, political stability, economic growth, 
ethnic relations and the rule of law
276
 have all been, at one time or another, attributed to variation 
in the colonial experience by African countries formerly ruled by France, the UK, Germany or 
Portugal.  While determining exactly what aspect of colonial legacy could impact term limit 
outcomes would necessitate in-depth case study analyses, one noted difference in colonial policy 
and legacy that could potentially affect domestic power dynamics today include the more hands-
on approach (both during the colonial period and after independence) taken by France versus the 
more hands-off governance approach taken by the UK, Germany and Portugal.  Therefore, the 
working hypothesis in this analysis is that being a former French colony will make it more likely 
that term limits will be lifted in a given country. 
 The former colonial power associated with each sub-Saharan African country will be 
verified by the description of the history of each state as recorded in the reference Africa South of 
the Sahara, various years.277  For countries that were colonized by more than one European 
power over the course of the colonial period, the European nation that colonized that country for 
the longest period of time will be employed in the analysis.  For example, present-day Tanzania 
                                                 
276
 See for example Acemoglu, Daron Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2001.  “The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative  Development: An Empirical Investigation.” American Economic Review 91: 1369-1401.     And  
Joireman, Sandra Fullerton. 2001.  "Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa and the colonial 
legacy," Journal of Modern African Studies, 39,4: 571-596. 
277
 Europa Publications Limited. 1990-2010. Africa South of the Sahara. London: Europa Publications, Ltd. 
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was colonized by Germany from 1884 until it was defeated in World War I in 1919, at which 
time it's colonial territories in East Africa were transferred to the United Kingdom, which ruled 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar (the two territories that comprise Tanzania today) until independence in 
1964.  Therefore, in the statistical analysis here, Tanzania will be classified as a British colony 
because it was under the dominion of the UK for 45 years but only under German rule for 35 
years.  The only African country case with multiple colonial powers whose classification cannot 
be resolved by recourse to length of colonization is Cameroon, whose present day territory was 
split between English and French protectorates following World War I and only untied upon 
independence in 1960.  However, since a majority of the territory of present-day Cameroon was 
administered by the French (eight districts vs. the UK’s two), Cameroon will be coded as a 
French colony in this analysis.  For the analysis, colonial power is treated as a dummy variable278 
where 0= non-French colonies and 1= former French colonies. 
 
10. Ethnic Fractionalization of the country-  Included primarily as a control variable, a measure 
of ethnic fractionalization in the country aims to measure the level of ethno-linguistic 
heterogeneity in a polity.  It has been argued that varying levels of ethnic diversity within a 
country can impact political and economic outcomes such as public goods provision,
279
 
government policies and economic growth in various ways in sub-Saharan nations.
280
  Therefore, 
it is important to assess whether differences in ethnic diversity plays a role in term limit 
outcomes across country cases.  
                                                 
278
 Treating colonial power as a categorical variable (i.e. France= 1, UK= 2, Germany= 3, Portugal=4) did not work 
well in this analysis because both Germany and Portugal categories had so few observations that it skewed the 
results.  
279
 Habyarimana, James P. et al. 2009. Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action.  New York:   
     Russell Sage Foundation. 
280
 Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 1997. “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions.” Quarterly  
     Journal of Economics, 112 (November):1203–50. 
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 The standard measure of ethnic fractionalization that is widely employed in statistical 
analyses is the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) measure developed by Easterly and 
Levine that employs a Herfindahl concentration index to assess the likelihood that two people 
chosen at random will be from different ethnic groups.
 281
  However, Posner argues that the ELF 
measure is not helpful to researchers interested in political outcomes because the data from 
which it was calculated “enumerates dozens of groups in each country that may be culturally or 
linguistically distinct from their neighbors but that are irrelevant as independent political 
actors.”282  Therefore, he constructs an alternative measure of ethnic fractionalization which 
seeks to account for the degree of politically salient ethnic diversity in each polity called 
Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG).
283
  As the issue of executive tenure is an inherently 
political issue, Posner’s PREG measure of ethnic fractionalization will be employed in this 
analysis.
284
  The PREG index calculates the politically relevant ethnic fractionalization in each 
country on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating a perfectly homogeneous society and 1 a fully 
heterogeneous society.  The data is sourced from Posner’s 2004 article in the American Journal 
of Political Science.
285
 
Two data tables (Tables 4.2 and 4.3) that include the values on all ten of the possible 
explanatory variables for each of the 26 cases under study are included below:   
 
 
 
                                                 
281
 Ibid. 
282
 Posner, Daniel. 2004.  “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa.” American Journal of Political Science, 48:  
      853 
283
 Ibid, p. 854. 
284
 As it turns out, neither ELF or PREG correlates highly with term limit outcomes in a pairwise comparison, 
although the direction of the correlation is different between the two. ELF has a correlation coefficient of -0.0843 
while PREG’s correlation coefficient is 0.0370.   
285
 Ibid, p. 856, 861-862. 
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Table 4.2:  Variable Values 
 
Country / President 
Incumbent 
President years 
in power 
Per capita Econ 
Growth during 
current term
286
 
Foreign Aid as 
% of GNI
287
 
Level of 
Democracy  
Seat share of 
President's 
party in 
legislature 
Term 
Limits 
Lifted? 
 Burkina Faso/ Compaore 10 1.35% 20.00% 7 91.00% yes 
 Cameroon/ Biya 26 1.02% 7.33% 4 85.00% yes 
 Chad/ Deby 14 12.85% 11.33% 5 71.00% yes 
 Djibouti/ Guelleh 11 3.2% 12.27% 6 100% yes 
 Gabon/ Bongo 36 -3.40% 0.66% 7 70.80% yes 
 Guinea/ Conte  17 0.50% 7.33% 5 62.30% yes 
 Namibia/ Nujoma 8 1.58% 4.70% 11 74.00% yes 
 Niger/ Tandja  10 1.51% 13.50% 9 41.60% yes 
 Senegal/ Diouf 17 0.18% n/a 8 66.40% yes 
 Togo/ Eyadema 35 -2.48% 4.33% 6 88.90% yes 
 Uganda/ Museveni 19 2.88% 14.33% 7 No-party 
(78%) (78%) 
yes 
       
 Benin/ Kerekou 34 0.48% 9.00% 12 37.80% no 
 Cape Verde/ Monteiro 10 4.35% 22.00% 13 55.50% no 
 Ghana/ Rawlings 20 1.72% 8.33% 10 66.00% no 
 Ghana/ Kufuor 10 3.90% 9.33% 13 55.70% no 
 Kenya/ Moi 24 -0.51% 3.33% 5 51.40% no 
 Malawi/ Muluzi 10 -3.04% 25.33% 9 48.20% no 
 Mali/ Konare 10 4.05% 14.66% 11 87.10% no 
 Mozambique/ Chissano 19 4.53% 34.66% 9 53.20% no 
 Nigeria/ Obasanjo 10 5.53% 2.33% 8 69.70% no 
 Soa Tome&P/ Trovoada 10 n/a n/a 13 56.00% no 
 Seychelles/ Rene 27 0.26% 1.70% 10 67.70% no 
 Sierra Leone/ Kabbah 11 7.02% 30.70% 9 74.10% no 
 Tanzania/ Mwinyi 10 -0.62% 25.00% 4 100% no 
 Tanzania/ Mkapa 10 3.60% 15.33% 9 91.00% no 
 Zambia/ Chiluba 10 -0.29% 19.70% 7 87.70% no 
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Table 4.3:  Variable Values, Continued 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
286
 Based on data from the World Development Indicators collected by the World Bank.  Year was included if the 
president was in office for more than six months out of that year.   
287
Average over the three years before attempt to lift term limits or year before president reaches the end of his 
second term. Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) database. 
Country / President 
Free and 
Fair 
Elections 
(2
nd
/3
rd
) 
Electoral 
System 
Party System 
Competive-
ness 
Colonial 
Power 
PREG: ethnic 
fractional-
ization 
Term Limits 
Lifted? 
 Burkina Faso/ Compaore 1 / 1 PR 1 France 0 yes 
 Cameroon/ Biya 1 / 1 Mixed 1 UK/France .71 yes 
 Chad/ Deby 1 / 1 Mixed 1 France .66 yes 
 Djibouti/ Guelleh 1 / 1 Majority 1 France n/a yes 
 Gabon/ Bongo 1 / 2 Majority 0 France .21 yes 
 Guinea/ Conte  1 / 1 Mixed 1 France .48 yes 
 Namibia/ Nujoma 2 / 2 PR 1 Germany .55 yes 
 Niger/ Tandja  2 / n/a Mixed 1 France .51 yes 
 Senegal/ Diouf 2 / 2 Mixed 1 France .14 yes 
 Togo/ Eyadema 0 / 1 PR 2 France .49 yes 
 Uganda/ Museveni 2 / 2 Majority 0 UK .63 yes 
       
 Benin/ Kerekou 1 / 2 PR 3 France .3 no 
 Cape Verde/ Monteiro 2 / 2 PR 3 Portugal n/a no 
 Ghana/ Rawlings 2 / 2 Majority 3 UK .44 no 
 Ghana/ Kufuor 2 / 2 Majority 3 UK .44 no 
 Kenya/ Moi 1 / 2 Majority 3 UK .57 no 
 Malawi/ Muluzi 2 / 1 Majority 3 UK .55 no 
 Mali/ Konare 2 / 2 Majority 3 France .13 no 
 Mozambique/ Chissano 2 / 2 PR 2 Portugal .36 no 
 Nigeria/ Obasanjo 1 / 1 Majority 1 UK .66 no 
 Soa Tome&P/ Trovoada 2 / 2 PR 3 Portugal n/a no 
 Seychelles/ Rene 2 / 3 Mixed 3 UK 0 no 
 Sierra Leone/ Kabbah 2 / 2 Majority 3 UK .56 no 
 Tanzania/ Mwinyi n/a / 1 Majority 1 UK .59 no 
 Tanzania/ Mkapa 1 / 2 Majority 1 UK .59 no 
 Zambia/ Chiluba 1 / 1 Majority 3 UK .71 no 
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Assessing the Explanatory Variables- Difference of Means Analysis 
As mentioned earlier, the medium-n size of the universe of cases encapsulated by this 
research question poses challenges for quantitative analysis.  While logistic regression is 
generally used to assess an array of possible explanatory independent variables against a 
dichotomous dependent variable, the number of potential explanatory variables identified above 
relative to the comparatively small number of president/country cases in the analysis decreases 
the precision of the logistic test.  Therefore, the quantitative analysis for this part of the 
dissertation will be undertaken in two steps.  First, the relationship between all ten of the possible 
explanatory variables introduced above and term limit adherence will be assessed through a 
difference of means (two tailed t-test) analysis.  Such an analysis tests the null hypothesis that 
the mean values of each variable do not differ significantly from each other between two groups 
of cases- in this instance the term limit upholders and term limit contraveners. Any variable for 
which the null hypothesis can be rejected has the potential to be reliable predictors of term limit 
outcomes across sub-Saharan cases.   Once the results of the difference of means test are known, 
only those potential explanatory variables for which the null hypothesis was rejected at an 85% 
confidence level will be entered into a logistic regression analysis.
288
  The lower number of 
variables included in the regression will increase the precision of the logistic test, thus creating a 
firmer statistical foundation on which to base the qualitative portion of the analysis.    
 The results of the difference of means analysis are listed in Table 4.4.  Among the less 
reliable predictors of term limit adherence turn out to be incumbent president’s years in office, 
economic growth under the incumbent, the incumbent party’s seat share in the legislature, the  
                                                 
288
 The lower threshold of 85% is being used rather than the normal 90% for two reasons.  First, methodologically, 
with such a small n, the results of any quantitative analysis will merely be suggestive, so greater leeway should be 
given before ruling out potential explanatory variables.  Second, on a practical level, two variables (Aid as a % of 
GNI and Free and Fair elections) both fall below the 90% confidence level by less than .004, and therefore should be 
included in the second round of analysis.    
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Table 4.4: Difference of Means (t-test) Results for Indicators of Executive Term Limit       
                  Adherence
289
 
 
 
Variable                                                         Difference of Means
290
 (P-value in parentheses) 
 
Years incumbent president                                      -3.5879 
 in office                                                                  (0.3151) 
 
Econ Growth (% per capita)                                    0.4608                                
during president’s current term                               (0.7389) 
 
Aid as % of GNI                                                     10.3730  
                                     (0.1029) ǂ 
 
Level of democracy                                                  2.6485 
                                                                                 (0.0122) ** 
 
Legislative seat share                                               -8.6236 
of President’s party                                                  (0.2201)        
 
Free and fair elections 
    second election                                                     0.3701 
                                                                                 (0.1606) 
 
    third election                                                         0.4000  
                                                                                 (0.0847)* 
 
Electoral system                                                        0.2121 
                                                                                 (0.2982) 
 
Competitiveness of the                                             1.6242 
party system                                                             (0.0000) ** 
 
Colonial Power                                                        -0.5939  
                                                                                 (0.0011) ** 
 
PREG- ethnic                                                            0.0158 
fractionalization                                                       (0.8671) 
 
                                                 
289
 Two-tailed t-test.  Null hypothesis (H0): Difference between means = 0.  Hypothesis tested (Ha): difference 
between means ≠ 0.  Pr (|T| > |t|) = P.   
290
 difference of mean = mean (term limit adherents) - mean (term limit non-adherents) 
Key 
n= 26 
**= significant at the 95% level 
 *=  significant at the 90% level 
 ǂ =  significant at the 85% level 
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electoral system, and politically relevant ethnic fractionalization.  As the values in Tables 4.2 
and 4.3 show, we see heterogeneous patterns of all of these variables in both polities that retain 
and polities that abolish term limits.  For example, contrary to the hypothesis that presidents who 
oversaw a period of positive and significant economic growth would be more likely to see term 
limits lifted in their countries does not hold up in reality as, out of the eight countries with 
average growth rates above 3.0% during the incumbent presidents second term, seven of them 
are countries that ultimately retained executive term limit laws.
291
   In addition, countries with 
negative growth rates can be found amongst both groups of country cases. Similarly, presidents 
with long tenures in office can be found in both countries that adhere to and countries that breech 
constitutional limits on executive tenure, as can a mix of various electoral systems, both low and 
high levels of ethnic fractionalization and small and large percentages of legislative seats held by 
MPs from the president’s party.  These findings suggest that term limit outcomes do not seem to 
rest on the past performance of the specific president, are not simply an outcome of socio-
political cleavages or of previous institutional choices or that lifting term limits is not as easy as 
simply having a majority in parliament at the time of the vote on the term limit amendment.  
Accordingly, due to their low difference of means results, these five variables will not be 
included in the logit analysis. 
Other variables appear to be better potential predictors of term limit outcomes based on 
the t-test outputs. The Level of Democracy appears to have a fairly robust relationship to patterns 
of term limit adherence.  In general, as observable in Table 4.3, countries that retain term limits 
tend to have higher (“more free”) scores than countries in which limits on executive tenure are 
abolished.  However, there are a number of country cases that do not confirm to this pattern, 
                                                 
291
 This group includes Cape Verde, Ghana (under Kufuor), Mali, Mozambique,  Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, and 
Sierra Leone.  Chad was the only country that lifted term limits that have an average growth rate above 3.0%. 
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including Namibia and Niger as relatively democratic countries that lifted term limits and, on the 
other side, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, relatively less free countries (as rated at the time of 
term limit decisions) that enforced term limit laws on incumbent leaders.  This apparent 
disconnect in several countries between levels of political freedoms for citizens (the aspect of 
democracy that Freedom House scores are based upon) and the adherence to the rule of law by 
political elites indicates that we should not assume that all aspects of democracy co-vary 
together.  Therefore, it is important to disaggregate the concept of democracy and explore 
aspects of democracy that more directly relate to representation and elections.  One variable that 
looks at a specific aspect of a country’s level of democracy is Free and Fair Elections indicator.  
In the difference of means test, while the difference of means for the second elections cannot be 
ruled to be different from zero, the difference of means in fairness of the third multiparty 
elections (the elections that are or would have been the “third term” elections for the incumbent 
president) is above the 90% confidence level for rejecting the null hypothesis and the positive 
value of the p-value for this variable indicates that countries that kept term limits in place as a 
group have higher average scores on Lindberg’s measure of free and fair elections than the 
cluster of contraveners. As such, the degree to which the holding of free and fair elections relates 
to term limit outcomes also warrants further analysis. Likewise, the variable Aid as a percentage 
of GNI falls just above the 90% confidence level and behaves as predicted, which is in line with 
the hypothesis that the more aid-dependent a country is the less likely it is to abolish term limits 
for fear of disillusioning donors regarding their democratic credentials.  It too will be further 
explored in the logit models. 
Besides the Free and Fair elections indicator, another variable, Competitiveness of the 
Party System, a measure constructed to capture the degree and direction of change in the relative 
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balance of power between the incumbent and opposition parties over time, attempts to isolate 
one aspect of democracy for analysis.  The difference of means test reveals that it is one of two 
potential predictors that appear to demonstrate the strongest relationship to patterns of term limit 
adherence across the two categories of with a confidence interval above the 99% level.  Recall 
that  that party system competitiveness was the one variable for which the hypothesized 
relationship with executive tenure outcomes was unclear, as one logic suggested that current 
incumbent parties in highly competitive states might have incentives to lift term limits in order to 
capture incumbency advantage for the next election whereas another logic suggested that term 
limits were more likely to be lifted in non-competitive states because the need to regulate 
political competition (the reason for the adoption of term limits in the first place as discussed in 
Chapter 3) no longer obtained.  Yet, sign on the t-statistic clearly suggests that ruling parties in 
non-competitive and less competitive party systems are much more likely to contravene term 
limits than their counterparts in more competitive party systems.  In fact, both of the two (100%) 
president/country cases classified as non-completive lifted term limits, eight out of the eleven 
(72%) rated as less competitive did away with tenure restrictions, one out of the two (50%) cases 
classified as semi-competitive abolished limits but none (0%) of the ten cases rated as 
competitive altered term limit laws in their constitutions.  Thus, as the level of competitiveness 
in the electoral system increases, so too does the likelihood that term limits will be retained at the 
end of the second term of the first president elected under the re-introduced multi-party system.  
The strength of this variable will be further tested in the logit analysis. 
Finally, the other variable that demonstrated a very strong relationship to term limit 
outcomes in the difference of means analysis is the colonial power variable.  As predicted based 
on visual observations of a map indicating countries where term limits have been contravened, 
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being a former French colony greatly increases a country’s probability of abolishing term limits 
ten years after first implementing them.  This variable poses a bit of a puzzle in this analysis as 
the large time gap between the end of the colonial era in the 1950s-60s and the abolition of term 
limits in the late 1990s-2000s means that it is difficult to establish a clear link between colonial 
experiences and more modern elite decision making.  The hypothesis presented earlier, that 
France’s of active support of rulers (even dictatorial ones) in its former colonies well into the 
1980s-90s could have contributed to building up strong incumbent regimes that were later better 
equipped to fend off opposition challenges, may explain part of this pattern. However, the high 
degree of variation in French involvement between her former colonies makes this line of 
reasoning incomplete.  It is likely that this largely geographic variable
292
 is actually masking 
other factors that have not been included in the statistical analysis. Uncovering the mechanisms 
that link French colonial history to term limit outcomes is best done through case study analyses. 
Unfortunately, the case studies selected for this part of the project do not allow for this type of 
investigation as both Uganda and Zambia are former British colonies.
293
  Thus, while it is 
important to note the apparent link between French colonial experience and term limit abrogation 
and to include the colonial power variable in the forthcoming logit analysis, a full investigation 
of this variable must be left for future research. 
 
  Assessing the Explanatory Variables- Logistic Regression Analysis  
 The difference of means analysis above revealed that, of the ten explanatory variables 
assessed, five seemed to relate to patterns of term limit adherence to a high enough degree to 
                                                 
292
 Most former French colonies are found in West Africa while the majority of former English colonies are in 
Eastern and  Southern Africa. 
293
 It should be noted that when attempted but unsuccessful term limit contraventions are combined with successful 
contraventions, the French colonial link is weakened since all three failed attempts (Zambia, Malawi and Nigeria) 
are former British colonies.  Therefore, the impetus to try to lift term limits seems more universal than the success. 
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warrant further investigation.  With the number of independent variables cut in half, we can now 
move to a series of logistic regression analyses in order to assess the relationship between each 
variable and term limit adherence when all other variables are held constant.  The five variables 
that will be included in the logistic regression analysis are the amount of foreign aid received by 
each country, the level of democracy/Freedom House rating, the free and fairness of elections, 
the competitiveness of the party system and the colonial power variables.   
 In order to examine to effects of the independent variables listed above upon term limit 
adherence across sub-Saharan Africa, variations on the following logistic regression model will 
be estimated: 
 
Ln (p/1-p) = B0 + B1XAid%GDP + B2XFreedomHouse+ B3XFreeFairElec +B3XCompetitiveness + B4XColPower + u 
 
 
where B0 represents a constant, XAid%GDP  represents the average amount of aid as a percentage of 
GDP that a country receives over the three years prior to the term limit decision, XLevelofDemocracy 
represents the level of democracy in the country, coded as an inverted Freedom House score,     
XFreeFairElec stands for the degree to which the third election is free and fair as coded by Lindberg, 
XCompetitiveness represents the degree and direction of change in the balance of power between the 
president’s party and opposition parties over the first three multi-party elections and XColPower 
represents the coding of French vs. non-French colonial history.   
Unfortunately running the logistic regression with all five variables against the 26 cases 
produces an error in which “10 failures and 15 successes completely determined.”294  Therefore, 
six different models will be run using several combinations of variables, the results of which are 
presented below in Table 4.5.  Models One and Two alternatively include either colonial power  
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 The error occurs when the Colonial Power and Competitiveness variables are included in the same model.   
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Table 4.5:  Results of Logistic Regression Models on Term Limit Adherence 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Aid as % of 
GNI 
 
0.1018 
(1.17) 
 
 
0.1586 
(1.37) 
 
 
 
0.1489 
(1.32) 
0.1435 
(1.35) 
Level of 
Democracy 
 
 
    0.4863  
(1.56) 
 
 
    0.3008 
(0.61) 
 
   0.5571 ǂ 
   (1.84) 
    0.1651 
(0.38) 
0.2555 
(0.77) 
 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
 
0.1869 
(0.14) 
 
 
0.2449 
(0.13) 
 
 
-0.4059 
(-0.30) 
 
    0.4139 
(0.20) 
 
   1.1149 
(0.81) 
 
Colonial Power 
 
 
-2.789* 
(-2.07) 
 
 
 
 
  -2.983* 
(-2.31) 
 
 
 
  
 
Competitiveness 
of Party System 
 
 
 
2.4507 ǂ 
   (1.88) 
 
 
   2.1630* 
    (2.22) 
 2.5513* 
(2.11) 
 2.3482* 
(2.07) 
Constant 
   -3.8917 
(0.82) 
   -7.8952 
(-1.87) 
 
   -2.1533        
    (-1.08) 
 
   -4.9260 
    (-2.03) 
-7.4162 
(-1.86) 
-6.7290 
(-2.09) 
Pseudo R 0.4819 0.6073 0.4330 0.5290 0.5969 0.5956 
N 25 25 25 25 26 25 
    Coefficients above, z-value in parentheses. 2-tailed p-value: ǂ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
or level of party competition along with the other three variables in order to overcome the error 
that results when all five variables are regressed together.  The variable for Aid as % of GNI is 
dropped from models Three and Four due to the fact that it was the lowest scoring indicator in 
the difference of means test and was also not found to be significant in the first two logit models. 
Thus, models Three and Four are included in order to further isolate the variables that seem to 
offer the greatest possible explanatory power.  In all four models, colonial power and party 
system competitiveness are the only variables that are consistently significant at or above the 
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90% level. Furthermore, in models Five and Six, the level of democracy and free and fair 
elections variables are assessed one at a time in order to address issues of multicollinearity 
between the two.  Both variables are included in the overall analysis because the political 
phenomenon they seek to represent and evaluate are conceptually distinct, with level of 
democracy speaking to the impact of overall regime type on term limit outcomes and free and 
fair elections assessing a much more proximate possible explanation, namely to degree to which 
the ruling party’s ability to manipulate elections in specific affects a ruling party’s decision to 
tamper with term limit laws.  However, based on the way each are operationalized here, they are 
highly correlated statistically (with a correlation coefficient of 0.6228), which poses a problem of 
mutlicollinearity, especially given the small number of cases being assessed.  Therefore, models 
Five and Six are included in order to address this issue by gauging the extent to which it affected 
the results of the earlier models in which both level of democracy and free and fair elections 
were included in the same regression.  As the results from these two models demonstrate, 
separating out values for level of democracy and free and fair elections do not yield results that 
are significantly different from earlier models.  While the coefficients for both level of 
democracy and free and fair elections do change somewhat (especially the increase of the later) 
in models Five and Six, the overall result indicates that the level of competitiveness within the 
party system is a much stronger determinant of term limit adherence across the universe of 
African cases.   
 
Overall, after entering various combinations of all five variables that related most directly 
with term limit outcomes into logit analyses, I find that only two factors remain robustly 
significant: the competitiveness of the party system and the former colonial power.  Both were 
significant above the 90% level in models One and Two and at a 95% level in models Three and 
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Four, while competitiveness of the party system was also significant at the 95% level in models 
Five and Six.  These results signal that, controlling for other factors, states with less competitive 
party systems and French colonial histories are much more likely to contravene executive term 
limits than countries more competitive party systems and countries that were colonized by the 
UK, Portugal or Germany.  While the level of democracy was significant at the 90% level in 
model 3 when assessed against the colonial power variable, it was not significant in any of the 
other five models, including the four models in which competitiveness was included a variable. 
In further testing, interactions between competitiveness * levels of democracy; 
competitiveness * free and fair elections; colonial power * levels of democracy; and colonial 
power * competitiveness were added to the various models, but all of the interaction variables 
were found to either not be significant or return errors of over-determination.
295
  This suggests 
that, given the limitations of small n data analysis, the degree of competitiveness in the party 
system and the colonial history of sub-Saharan countries on their own appear to be the best 
indicators of the probability that a sitting government will adhere to executive term limit laws.      
Based on these statistical findings, the focus of the qualitative investigation in the next 
two chapters will be to unpack the causal mechanisms that drive the relationship between party 
competitiveness and term limit adherence.  Through interviews with political elites and analysis 
of key documents, the aim of the qualitative analysis is to flesh out the reasons why term limits 
were lifted in Zambia’s non-dominant party system while term limits were abolished in 
Uganda’s dominant-authoritarian system.  As mentioned previously, uncovering the basis, either 
direct or indirect, for the relationship between French colonial history and term limit 
contravention will be left to future research.  
                                                 
295
 Whether there is genuinely no interaction effect or whether the N is simply too small (i.e. does not produce 
enough cross-cutting variation) to be able to find results with an interaction term and the two parent variables in the 
model is difficult to know. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
TERM LIMIT ABROGATION: THE CASE OF UGANDA 
 
 
 
The Ugandan parliamentary chamber was unusually packed with both lawmakers and 
spectators on July 12, 2005 as each Member of Parliament took his or her turn in declaring “aye” 
or “nay” on the amendment of article 105(2) of the national constitution, the clause which placed 
a two term limit restriction on the office of the president.  The debate over unlimited executive 
terms, or “kisanja” meaning “another turn” in the Luganda vernacular widely spoken in and 
around the capital Kampala, had begun in March 2003 at a party conference at Kyankwanzi and 
had simmered in the media, among civil society groups and in the halls of parliament all the way 
up until this vote.  President Yoweri Museveni had been careful to stay silent during the two-
plus-year debate, yet it was common knowledge that the President not only favored the abolition 
of term limits, but had actively lobbied individual members of parliament to vote in favor of 
lifting the restriction on his office.  In the end, 220 MPs chose to vote with the president to lift 
executive term limits while only 53 voted against amending the article. Yet, the choice on how to 
vote was a complex matter for many MPs, some of whom left the chambers crying after voting to 
lift term limits because they had “gone against their conscience.”296 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether the collective results of MP choice in the 
Ugandan term limit debate described above is consistent with the expectations of the decision 
model developed in chapter two.  The model’s probabilistic prediction of the outcome of the 
Ugandan case rest upon the balance of power between the incumbent and opposition parties in 
                                                 
296Author’s interview with NRM member of Parliament, 2/7/2008. 
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the closing years of the executive’s second term.  Yet, it is not the absolute levels of power 
possessed by each party (to the extent that such a variable can even be measured with any degree 
of accuracy) that determines the outcome of term limit debates.  Rather it is the perceptions that 
members of parliament possess regarding the extent to which their party’s power is actually 
increasing or decreasing relative to competitors.   By 2005, when the constitutional amendment 
lifting term limits was passed in Uganda, it was clear to MPs that the ruling National Resistance 
Movement’s power remained high relative to opposition forces in the country.  Over its nearly 
twenty years in power, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) had carefully controlled 
opposition forces through a “no-party” democracy system while simultaneously building support 
for itself through both the implementation of key policies and by constantly reminding voters of 
the unrest that plagued Uganda prior to the NRM’s rule.  Drawing on cues from their fellow 
MPs, their constituents, the media and other sources, the majority of NRM members of 
parliament deduced that the NRM’s hold on power was secure for the foreseeable future. 
Accordingly, we should find that the decision process and outcome regarding executive 
term limits in Uganda correspond to Strategy I as laid out in Chapter 2, where the electoral 
uncertainty that prompted the adoption of term limits in time period one has given way to a more 
certain political environment in time period two wherein incumbent party members feel secure in 
their party’s hold on power.  This change in incumbent party actors’ perceptions of the degree 
and direction of their relative power affects many facets of debate on term limits, including the 
amount of leverage each category of actors possesses within the decisional context, the balance 
between actors’ action and outcome preferences, and the strategies available to each group of 
actors.  In the end, this perception of electoral certainty among Uganda MPs lead to the abolition 
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of executive term limits in specific, and a weakening of the rule of law in general due to the 
absence of the mechanisms of fear of replacement and ability to switch parties. 
This chapter will open by constructing a more in-depth look at relative party strength 
between the incumbent National Resistance Movement and the opposition in Uganda which will 
combine public opinion data with an examination of the strategies all parties have employed over 
the post-1986 period to build support for themselves.  After this, the remainder of the chapter 
investigates the dynamic interplay of actor perception, preferences, power and strategies that 
shaped the collective choice to undermine the rule of law in Uganda by not upholding key 
constraints on presidential power.   
 
Relative Party Strength:  Assessing the NRM and the Opposition 
 At the time of the vote to abolish executive term limits from the Ugandan constitution in 
2005, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and President Museveni had been at the helm 
of the Uganda state for nearly twenty years.  During that time, the NRM had built a formidable 
political organization that dominated Ugandan public life from the lowest-levels of the local 
councils to the central government. Unlike most liberalizing African polities that introduced 
multi-party systems in the early-to-mid 1990s, the NRM maintained a no-party “movement” 
democracy from the time it seized power in 1986 up until shortly before the 2006 presidential 
and parliamentary elections.  In this way, and through other tactics, NRM elites were able to 
contain and control opposition to President Museveni through this purportedly all-inclusive 
political system in which elections were theoretically based on individual merit rather than party 
politics.  At the same time, internal divisions, a lack of resources and a history of political 
mismanagement weakened the appeal of opposition parties among voters who valued political 
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stability above all else.  As a result, opposition forces were not able to develop a clear and 
plausible alternative to the ruling coalition, which later profoundly structured the choice of 
strategies available to members of parliament at the time of the term limit vote.  
 Available data demonstrates that the relative strength of the National Resistance 
Movement-Organization (or NRM-O, as the Movement-affiliated party has been dubbed since 
the return to multi-partyism) grew substantially vis-à-vis Ugandan opposition parties in terms of 
its ability to garner public support and win national elections over opposition parties in Uganda 
between the adoption of term limits in 1995 and the time of the parliamentary vote to lift 
executive term limits in 2005.  The quantitative analysis in the preceding chapter measured 
relative party strength by the difference in the percentage of votes (or seats where vote-share data 
is not available) won by the incumbent and the main opposition party in all parliamentary 
elections following the implementation of executive term limits in the country.  The data from 
Uganda
297
 reveals that NRM-aligned MPs captured just over a majority (approximately 57%) of 
the seats in the 1996 parliamentary elections
298
 and increased their share to 78% of seats in the 
2001 elections.
299
   By the February 2006 parliamentary election, which occurred just seven 
months after executive term limits were removed from the constitution in July of 2005, the 
NRM-O won 191 out of 284, or 67.3%, of the legislative seats up for grabs, which at first looks 
like a decrease over 2001 levels.  However, the actual number of seats controlled by the NRM-O 
is in fact even higher than 191, as most of the candidates who lost NRM-O primary elections but 
later won a seat as one of the 37 Independent parliamentarians signed a “memorandum of 
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 As mentioned above, Uganda was officially a “no-party” system from 1986 until 2006.  As a result, there is no 
official data available on the seat or vote shares of parties during this time, since all candidates ran as individuals.  
However, estimates by close observers of Ugandan politics and declarations of NRM seat shares by President 
Museveni himself in 2001 allow us to approximate the seat share of the NRM in the 1996 and 2001 elections.   
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 Uganda, African Elections Database-  http://africanelections.tripod.com/ug.html#1996_Parliamentary_Election 
299
 Wasike, Alfred 2001. “Movemnent has 230 MPs – Museveni,”  The New Vision, Kampala, Uganda. 1 July 2001. 
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cooperation” with the NRM-O shortly after the election,300 making the actual proportion of the 
National Assembly controlled by the NRM close to 80%.  Thus, compared to the 37 seats (13%) 
captured by the largest opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), in 2006 the 
NRM-O enjoys a very asymmetric balance of power in their favor.   
 Moving beyond electoral returns, public opinion data gathered between April and May 
2005,
301
 less than one year before the 2006 elections, demonstrates similar strong support for the 
NRM over the opposition among Uganda constituents.  When asked to rate their level of trust in 
various political organizations and institutions, 72% of respondents reported trusting the 
Movement either “a lot”(47%) or “somewhat”(25%) compared to only 35% (12% “a lot”, 23% 
“somewhat”)  claiming a similar level of trust in “opposition political parties” in general. At the 
other extreme, only 11% of citizens claimed to “not at all” trust the NRM, while a full 32% 
claimed no trust whatsoever in any/all opposition parties. Similarly striking, when subjects were 
asked if they “feel close to any particular political party,” 46% expressed an affinity for the 
NRM (a ten point increase from the 36% of respondents who expressed feeling close to the NRM 
in the previous survey conducted in 2002), whereas the main opposition parties- the Uganda 
People’s Congress (UPC), the FDC, and the Democratic Party (DP) only garnered six, four and 
three percent, respectively in 2005.    
How exactly was the NRM/NRM-O able to build such a formidable political organization 
and why were none of the several opposition groups in the country able to challenge the NRM’s 
hold on power by 2006?  The actions and strategies followed by both the NRM and opposition 
forces within the Ugandan politico-historical context needs to be closely examined in order to 
understand the causes of this asymmetry within the party system leading up to time that the vote 
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on the executive term limits was held.  This analysis will begin with an exploration of the 
origins, organization and policies implemented under the Movement political system that have 
allowed the NRM to become a dominant party in the present era.  Next, the analysis will turn to 
an investigation of the main opposition forces in the country, namely the two historical, 
independence-era parties- the UPC and DP- and the newest opposition party, the FDC and the 
strategies they have pursued in their quest to increase their own support among the electorate.  
The goal of this section is to show how the NRM developed its strong position relative to 
opposition forces in the time preceding the third term debate in Uganda, thereby setting the 
structure of party competition in which members of parliament found themselves during the vote 
on the kisanja amendment in parliament. 
 
The National Resistance Movement:  Constructing Support 
 In response to the perceived rigging of the 1980 election by former President Milton 
Obote and his Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) party, a group of twenty-six insurgents formed 
the Popular Resistance Army (PRA) (later rebranded as the National Resistance Army (NRA)) 
and took to the bush with the aim of overthrowing the UPC government (and later the Okellos’ 
regime after they deposed Obote in 1985).  Headed by Yoweri Museveni, the former leader of 
the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), one of the Ugandan insurgent groups that joined 
the Tanzanian military to oust dictator Idi Amin Dada in 1979, and later the vice-chair of the 
Military Commission in the transitional government that was set-up shortly thereafter, the 
guerilla movement engaged in a brutal five-year civil war with UPC military forces primarily in 
the Luwero Triangle area of central Uganda.
302
  After the NRA marched victorious into Kampala 
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in January of 1986, the guerilla movement faced the task of transforming itself into a civilian 
government, which became known as the National Resistance Movement (NRM).   
 Perhaps the most pressing task of the new NRM government was to build national 
support for its authority.  Comprised mostly of Banyankole from the west and Buganda from 
central Uganda, the NRM leadership represented only a minority of regional interests and were 
thus viewed with suspicion by groups in the North and East, especially those like the Langi and 
Acholi who had been associated with the Obote and Okello governments.
303
  To build such 
support, and to make good on their pledge to bring democracy to all Ugandans made in their 
“Ten Point Programme” manifesto promulgated in 1985, the central NRM leadership decided to 
expand to the entire country the system of local-level democratic self-government that they had 
initiated in the Western areas they had controlled during the armed struggle.  This unique form of 
participatory democracy, dubbed the “movement system,” consisted of five levels of local 
government bodies called “resistance councils” (RCs) that spanned the village (RC1), parish 
(RC2), sub-county (RC3), county (RC4) and district (RC5) levels.  Villagers directly elected 
their nine-member village council while members of higher councils were selected by lower 
council seat-holders from among their own ranks.  After years of enduring civil war, erratic 
dictators and general political upheaval, the construction of a political system that “responded to 
a widely held desire by Ugandans that they should be permitted to participate effectively in their 
governments”304 brought the NRM regime much popular support across the various regions of 
the country.  Even though the system lost some of its local autonomy in 1987 when legislation 
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was passed to bring the RCs under greater central NRM government control, the NRM’s 
implementation of direct democracy “offered it the most immediate and… useful technique it 
could credibly deploy to broaden its appeal among groups with whom it had few social 
connections.”305   
 While it is clear that the NRM’s introduction of the regional council system helped the 
regime win widespread support among the population, additional NRM actions aimed at 
strengthening its own real and perceived authority and popularity among voters also contributed 
to its growing dominance in Ugandan public life as it morphed from being an “interim 
arrangement” to a permanent political organization.  For example, the program of political 
education called chaka mchaka that had been started by the NRA during the guerilla war to build 
support for the group within the territories the NRA controlled was expanded after 1986.   The 
goal of these programs was twofold:  1) to teach people not to fear the gun and provide basic 
military training to community defense organizations and 2) to teach people the history of 
Uganda according to the NRA/M, which painted traditional political parties as being responsible 
for all of Uganda’s problems, thereby justifying the NRMs continued restriction of party 
activity.
306
  Civil servants such as teachers, soldiers, bureaucrats and employees of parastatals 
were expected to attend such programs and Resident District Commissioners were tasked with 
organizing trainings for the general population around their districts.
307
  The chaka mchaka 
program was highly effective as, according to a senior NRA officer, “[q]uite apart from 
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educating people about the aims and objectives of the NRM, political education was a very 
effective way of winning support for the Movement.”308 
 Furthermore, the NRM ingratiated itself to many citizens in 1993 by formally restoring 
the traditional regional monarchies that had been abolished by the first Obote regime in 1966, 
including the Kabaka, the Buganda king and the kingships of Toro, Bunyoro, and Busoga.  
Although resurrected only as “cultural institutions,” meaning that the monarchs were prohibited 
from engaging in politics, the reinstatement of the four kingdoms gained the NRM much popular 
support, especially in Buganda, which had the added benefit of simultaneously weakening the 
appeal of the Democratic Party since the central Buganda region was its former stronghold.
309
  
Other popular policies and initiatives, such as the introduction of free primary education for all 
children, the regular, relatively peaceful holding of elections, an and a participatory national 
constitution-making process also lead many citizens to feel that the NRM government as more 
responsive to their needs and views than previous governments had been.
310
   
Finally, perhaps the most important way that the Movement gained the trust and support 
of constituents was to usher in a period of relative political stability and peace in much of the 
country wherein citizens feel safe sleeping in their homes
311
 and engaging in daily life.  
Following decades of repressive rule, dictatorial decrees, wanton political detentions and killings 
and civil war under Obote I and II and Amin, “the guaranteeing of relative security which had 
long eluded the area, must be an important, if not the critical factor explaining the lack of 
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opposition to Museveni’s political project and the absence of an effective autonomous 
democratic movement.”312 
Besides attempting to build support for its rule among constituents, the NRM also sought 
to strengthen itself and weaken opponents by designing and later altering the institutions of 
governance in its favor.   Perhaps the most austere NRM strategy for hindering political 
opposition was the fact that the Movement system was developed as an officially a “no-party” 
system.  The first act by the provisional parliament that was formed in 1986 by NRM officials 
was to issue Legal Notice No. 1/1986, which, among other things, placed severe restrictions on 
the activities of political parties.
313
  Even though parties were still allowed to exist in name and 
maintain a national office in Kampala, in reality parties were prohibited from engaging in 
politics as they were forbidden to have branch offices close to constituents, were not allowed to 
hold rallies or other public events and were barred from sponsoring candidates in elections.  As a 
result, candidates in all elections from the village RCs up through the national parliament were 
elected on “individual merit” rather than along party lines.  The NRM leadership justified this de 
facto ban on political parties in two ways : 1) by arguing that the turbulence and violence in 
Uganda’s post-independence period had been brought about by the ethnic and religious divisions 
enshrined in the Democratic Party (DP) and the Uganda’s People’s Congress (UPC), the two 
long-standing national parties in the country, and 2) by maintaining that parties are only 
necessary in advanced industrial societies with socio-economic cleavages, not polities like 
Uganda where there is only one class- the peasantry.
314
   In place of a multi-party dispensation, 
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the NRM proclaimed that the Movement system was a “broad-based” government that includes 
all Ugandans under the movement banner.
315
  
However, even though the NRM claimed to be implementing a no-party system, the 
Movement leaders often acted counter to this philosophy in practice by taking steps to increase 
the power of groups and individuals deemed to be sympathetic to the current NRM leadership 
and by fusing its organization with the state apparatus.  As a case in point, before the 1996 
elections, the NRM bolstered itself and weakened opposition forces by institutionalizing 
permanent seats for some of its main social constituencies including women, workers, army and 
youth into parliament, thus guaranteeing itself “a working parliamentary majority even before 
the election was held.”316  The NRM leadership went even further in 1997 by promulgating the 
“Movement Act” which served to change the NRM organization from an interim transitional 
government (which legally ceased to exist following the 1996 presidential and parliamentary 
elections) into a de facto one-party state.    Among other things, the Act required all Ugandan 
adults to be members of the Movement, stipulated that the Movement Secretariat would be 
funded by state monies, and generally “formalized a growing trend in which Movement interest 
were gradually being superimposed onto the logic of the state in ways that made it [the state]… 
the purveyor of NRM political objectives.”317   This fusing of the NRM with the state meant that 
the Movement could use state administrative personnel (i.e. resident district commissioners, local 
council representatives) to essentially campaign for the NRM’s preferred candidates in elections 
and the NRM’s preferences in popular referendum.  Furthermore, the Movement was also able to 
use the organs of the state, including the police and courts, to circumscribe individuals who 
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demonstrated opposition to the central leadership’s control.  Most notably, this was demonstrated 
by the treatment endured by Kizza Besigye, an NRM “historical” who challenged Museveni in 
both the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections and “faced intimidation, harassment and 
recrimination”318 throughout both of his campaigns, including being arrested on a multitude of 
charges ranging from treason to rape prior to the 2006 contest.   
Through the use of popular policies, institutional safeguards and a well-developed 
patronage network,
319
 the NRM managed to build a solid enough base of support to allow it to 
become the dominant political force in Uganda.  In fact, the NRM leadership was so sure of its 
strength that it approached the 2006 legalization of multipartyism not with trepidation, but used 
it instrumentally as an opportunity to root out troublemakers within the Movement.  Yet, the 
NRM was also helped out by the failings of opposition forces in the country to develop a 
plausible ruling alternative to the Movement organization in the eyes of constituents.  A 
discussion of these opposition groups follows.       
 
Opposition Parties: Lost Legitimacy 
While the NRM leadership was skilled at building support for itself, it was also bolstered 
by the relative decline of opposition forces.  A combination of restrictive NRM policies 
regarding political party activity and the internal weaknesses of the opposition forces themselves 
created a situation by 2005 in which it was widely perceived that no opposition group could 
meaningfully challenge the NRM for political control.   
 At the time of the NRM’s ascent to power in 1986, the only visible alternative sources of 
political organization were the two historical political parties that had survived into the 1980s, 
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the Ugandan People’s Congress (UPC) and the Democratic Party (DP), both of which had been 
active in Ugandan politics since the 1950s and became the main parties in post-independence 
Uganda in the early 1960s.  The overtly Protestant UPC had been the dominant force in the UPC-
Kabaka Yekka Party coalition that formed the first government in 1962 and had risen to power 
twice on its own under President Milton Obote from 1964-1971 and again between 1980-1985, 
while the Catholic-Dominated DP had served as the loyal opposition during the periods of multi-
party politics both before and after the Idi Amin years (the military dictator that ruled Uganda 
from 1971-1979).  Yet, the economic mis-management, widespread corruption, ethnic and 
sectarian infighting and the overt use of coercive violence against both political opponents and 
regular citizens by all post-colonial governments resulted in a situation where political elites 
were either “unable or unwilling… to build institutions that restrain state power, promote trust 
and accountability, and maintain reciprocal state-society relationships.”320  As a result, by 1986, 
the historical political parties entered the NRM era already suffering from very low levels of 
legitimacy among the population at large, which heightened the appeal of the NRM’s no-party 
philosophy among a brutalized and fearful population.       
  Once in the post-1986 era, the historical parties faced grave difficulties constructing an 
alternative to NRM rule.  Given the constraints the Movement government placed on political 
party activity, the DP, UPC and smaller parties such as the Conservative Party (CP) had to 
decide how to conduct themselves in order to survive yet also challenge the movement system.  
As part of the broad-based government of incorporation, many prominent members of the 
traditional parties were offered cabinet positions in the NRM government in the late 1980s.  
While DP and CP officials initially wagered that cooperating with the NRM leadership would 
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yield the most influence and agreed to join the cabinet,
321
 top UPC representatives choose to 
remain outside of the Movement structure and continue to denounce the NRM as an illegal 
regime.  Yet, neither of these strategies proved successful in sustaining a substantive and strong 
oppositional force.   
The UPC suffered severe internal divisions by the early 1990s as a younger faction within 
the party lead by Cecilia Ogwal began to defy Obote and the senior party leadership and compete 
in elections for RC and National Resistance Council (as the Parliament was known in 1989) seats 
as well as Constituent Assembly elections in 1994.  This infighting, combined with the 
disintegration of local-level UPC branch organizations and a loss of party funding (due to the 
fact that citizens were fearful of buying opposition party cards under NRM rule) lead to the 
weakening of the UPC apparatus under the Movement system.
322
  Similarly, the Democratic 
Party, which was already weak due to its abuse by the UPC government in the early 1980s, also 
suffered under the Movement dispensation.  By the early 1990s, the NRM had reduced the 
number of DP ministers in cabinet and the DP leadership began to rethink their alliance with the 
NRM.  In reaction, DP affiliates boycotted the 1996 parliamentary elections, but this only served 
to weaken the DP rather than hurt NRM in any meaningful way, as the DP “had nowhere to go 
after it had opted out of parliamentary elections.”323   
Organizational capacity was a challenge for both the UPC and the DP as both parties had 
lost much of their local party branch apparatus over time.  This resulted in a diminished ability to 
run candidates for office in every constituency.  For example, in the 2006 elections, UPC only 
ran candidates in 34 percent of the constituencies with DP faring even worse at only being able 
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to compete for 31 percent of available seats.
324
  Even in elections where candidates sympathetic 
to DP and UPC did run, it was impossible for the party to limit the number of “pro-multiparty” 
candidates on the ticket in any one constituency, meaning that the sole NRM-backed candidate 
generally prevailed against the disorganized opposition.
325
  To try to build some based of party 
support, in the 1990s, DP relied heavily on their legal ancillary organizations, including their 
NGO dubbed the Foundation for African Development (FAD) and their youth wing, the Uganda 
Young Democrats (UYD), to maintain a DP presence in the country.  While these organizations 
enjoyed a modicum of success, their paltry funding was no match for the state-funded NRM 
apparatus.   
The low levels of support for the two traditional parties since the NRMs rise to power is 
demonstrated in both election returns and public opinion data from the Movement era. Despite 
the fact that the 1996 elections were officially “no-party” elections, Mbabazi et al estimate that 
only 10% of MPs elected that year could be considered as representing the “opposition.”326  Non-
Movement affiliated MPs fared a bit better in 2001, when, according to President Museveni’s 
own count, 230 pro-Movement parliamentary candidates were elected out of 282 seats, leaving 
52 seats (18.5%) for all non-Movement affiliated MPs.
327
  However, the fact that this 18.5% is 
split between all opposition groups (loyalists of UPC, DP, CP and the newly formed Reform 
Agenda (see below)) means that no single opposition group was capable of mounting a serious 
challenge to the NRM on its own.  Furthermore, public opinion data from the Afrobarometer 
surveys highlighting the low (and falling) levels of support for opposition parties during the 
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Movement era.  While 32 percent of respondents demonstrated some modicum trust in “political 
parties” in the 2000 survey, by 2002, only 16 percent report having trust in “opposition 
groups.
328” 329     Also as part of the 2000 survey, respondents were asked “when you hear the 
term political party, what is the first thing that comes to your mind?”  While the highest number 
of subjects (18 percent) gave the name of one of the traditional parties (UPC, DP, etc.), a similar 
number (also 18 percent) equated political parties with violent conflict (using words such as war, 
division, hatred, and even death).
330
   In fact, 76 percent of respondents agreed with the notion 
that “[b]y causing conflict and confusion, political parties undermine national unity”331  Clearly, 
forces that are so widely perceived to be synonymous with such unpleasant feelings cannot 
represent a viable political alternative to the ruling regime. 
 With the traditional parties delegitimized, the final source of potential political opposition 
to the NRM regime sprang from within the organization itself.  In 2001, a political pressure 
group calling itself “Reform Agenda” emerged lead by Dr. Kizza Besigye, longtime NRA/M 
member and Musveni’s personal physician, who won 28% of the vote against Museveni’s 69% 
in the 2001 presidential elections. When opposition parties were legalized in 2004, the Reform 
Agenda organization formed a coalition with the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (PAF), a group 
of NRM MPs who had grown dissatisfied with the lack of internal democracy in the NRM, and 
the National Democratic Forum (a small party headed by Chapaa Karuhang) to create the Forum 
for Democratic Change (FDC).  The FDC registered as a party just fifteen months before the 
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final vote on the amendment to repeal executive term limits was taken in Parliament in 
September of 2005 and eighteen months before the elections in February 2006.  While Besigye, 
the FDC’s presidential candidate, managed to win 37 percent of the vote in the 2006 presidential 
elections, his personal success did not translate into great dividends for the party’s parliamentary 
candidates, as the FDC only won 13 percent of the seats in the legislature.   
The FDC’s difficulty in forming a plausible ruling alternative to the NRM across the 
board has been attributed to many causes, including the short time frame in which the FDC had 
to mobilize supporters, the fact that the party had no unifying force beyond the desire to oust 
Museveni, had no distinct ethnic constituency (Besigye was from the same region as Museveni), 
few links to society and had a platform that was similar to the NRM’s platform (save for the 
FDC’s desire to re-implement executive term limits).  The party was unable to establish a 
network local party branches before the 2006 election, which resulted in the FDC only being able 
to run candidates in 127 (59%) of the 215 constituencies (by comparison, the NRM ran 
candidates in 214 of the 215 races).
332
  Furthermore, campaign funding was a problem for the 
FDC.  Whereas Movement candidates were given between  UShs 2 million and UShs 25 million 
for their campaigns, the FDC only promised UShs 1.5 million for its parliamentary hopefuls and 
many candidates report never even receiving these promised funds.
333
  One FDC official blames 
the FDC’s struggle to raise adequate funds on the de facto criminalization of supporting an 
opposition party.  She reports that businesses who give to the FDC may suddenly find 
themselves audited by the Uganda Revenue Authority and civil servants who donate to the FDC 
could see their jobs given to “loyal” NRM cadres.334  
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 In sum, NRM strategies combined with the internal weakness of opposition forces 
created a situation in Uganda where the electoral arena went from highly uncertain in the early 
1990s when term limits were first adopted to relatively certain by the time of the vote on the 
executive term limit question tin 2005.  The relative strength of the NRM vis-à-vis the opposition 
parties thus created the structural backdrop against which the debate over the repeal of executive 
term limits would take place.  This strong position of the NRM interacted with broader patterns 
of competition in Uganda to influence the utility of the different choices MPs could adjudicate 
between in arriving at their final decision on the term limit question.  How exactly relative party 
strength shapes the strategies available to actors in this situation will be explored later in the 
chapter.  However, before that analysis can be undertaken, we must first examine the history of 
the term limit debate in Uganda. 
 
The Executive Term Limit Debate in Uganda 
 The issue of amending article 105(2) to remove the two term limitation from the Ugandan 
constitution was first officially raised in March of 2003 at the meeting of the NRM National 
Executive Committee (NEC), which at the time was composed of all cabinet ministers and 
members of parliament, District NRM chairpersons and other members of the national party 
organ.   According to many then-ministers and MPs, the meeting was ostensibly called in order 
to discuss the prospect of “opening up” the political space to allow for a multi-party system.335  
An ad hoc committee of NEC had been formed in December 2001to explore the “performance of 
the Movement system in light of current political trends/developments, including the calls to open up to 
political party pluralism,”336 and the March NEC retreat was to be the forum where the committee shared 
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their initial findings with the entire NEC before their final report was released in April 2003.  However, 
on the second day of the meeting, many MPs, including cabinet ministers close to the President, were 
taken by surprised when a number of District chairpersons rose to propose reconsidering the two-term 
limit on the presidency as stipulated in the 1995 national constitution.  While these district-level officials 
claimed to be forwarding the proposal based on the will of their constituents, many Movement insiders 
claim that the NRM “machinery” was used to “mobilized the district chairs to come and raise the issue of 
term limits.”337  Jaberi Bidandi Ssali, the Minister for Local Government at the time, maintains that some 
of this mobilization even occurred at the NEC meeting itself, saying that “during the night, members of 
the delegation were coming and going from the President’s tent, coming and going….  There was money 
changing hands, no question about that, overnight.”338 implying that the very same district chairpersons 
who had personally told him the day before that there was no popular will in their districts to “tamper 
with” the constitution and lift term limits changed their stance overnight due to a personal and monetary 
appeal by the President himself.   
 The reaction among the members of parliament to the proposal to abolish executive term limits 
was decidedly mixed, with many (some even estimating a majority)
339
 of MPs expressing initial 
opposition to the move at the NEC meeting, including high ranking ministers such as Ssali, Amanya 
Mushega, Mugisha Muntu add others who spoke out that day in front of the NEC meeting.
340
  However, 
between this 2003 NEC meeting and the parliamentary vote on the term limit question in the summer of 
2005, many parliamentarians would alter their stance and ultimately choose to back kisanja.  What caused 
this change of heart in an overwhelming number of MPs?  The next sections will lay out in detail the 
contours of the choice confronting members of parliament regarding the term limit amendment and show 
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how the outcome of their final decisions was greatly conditioned by their perceived dominance of the 
NRM in national political life.   
 
Perceptions of Party Strength 
 The discussion of party strength earlier in this chapter sought to use objective measures 
of party organization and popularity (including electoral returns, public opinion data and 
statistics on the number of candidates run) supplemented by examples of strategic successes and 
failures by various parties that drove the relative increase in NRM strength against opposition 
forces.  However, the question remains as to how Movement MPs in Uganda perceived the 
NRM’s strength vis-à-vis both the traditional and nascent opposition forces in the country at the 
time of the term limit vote in 2005. Do they feel that other parties pose a threat of replacement to 
their party, or do they feel that their party’s hold on power is firm? If they misperceive their 
party’s strength and feel that an opposition group represents a plausible ruling alternative, they 
are likely to select a different strategy with regards to their stand on kisanja than they would if 
they correctly perceive their party’s asymmetric power advantage. 
 By and large, Movement MPs did recognize the strong electoral advantage their party’s 
relative strength gave the NRM over newly registered opposition parties.  When asked if they 
feared that NRM would lose the presidency, MPs overwhelmingly responded that there was no 
such concern within their circles.  As one MP put it, “if President Museveni was not allowed to 
stand another NRM [candidate] would have won,”341 signaling her belief that no other party 
could challenge the Movement as a plausible governing alternative.  MPs report gaining 
information about citizens’ party preferences from visiting their constituencies and talking with 
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local leaders and voters,
342
 from polls and surveys done by the major newspapers in the 
country
343
 and by talking amongst each other to determine how many MPs would defect to the 
FDC or other parties once opposition parties were officially legalized.  From these sources, many 
members of parliament deduced that NRM was by far the most popular party among voters 
because “some constituencies were not ripe to accept opposition to the NRM.  So,… [m]any 
MPs realized that if they were to go with the opposition, they would lose their constituencies.”344  
As a result, it was fairly clear to the average NRM MP that their party would retain power for the 
foreseeable future.       
 
 
Preferences of Members of Parliament 
 
How does knowing that their party is stronger than all others in Uganda lead NRM 
members of parliament to collectively decide to eliminate the institution of executive term 
limits?  One could hypothesize that a party like the NRM that did not need the incumbency 
advantage boost that lifting term limits would provide should keep such constraints in place in 
order to uphold a veneer of good governance for both constituents and international donors.  
However, since the opposite outcome ensued and term limits were jettisoned in both in the 
Uganda case and in a host of other countries where the ruling party was dominant (as the 
medium-n analysis in Chapter 4 demonstrates), it is necessary to unpack the decision-making 
process of Movement MPs in order to understand how the party system structure described 
above interacted with actor preferences in a way that lead to the amendment of Article 105(2) in 
the Ugandan constitution. 
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As Chapter 2 established, actors often have competing preferences surrounding one issue 
or decision.  The kisanja decision faced by the Movement-affiliated MPs was no different in this 
regard.  In making the choice whether to support or oppose Constitutional Amendment Bill No.3 
of 2005, members had to “arbitrate between immediate rewards, conscience and constituency”345 
according to one MP.  This section explores the competing preferences that members of 
Parliament faced as they made their final decision on the term limit issue. 
 
Outcome Preferences   
 As discussed in Chapter 2, in situations in which a group of actors is tasked with making a 
collective decision, there are actually two types of preferences that each individual actor holds: 1) 
an outcome preference and 2) an action preference.
346
  An actor’s outcome preference is 
conditioned by her views regarding the broad consequences that may result in the aftermath of the 
decision.  Put more simply, it is a matter of what end result the actor favors for ideological, 
strategic or pragmatic reasons.  This is what choice the actor would choose in a vacuum where 
there was no cost associated with choosing one outcome over another. In terms of parliamentarians 
voting on constitutional matters, their outcome preference is to adopt the constitutional language 
that they feel is most concomitant with their paramount interest, without reference to how other 
stakeholders may think of and/or react to their choice.  Of course, MPs may have a multitude of 
competing interests that complicate their outcome preference formation.  Uncovering the range of 
these interests is key for understanding the ultimate collective choice of Ugandan MPs to side with 
the President and remove the two-term limit on executive tenure.       
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 Many Ugandan parliamentarians were clearly torn on whether they preferred executive 
term limits to remain in force or be rescinded at the conclusion of the parliamentary vote because 
of a dilemma between what they felt as their ideological (some would even say moral) 
commitment to democracy and their strategic political desire for the NRM to retain its strength 
well into the multi-party era.  One NRM woman MP maintains that for herself and many of her 
colleagues, their consciences dictated that “it was more important to look to Uganda’s future as a 
country and uphold the constitution than to consider any individual benefit in the present.”347  
Yet, the same MP also described her nervousness regarding the future direction of the party if 
President Museveni was made to step down as national and party leader.  She wondered whether 
a new NRM chief would be able to hold the party together in the long run.  Another NRM 
parliamentarian linked upholding the constitution to ethical considerations, saying that lifting 
term limits was, in fact, “immoral” because it went against the spirit of constitutionalism.  She 
explained that “[a]n article in the constitution that has not been tested, it is wrong, it is morally 
wrong [to remove it].  For most of us, that was it, not because we didn’t like the President. If an 
article hasn’t been tested, why remove it?”348  Yet, she also mentioned more personal 
considerations such as her own legacy as a politician, saying “I have stood up on what I stand 
for.  It should be clear and we should leave a legacy at the end of the day.  People have got to 
know who I am, the President inclusive.”349   
However, other NRM colleagues took a more strategic line in arguing that there were 
many pragmatic points MPs had to consider when deciding on term limits (and by extension, 
whether or not President Museveni would be allowed to continue as President) due to the 
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consequences the decision was likely to have both for the country and the party.  In describing 
these wide-ranging considerations, one Movement MP declared:   
      “What is the future of our country?  How do we move?  Because we have a party to 
       protect, we have our mission to achieve.  So, people had to consider so many things.  
       One, you consider the stability of the country, two you consider now the mileage of 
       the struggle that you have done, you consider mission and now the strategy.  So the  
       debate went on and on, and I think many people decided that for stability, for us to 
       remain focused, to maintain the mileage and in order to carry on with our strategy,  
       we need to go that way [lift executive term limits] for the time being.”350 
 
He expanded these sentiments by explaining that his concerns for the stability of the country 
were based on the fact that President Museveni personally did not want to give up the presidency 
and that he had alluded to the fact that if the lifting of term limits was rejected that he could use 
his command of the army to retain power.  This, combined with the instability caused by the 
ongoing war with the Lord’s Resistance Army in the North, convinced this MP that it was better 
to lift term limits in order to keep peace in a country that had been so scarred by violent conflict 
in the past.  Echoing his sentiments, another NRM MP maintained that a strong president was 
needed to guarantee stability in the absence of underdeveloped institutions in the country and 
that President Museveni was just such an “anchor and symbol of stability.”351 
 The tension between these interests facing Movement members was apparent to even those 
outside of the NRM fold.  One Independent MP describes her observations as such: 
“What I saw at that time was a genuine concern amongst certain NRM cadres  
despite the rigidity and despite the pressure within.  People wanted to stand  
on principles of democracy.  Because, for example, Eriyah Kategaya said that ‘I was  
in the bush.  The principles that compelled us to fight were based on democracy and 
democratic principles.  We promised ourselves these benchmarks, and I cannot be  
party to breaking the very benchmarks that took me to the bush.’  The same thing was  
echoed by Winnie Byanyima, was echoed by Miria Matembe, was echoed by Bidandi  
Ssali.”352   
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Yet, this same Independent MP also remarked that her Movement counterparts were also very 
nervous of an eventual split within the NRM if President Museveni no longer held the top 
office.
353
  Even if the split did not occur right away or did not jeopardize the NRM’s chances of 
retaining the presidency and the majority of seats in the legislature in the foreseeable future (due 
to the weakness of the opposition), MPs feared the uncertainty that would result from shifting 
coalitions within the party.  Would they personally be on the wrong side of the new NRM 
leadership?  Would they be able to retain their ministerial posts or their other positions of favor 
within the party apparatus?  Would they be pushed out of the party all together?  Such fears were 
very real in the minds of many NRM officials.   
 Overall, these competing interests held by and between Movement-affiliated members of 
parliament resulted in a mix of outcome preferences within the group.  As MPs discussed their 
stances on the third term issue amongst each other, many report that there was a definite split 
with significant numbers of parliamentarians favoring each outcome.  However, based purely on 
outcome preferences, it initially appeared that those MPs who preferred to retain term limits 
posed a formidable challenge to those who preferred the vote to result in the lifting of term 
limits.  Members of the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (PAFO), an informal caucus of 
moderate MPs who joined together in 2002 with the express goal to “safeguard 
constitutionalism,”354 took it upon themselves to mobilize MPs to vote “no” on the impending 
kisanja vote.  As PAFO members polled their parliamentary colleagues in one-on-one meetings 
through 2004 and early 2005,
355
 they found that far more than the 93 MPs needed to block the 
passage of the amendment said that they preferred term limits to be upheld in Uganda at the end 
of the day.  However, outcome preferences are not the only preferences on which actors base 
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their ultimate choices in collective decision-making environments.  In order to understand why 
term limits were lifted in Uganda despite the fact that less than the required two-thirds of MPs 
preferred this outcome, it is necessary to also explore the action preferences of Ugandan 
members of parliament. 
 
Action Preferences 
Apart from their personal outcome preferences, actors who are part of a collective 
decision must also be cognizant of a second type of preference: their action preference.  At its 
most basic, an action preference is the behavioral stance towards the decision that each actor 
prefers to take in light of the consequence s/he expects to face from the various stake holders. As 
such, an actor’s action preference is rooted in his/her perception of where other stakeholders (the 
reference group) stand on the issue and their ability to exact punishment on those who take the 
opposite stand.
356
  In addition, each actor’s action preference is shaped by his/her individual 
threshold, which is the propensity of an actor choose a course of action that deviates from the 
behavioral stance of the majority of the reference group.  As Ermakoff concisely wrote, “isolations 
carries a cost.”357  Is the actor willing to take a stance that is opposed by all other actors (an 
absolute threshold)?  If not, what proportion of actors must demonstrate a willingness to undertake 
one line of action before the actors in question will exhibit a similar behavioral stance (a relative 
threshold)?  Thus, an actor chooses an action preference after assessing the costs of each choice 
based on both an assessment of the reference group’s future behavior and his/her own action 
threshold.  In short, if an actor’s outcome preference is conditioned by her views regarding the 
broad consequences in the aftermath of the decision, then her action preference is conditioned by 
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her perceptions of personal consequences stemming from the performance of proclaiming one’s 
choice.   
The action preferences of Ugandan MPs surrounding the kisanja debate is rooted in how 
they want others to see them voting on the term limit issue.  This is because the way they vote has 
consequences for both their popularity among constituents (did s/he represent voters’ position on 
the matter?) and their standing with the Movement leadership (did s/he vote with or against the 
party line?)
358
  These various considerations influence the cost and benefits of different action 
choices and lead to each actor to prefer one behavioral stance over another.  Therefore, each of 
these referent group considerations, and how they interact with larger patterns of competition in the 
Ugandan electoral context, must be examined in turn. 
 
Constituent Support 
 As elected representatives, MPs are concerned with how their constituents view them and 
the job they are doing representing local interests and preferences.  Since the turn-over rate in the 
Ugandan parliament had been quite high in the previous two elections
359
 (for example, 50 
incumbent MPs out of 214 failed to regain their seats in 2001 for a 25% non-reelection rate)
360
 and 
also because the next parliamentary election after the final November 2005 vote on term limits was 
set to take place just three months later in February of 2006, Ugandan MPs were especially 
cognizant of acting in accord with their constituents’ interests on the issue of executive term limits 
in order to retain electoral support in the near term.      
 Public opinion regarding the executive term limit issue in Uganda was highly enmeshed 
with public opinion about President Museveni himself.  Seizing on the 81% approval rating 
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President Museveni enjoyed
361
 among large sections of the country, MPs report that pro-
amendment forces sought to “make the issue personal, not about the institution of term limits.”362  
As a result, public support for Museveni to have a “third term” (as the issue was often termed in 
the Ugandan press even though the Bill, if passed, would allow the President to also run for 
unlimited terms) was quite high, reaching 70.5% in the rural areas as early as mid-2003
363
 and 
reaching an absolute majority, even when urban populations were included in the sample, by 
2005.
364
  As a result, members of parliament, the majority of who represent rural constituencies, 
felt pressure to be recorded in the hansards, the public record of parliamentary proceedings, as 
supporting the president by voting to eliminate executive term limits.  One member of parliament 
described the actual stakes for an MP who did not vote along with their constituency’s 
preference on allowing President Museveni to continue in office by revealing that in the “areas 
that adore  President Museveni…. [t]hey would be seen in those areas as traitors!”  Since being 
labeled a traitor is not generally good for re-election prospects, this was one factor that lead 
many MPs to form an action preference for voting to lift term limits. 
 
Standing with the Movement Leadership 
 When describing how they reached their decision regarding the vote on term limits, 
almost every member of parliament interviewed stressed than an important factor in their 
assessment of whether or not to vote for the removal of executive term limits from the national 
constitution was a concern for how it would affect their standing within the NRM party.  
Member after member described how opposing the term limit amendment meant an almost 
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certain fate of being decampaigned by the Movement in the upcoming election.  They explained 
that being “decampaigned” meant that the NRM would select and financially back a challenger 
to the errant MP in the NRM primary in an attempt to unseat the disloyal member even before 
the general election.  The central Movement organs would even send the security agencies to the 
district to convince voters to cast their ballots for the other candidate.
 365
  Beyond the prospects 
of losing their seat in parliament, one MP also observed that there was also a personal dimension 
to being decampaigned on grounds of disloyalty towards Museveni himself saying “so many of 
them could not stand the force of being de-campaigned  by their ‘god-father.”366 
Beyond the threat of decampaigning MPs who opposed the term limit amendment, the 
Movement leadership also employed a host of other tactics that played to MP’s fears of losing 
their standing with the party.  A number of high-ranking ministers who had publically spoken out 
against the third term after the initial proposal was forwarded in March of 2003, including 
Bidandi Ssali, Miria Matembe and Eriyah Kategaya, were dropped from the cabinet in a 
reshuffle just two months later,
367
 while other rank and file members who were deemed to be 
against the third term were removed from key parliamentary committees.
368
  MPs involved in 
PAFO or who were rumored to be against the amendment were also threatened with disciplinary 
action for breaches of the NRM Code of Conduct, which could result in expulsion from the party 
if the member was found in violation of the (deliberately vague) protocol.
369
  One MP also 
reported that the Movement leadership circulated provisional NRM candidate lists for the 
upcoming election in the week prior to readings of the Constitutional Amendment Bill in 
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Parliament, as if to remind MPs that the lists could be altered depending on the way members 
voted.
370
  
In order to be able to back up these threats and monitor individual MPs’ votes on the 
amendment, the Movement leadership first had to amend another related set of rules- the 
parliamentary voting procedures.  From the commencement of the first elected Movement 
parliament in 1996, Rule 75(a) of the Ugandan Parliamentary Rules of Procedure had stipulated 
that: “There shall be secret voting in the House in respect of a Bill for an Act of Parliament to 
amend any provision of the Constitution.”371  However, when it became widely known in the 
halls of Parliament that PAFO had mobilized enough MPs to block the term limits amendment 
based on MP outcome preferences, Movement insiders sought to alter members’ action 
preference calculations by repealing the secret voting provision in Rule 75 so that votes on 
constitutional matters, including the upcoming vote on the executive term limit, would be subject 
to an open vote (either by show of hands or by roll call, at the discretion of the Speaker).  The 
logic within the NRM was that if the party was able to monitor the votes of individual MPs that 
parliamentarians would be compelled to favor their action preference of being seen as loyal to 
the party over any outcome preference they may have.   
The motion to alter Rule 75(a) was moved by Honorable Nyombi Thembo in December 
2004 and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Rules, Privileges and Discipline produced 
both a majority and minority report on the motion in March of 2005.  While the majority report 
recommended that the rule should be changed on the grounds that the public had a right to know 
how their member of parliament voted for reasons of accountability, the minority report, written 
by deposed Minister Miria Matembe, reasoned that the old rule allowed members to “vote 
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without fear or favour,” and that “the timing of the motion, amidst the proposed amendments to 
the Constitution… shows that it is intended to intimidate or coerce Members of Parliament to 
vote for the lifting of the presidential term limit.”372  Yet, even though many MPs interviewed 
agreed with the minority report regarding the suspect timing of the procedural change,
373
 the 
motion passed easily in April 2005.  As a result, the NRM leadership could then enact a credible 
commitment to decampaign or otherwise discipline MPs who did not vote the party line on the 
term limits question.   
Finally, the NRM leadership also employed a number of “carrots” along with the “sticks” 
described above in order to induce Members of Parliament to base their action preference on 
matters related to their standing within the Movement.  MPs mentioned that offers of ministerial 
positions
374
 and other appointments, more funds for their constituency
375
 and additional 
campaign monies
376
 were some of the positive inducements that they were offered to increase 
their standing in the party if they voted to eliminate the limit on presidential terms of office.  
Some even report being personally telephoned by the President himself to “encourage” them to 
vote for the proposed term limit amendment.
377
  Lastly, perhaps the inducement most widely 
publicized by the Ugandan media was the Ushs 5 million (approximately $3000) “facilitation 
fund” given to MPs regarded as being within the NRM fold.  Officially the money was to be 
used by MPs to travel around their constituencies to inform and consult with citizens about the 
recently released Government White Paper that laid out the government’s position on a number 
of proposed constitutional amendments.  However, many respondents viewed the sum as both a 
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sorting mechanism and a bribe because of what members were told informally when they went to 
collect the funds.  One MP recalls the events as such: 
      “We were told ‘the money has come.’  But, when I went to pick it, the remarks that were    
        being said… they said ‘don’t think this is just for facilitation for the white paper; it’s for  
        the third term.  Whoever takes this money should support the third term, should tow the 
        line, should listen to instructions,’ and many things were said.  I thought if I didn’t take it,  
        they would think I am against the third term.  But it was a bribe.”378   
 
 By signing for and accepting the Ushs 5 million, MPs were thus signaling to the 
Movement leadership that they wanted to be counted among the loyal NRM and that they wished 
to demonstrate this by supporting the third term as they had been told to do.  In this manner, 
Movement elites were able to influence MPs’ action preference to favor casting an “aye” vote to 
abolish presidential term limits.   
 Overall, Movement MPs faced many pressures from both citizens and the NRM as a new 
party organization that lead them to believe that the best action preference was to be seen as 
voting to lift executive term limits during the vote on the House floor.  Thus, the next step in the 
analysis is to explore how individual members’ outcome and action preferences interacted with 
their larger political environment to shape their ultimate decision on the kisanja issue. 
 
 
Individual MP Decisions 
 
 Once a Member of Parliament has deduced both her outcome and action preferences, how 
does she adjudicate between them to arrive at her ultimate decision on the matter at hand?  In 
some cases, an individual’s outcome and action preferences overlap, making it easy for the actor 
to make their strategic choice.  So, for those MPs whose outcome preference was to see 
executive term limits abolished in order to keep the NRM strong and their action preference was 
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to show both their constituents and the NRM leadership that they wanted President Museveni to 
have a third term in order to retain their support in the next election, there was no conflict 
between the two preferences and thus their final decision to vote to amend Article 105(2) was a 
relatively simple one.  However, those MPs who had reached an outcome preference of retaining 
term limits in the national constitution due to a commitment to democratic principles but whose 
action preference called for them personally to vote to lift these same limits faced a dilemma 
between their two incompatible preferences.    In these cases, actors will look to see what 
strategies are available to them that could ameliorate this tension while keeping in mind their 
ultimate interest in retaining their own parliamentary seat.   
 For parliamentarians, switching parties is perhaps the most readily available strategy for 
an MP who wished to have a chance to recapture her seat but who is hesitant to acquiesce to 
changing the constitution just to retain the favor of her party and constituents.  Yet, just as the 
relative balance of power between parties in the party system affects MPs’ perceptions of the 
threat of replacement (as discussed earlier in this chapter), it also affects the ease of switching 
parties for MPs.  Given the non-programmatic/non-ideological character of most African party 
systems, switching parties is a relatively easy endeavor in the sub-Saharan context.  Yet, whether 
one could win an election under the banner of another party is highly contingent on the relative 
power of the parties in the national party system.  As will be demonstrated in Chapter 6, due to 
the declining power of the MMD party in Zambia relative to the opposition, many Zambian 
MMD Members of Parliament took a stand against their party leadership by declaring they 
would not vote to lift term limits for President Chiluba precisely because they knew that if they 
were decampaigned by the MMD for their disloyalty, they could switch parties and still have a 
good chance of re-taking their seat.  However, in Uganda, MPs faced a different situation in that 
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the NRM’s relatively high degree of power in the Ugandan party system made it very unlikely 
that an MP who was decampaigned by the Movement would be able to win her seat under the 
banner of another party.
379
  
  This difference between the Zambian and Ugandan cases can be illustrated by the 
variation in actions by senior ministers who left or were kicked out of the NRM or MMD due to 
their vocal opposition to amending the executive term limit provision in their countries.  In 
Zambia, Vice President Christon Tembo and ministers Godfrey Miyanda and Edith Nawakwi 
immediately formed a new political party, the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD), 
which many rank and file MMD MPs also joined, and which placed a respectable third in both 
the presidential and legislative elections despite having less than a year to organize and build a 
support base before the December 2001 elections.  However, in Uganda, almost none of the 
high-ranking ministers who broke from the Movement over the third term issue formed or even 
joined a new political party.  Seeing no prospects for challenging the NRM’s dominance in 
Ugandan politics, Kategaya and Ssali returned to their law practice and business ventures, 
respectively while Miria Matembe ran as an Independent candidate in the 2006 election.  As for 
rank and file MPs who did not have lucrative side businesses to return to, most decided to stay 
within the NRM fold, which meant privileging their action preference over their outcome 
preference and voting for the third term amendment.   
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Aggregate Decision- The Result 
 With no means of switching parties and fearing their employment prospects out of office, 
most Movement-affiliated MPs entered the Parliamentary chambers on July 12, 2005 resolved to 
vote in favor of the clause to lift the two-term limit on the office of the president.  At the end of 
the day, 220 MPs voted for the amendment, 53 voted against it and two abstained.  Among the 
220 “ayes” were members of PAFO who had been active lobbyers against the third term in the 
past and other known “rebel” MPs, all of whom had been tamed in this instance by the strength 
of NRM within the Ugandan Party system.  Thus, when President Museveni assented to 
Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 3 two months later in September, he removed the last 
institutional hurdle to his own life presidency.  
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CHAPTER 6 
TERM LIMIT ADHERENCE: THE CASE OF ZAMBIA 
 
 In the previous chapter, the debate over executive term limits in Uganda demonstrated 
that political elites may alter political institutions if the political realities on the ground do not 
lead actors to favor their continued use and enforcement.  In the case of institutions regulating 
electoral competition specifically, a power imbalance within the party system that leads to the 
outcomes of elections being all but foregone conclusions creates an environment in which ruling 
party actors seek to overturn rules that restrict the power of their now-dominant party.  However, 
despite the lament of observers of African politics that multi-party elections in many sub-
Saharan African states continue to be dominated by the party that won the first elections after 
liberalization,
380
 not all party systems have devolved into dominant-authoritarian systems in 
which the balance of power is so skewed towards the ruling party that the incentives to uphold 
democratic institutions fully disappear.  Rather, as Sartori theorized, political systems that 
possess even the slightest potential for competition can cause the ruling party to feel vulnerable 
and lead party members to act in an anticipatory nature to constrain themselves in order to 
regulate competition.
381
  This leads to the question of under what circumstances ruling party 
actors will perceive a high enough level of uncertainty in the electoral arena to uphold 
meaningful constraints on the power of political offices.   
An exploration of the debate over executive term limits in Zambia during 2000-2001 can 
aid us in understanding the dynamics that lead to institutional enforcement in such cases.  
Despite a strong push from President Frederick Chiluba and some party elite to lift executive 
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term limits so Chiluba could contest elections in 2001 and beyond, a number of cabinet members 
and rank and file MPs came out against amending the term limit clause in the constitution and 
were ultimately able to preserve this key constraint on executive power.  The main argument 
presented in this chapter is that the perceptions of incumbent political actors in Zambia regarding 
the increasingly competitive party system, and the threat of replacement and ease of switching 
parties that this electoral uncertainty engendered, is what ultimately lead to the enforcement of 
term limits in Zambia.  Despite the MMD’s landslide electoral victories in both the 1991 and 
1996 elections and their 85% majority in the legislature during President’ Chiluba’s second term, 
by 2001, internal MMD weaknesses and strides made by opposition parties within the 
historically open political environment in Zambia created a situation in which the MMD’s future 
hold on power was growing less certain.  While early on in Chiluba’s second term some MMD 
members, including the president himself, viewed the party as secure enough in its power to 
advocate for lifting term limits, towards the end of the second term many within the party came 
to hold a different perception of the degree and direction of change in the MMD’s relative 
strength over time and, as a result, worked to maintain executive term limits as a mechanism to 
regulate political competition in the future.   In the end, this perception of increased competition 
within the party system among a majority of Zambian MPs lead to the  enforcement of executive 
term limits in specific, and a strengthening of the rule of law in general in the Zambian case. 
 
This chapter will open by unpacking and expanding upon the key “party system 
competitiveness” variable in Zambia by taking an in-depth look at  electoral results, public 
opinion data and party strategies during the 1991-2001 period in order to evaluate changes in the 
balance of power in the party system leading up to the decision on term limit enforcement.  
Following this, the remainder of the chapter will investigates the perception and preferences of 
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political actors in order to understand how the strategies selected by individual party members 
shaped the collective judgment to retain executive term limits as s feature of the Zambian 
constitution.   
 
Relative Party Strength:  Assessing the MMD and the Opposition 
 
In the statistical analysis in Chapter 4, Zambia’s is classified as having a non-dominant 
party system in the  “party system competitiveness” variable, a measure largely constructed from 
seat share data from the first three multi-party elections following liberalization in each sub-
Saharan country.  Looking more closely at the electoral returns from Zambia, it is clear that the 
strength of MMD was at first high and fairly static but then later declined relative to opposition 
parties during the ten years in between the implementation of executive term limits in 1991 and 
the challenge to term limits in 2001.  The MMD began its life with a big victory in the first 
multi-party elections in 1991.  National vote share results in the elections to the Zambian 
National Assembly compiled from Electoral Commission of Zambia data reveal that the MMD 
captured 74% of votes (and 83% of seats) in the first multi-party National Assembly election in 
1991, UNIP won 24% of the votes (17% of seats), and the other 1% of the vote share was split 
between a handful of independent candidates and three smaller parties.  In the next election in 
1996, looking purely at the 87% seat share won by the MMD might lead the casual observer to 
assume MMD’s strength was on the rise relative to other parties within the party system since the 
party increased their seat share by 4% over 1991 levels.  Yet, MMD’s vote share in the National 
Assembly elections in 1996, a measure of party strength that more closely reflects overall trends 
in voter preference, fell 13 percentage points to 61%.  This compared with the 14% of votes won 
by the Zambian Democratic Congress (ZDC), a newly formed opposition party headed by former 
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MMD ministers, and the 25% of the votes that went to a mix of independent candidates and nine 
smaller parties.  In addition, MMDs vote share would likely have been even lower if UNIP had 
not boycotted the 1996 parliamentary elections (for reasons that will be discussed below).  In 
fact, in the subsequent 1998 local elections, UNIP won twice the number of seats that MMD won 
in Eastern Province, which suggests that MMDs sweep of National Assembly seats in that 
province two years earlier in the 1996 election was merely an aberration due to UNIP’s 
boycott.
382
  In all, MMD won just over 60% of the votes nationwide in the 1998 local elections, 
demonstrating their continued decline from their 1991 vote share levels.   
Between the 1996 and the 2001 elections, the MMDs electoral strength declined and the 
strength of opposition parties both individually and as a whole increased to an even greater 
extent than between 1991 and 1996.  In a closely contested National Assembly race in 2001, the 
MMD garnered only 28% of the vote, followed by the United Party for National Development 
(UPND) with 24%, the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) with 16% and UNIP 
with 11% of the vote share.  The top opposition performer, UPND, had been founded by 
businessman Anderson Mazoka in 1998 and quickly became competitive in by-elections in many 
provinces from 1999-2001.  As such, the party was thought by many to be a growing threat to the 
MMD in some of their former strongholds, most notably the Southern Province and rural areas of 
the Copperbelt Province.
383
  UPND’s strong performance in the 2001 parliamentary and 
presidential elections (where Mazoka himself came in second to MMD’s Levi Mwanawasa by 
less than 2% of the vote) reveals the strength UPND gained leading up to the 2001 elections.  As 
Rakner and Svasand declare “the 2001 electoral outcome clearly indicated that the Zambian 
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population wanted change as 71 percent of the electorate cast their vote for an opposition 
candidate/party.”384 
Overall, as the electoral data indicators for the “party system competitiveness” variables 
show, Zambia can best be categorized as being in transition from a dominant party system in the 
1990s to a non-dominant system by 2000-2001 when the question on term limits was being 
debated in Zambia. The party system is classified as non-dominant because they MMD failed to 
gain over 50% of the vote in three subsequent elections and because the general direction of their 
vote share over time shows a marked decline.   
 
Moving beyond electoral returns, there are additional case study indicators that are not 
included in the “party system competitiveness” variable that further support the argument that 
the Zambian party system was growing increasingly competitive by the end of Chiluba’s second 
term.  For example, public opinion data
385
 gathered from a representative sample of 1,200 
Zambian citizens in May of 2002
386
 demonstrates that opposition parties were trusted much more 
in Zambia than in Uganda around the time of the third term debate.  While the level of trust in 
the ruling parties were similar in Uganda and Zambia at 72% and 74% respectively, 55% of the 
Zambian population trusted opposition parties whereas the data analyzed in Chapter 5 showed 
that only 35% of Ugandans expressed any level of trust for opposition parties.  Despite the fact 
that the MMD did enjoy a higher level of trust than opposition parties, the fact that an absolute 
majority of voters did articulate trust in the oppositions means that an opposition party has a real 
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chance of winning the presidency or the majority in parliament.  This possibility for electoral 
turnover was additionally bolstered by the fact that few voters in Zambia feel loyal to the MMD 
party.  In response to another question in the 2002 Afrobarometer survey, only 25% of 
respondents reported feeling close to the MMD and 7% report an affinity for UPND, while a full 
61% report not feeling an affinity for any specific political party.  This is in stark contrast to 
Uganda, where close to 50% feel close to the NRM-O and only 33% report not feeling close to 
any party.  As the 2001 electoral results indicate, this lack of voter loyalty to any particular party 
resulted in a sharp decline in votes for the MMD between the 1996 and 2001 elections. 
What factors on the ground in Zambia drove these electoral and public opinion outcomes 
that reflected (and at the same time, contributed to) the increasing competitiveness in the 
Zambian party system between 1991 and 2001?   The actions and strategies followed by both the 
MMD and the various Zambian opposition groups, both historically and in the lead up to the 
third term debate, will be closely examined in the next section in order to understand the party 
system dynamics that shaped the enforcement of executive term limits in Zambia.  While the 
insights uncovered in this analysis are not intended to form the basis of a theory that explains 
increasing competitiveness of party systems in every country in which executive term limits are 
upheld, the details will illustrate the dynamics within the Zambian party system that created an 
environment in which a majority of MMD members of parliament viewed enforcing term limits 
as the best strategy for themselves and their party. 
 
The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy: A Party in Decline 
 As previously described in Chapter 3, the MMD formed in July 1990 as a multi-ethnic 
and multi-class coalition of labor unions, businessmen, students and lawyers who were all 
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advocating for democratic pluralism and the re-legalization of opposition political parties.  
Initially founded as the National Interim Committee for Multiparty Democracy and headed by 
former UNIP finance minister Arthur Wina, the MMD was registered as a formal party in 
January 1991 and Frederick Chiluba, long-time leader of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU) and the deputy who had been in charge of organization and operations for the Interim 
Committee, was selected party leader and presidential candidate in an intense election at the first 
MMD convention in February.
387
  The MMD’s decisive electoral victories in both 1991 and 
1996 lead many observers of Zambian politics to classify the Zambian party system as either 
dominant or dominant authoritarian during Chiluba’s terms in office388 as it appeared that MMD 
had succeeded in building an uncontested and formidable new party organization that could 
garner widespread electoral support in eight of the nine of the provinces.
389
  Yet, strong electoral 
numbers masked many of the factors both within and outside of the party which made it difficult 
for MMD become a truly consolidated party that could enjoy the sustained loyalty of a core 
group of voters.  In reality, between 1991 and 2001, MMD’s relative strength declined, first only 
slightly but later more precipitously, relative to emerging opposition parties.  The cause of 
MMD’s inability to sustain its electoral dominance into the new millennium stems from a 
combination of internal party weakness and fragmentation, ineffective policy choices, a political 
environment permissive of turn-overs in power and the growing capacity of the opposition to 
appeal to voters.  Each of these factors, and the role they played in shaping the direction and 
change of MMD’s relative strength within the party system, deserves further attention. 
 First, like the NRM in Uganda, which faced the challenge of converting itself from a 
rebel movement into a legitimate government, the MMD struggled with how to transform itself 
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from a pro-multiparty pressure group (comprised of many different constituencies) into both a 
cohesive political party and an institutionalized governing body.
390
   One main challenge in terms 
of internal party cohesion was the balancing of the various interests represented within the MMD 
coalition.  Perhaps the most striking conflict within the MMD was the tension between labor 
unions and the business community.  The unions were indispensible to the MMD as “the 
eighteen affiliate unions of ZCTU provided the infrastructural base [of the party]... especially in 
rural areas, where its branch offices and officers lent support for campaigns and membership 
drives.”391   Meanwhile, the businessmen in the party largely financed the operations of the party 
both before and after the 1991 elections.  Although these two factions complemented each other 
during the campaign period, once the MMD was in office and began to address the main issue 
facing Zambia, namely the disastrous economic situation due to decades of financial mis-
management under UNIP, tensions began to arise between them. 
Owning to their differing economic interests, it would be difficult for the MMD to design an 
economic recovery program that would appeal to both labor and capital. Traditionally, the trade 
unions had been largely dependent on the statist model of economic development pursued by 
UNIP for years and had resisted attempts at economic restructuring by the government 
throughout the 1980s.  Meanwhile, many in the business community favored the introduction of 
a neo-liberal economic agenda with free-market principles.  In the end, due to pressures from 
both the business interests within the party and the international financial community, the MMD 
adopted a platform of economic liberalization through structural reforms, a greater reliance on 
markets and the privatization of parastatals.  The labor unions initially went along with this 
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economic reform agenda believing that Chiluba, the former head of the union movement, would 
protect them within the boundaries of a neo-liberal program.  However, by 1994 when it became 
apparent that the MMD had ceased consulting with the ZCTU, the unions became more 
outspoken in their criticisms of the MMD and their economic policies.
392
  As one former MMD 
Minister recalled, “the trade unions had expected more from Chiluba.”393 While fractures within 
the union movement between public and private sector unions leading to a split-up of the ZCTU 
itself in October of 1994 meant that the unions could not constitute a threat to the MMD in the 
1996 elections in terms of shifting widespread support to one opposition party, by 2001, many 
unions had joined the anti-third term movement in direct opposition to Chiluba and the MMD.  
This clear split in the original coalition that supported the MMD weakened the party by calling 
into question the loyalty of the party’s base in the key union stronghold Copperbelt region and 
beyond.   
The split in the business/labor coalition that founded the MMD was not the only cracks that 
occurred within the party organization following the 1991 elections. Second,  as early as 1993, a 
pattern of defections of high ranking party officials out of the MMD into new opposition parties 
created an environment in which loyalty to the party came second to personal rivalries and 
individual ambition.  Just eighteen months after the MMDs electoral victory in October of 1991, 
a number of prominent minsters and MMD founders including Emmanuel Kasonde (Minister of 
Finance), Arthur Wina (Minister of Education), Guy Scott (Ministry of Agriculture) and 
Humphrey Mulemba (Ministry of Mines) were sacked in an April 1993 cabinet reshuffle.
394
  
While the stated reason for the dismissal of these ministers in specific was their involvement in 
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corruption, the fact that both Wina and Mulemba had vied for the party presidency against 
Chiluba at the MMD’s inaugural convention in 1991 and that both still maintained a loyal 
following within the party membership was widely believed to be the real reason they were 
targeted for dismissal.  Instead of staying within the MMD party and remaining rank and file 
MPs from their constituencies, Kasonde, Wina and Mulemba drew on their experience launching 
the MMD to establish a new party, the National Party (NP) in August of 1993.  They were 
quickly joined by other notable MMD defectors including Akashambwata Lewanika and twelve 
other MPs.
395
  Similarly, Scott later when on to found the National Lima Party (NLP) shortly 
before the 1996 elections.   
This early fracturing and defection in the party leadership opened the door and set a 
precedent for a large scale exodus from the party by leading members in the future.
396
  In all, 
thirty-five opposition parties, many of them headed by MMD members who defected or had 
been expelled, were formed during the MMDs first term in office,
397
 thus creating a possible 
challenge to the MMDs future electoral strength.  While, as detailed in Chapter 5, the NRM in 
Uganda also faced the defection of Kizza Besigye, a party notable who  first founded the Reform 
Agenda and later the FDC, the very early fracturing of the MMD (timing) and the much larger 
number of parties that have been founded by defecting members (level) put Zambian into a 
different category in terms of the ease with which members could defect and still have a political 
future. 
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   Besides a growing pattern of MMD ministers defecting to form their own parties, the 
weakness of internal party coherence and loyalty were evident in the repeated incidents of 
infighting between party members at all levels.  For example, Von Doepp reports that through 
the 1990s, [c]abinet members threatened lawsuits against each other. Provincial and district officers 
criticized national leaders.  Junior cabinet members were expelled from the party for publicly criticizing 
the party leaders.”398  Incidents of bitter fighting between party officials in many of the Provinces and the 
MMD National Executive Committee over various issues, including provincial appointments in the 
Northern Province,
399
 control of local party operations in the Copperbelt,
400
 and complaints about an 
unequal distribution of national resources to the Northwest and Southern Provinces
401
 were widely and 
publically reported in the media.  The inability of the MMD to instill a sense of discipline within party 
caused Minister Michael Sata to declare to the Times of Zambia that the party would be destroyed if 
the problem was not addressed.
402
   
Third, while the infighting within the MMD weakened the party internally, the number of 
corruption and other scandals that rocked the party throughout the 1990s weakened the voting 
public’s view of the MMD and its capacity to govern competently.  The privatization of many 
state-held industries called for in the economic reform process provided ample opportunities for 
MMD members and their allies to quietly acquire property and abuse procurement procedures 
for their own gain in a system where transparency of government dealings was still largely 
underdeveloped.  A staggering number of party officials were accused of engaging in land 
grabbing (including Ronald Penza, Derrick Chitala,  Matthew Ngulube and Roger Chongwe), 
import irregularities (Ephraim Chibwe, Guy Scott, and Ronald Penza), drug-trafficking 
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(Nakatindi Wina, Sikota Wina and Vernon Mwaanga)
403
 and banking scandals (Sata).  Even 
President Chiluba himself was not spared accusations of corruption- in 2000 UPND leader 
Anderson Mazoka charged Chiluba with theft of the profits from cobalt sales from a metals 
marketing company that, at the time, was a subsidiary of the government-owned Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), and Edith Nawakwi, herself an former MMD Minister of 
Energy, accused Chiluba of being intimately involved in the disappearance of over 700 takers of 
petrol belonging to the parastatal Zambian National Oil Corporation (ZNOC).
404
  As Ihonvbere 
observed, all of these reports of corruption created “[t]he general impression around the 
country…  that the ministers were so rich and comfortable that they lacked the capability or 
credibility to fight corruption, strengthen the party, and take care of the needs of the people.”405   
Indeed, the 1999 Afrobarometer survey carried out in Zambia found that 51% of respondents 
believe that “almost all” or “most” officials in the MMD government were involved in 
corruption, leading to low levels of trust in all levels of the MMD political hierarchy with only 
20% reporting trust in local governments, 23% in Parliament and 37% in the President.
406
 
Finally, the MMDs record on governance and policy implementation, especially in terms 
of economic reforms, proved to be disappointing, which disillusioned many early supporters.  
There is no doubt that the MMD inherited a Zambian economy that had been in decline for more 
than 15 years due to falling copper prices (Zambia’s main export) through the 1970s-80s coupled 
with the UNIP’s  government’s economic mismanagement of the developmentalist state.407  
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World Bank data indicates that, between 1975-1990, real per capita growth declined by 30% in 
Zambia as subsides for other goods and industries could not be sustained without copper export 
earnings to back them.
408
  As a result, the main task facing the new MMD government was to 
reform and restructure the economy and lift Zambia out of permanent crisis.   
After campaigning on a platform of monetary and fiscal reforms, liberalization of price and trade 
regulations and the privatization of pubic monopolies,
409
 once in office the MMD quickly moved to curb 
inflation by cutting federal spending, eliminating mealie meal (the main maize-based staple food in 
Zambia) subsidies and implementing a cash budget system.  The government also deregulated the foreign 
exchange so that the exchange rates became fully determined by the market, relaxed restrictions on 
imports and exports, and lifted controls on lending and deposit rates in banks.
410
  However, after 
accomplishing these early monetary and trade reforms, the MMD’s commitment to carrying out further 
measures such as privatizing state-owned industries, public sector restructuring, agricultural liberalization 
and other structural adjustments waned considerably.   As a result, even though inflation was brought 
under control, the economy as a whole continued to decline by approximately four percent per year 
during the 1990s, leaving the Zambian economy even smaller in 2001 than it had been in 1991 when the 
MMD entered office.
411
  In fact, a 2000 United Nations Development Program Report noted that Zambia 
is the only country in the world (with data available) that had lower human development indicators in 
1997 than it had in 1975, and poverty rates grew throughout the 1990s to a high of 72.9% in 1998.
412
 
 Clearly feeling the effects of continued economic decline on their livelihoods, opposition 
to the MMDs economic reforms began to emerge among a diverse range of civil society groups.  
One by one, organizations like the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the Zambian 
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National Farmers Union (ZNFU), the Catholic Church and certain business associations began to 
openly criticize the government over the poor management of the reform process.
413
  Although 
not endemic, some strikes were carried out by various groups to protest the lack of jobs and the 
poor state of the economy including a nationwide eleven day strike by over 120,000 civil 
servants and public workers between February and March 1996 over lack of payment.
414
  
Afrobarometer polls from 1999 demonstrate that citizens widely viewed the MMD government 
as performing poorly on the economic front, with only 33% reporting that the administration was 
performing “very well” or “fairly well” in managing the economy and only 26% identifying the 
government as doing well in job creation.
415
    
 A further exploration of policy implementation shows that the MMD had a similarly 
spotty record in terms of strides in social policy during their first ten years in power.  While 
nearby countries such as Malawi, Uganda and Botswana implemented free universal primary 
education in 1994, 1996 and the mid-1980s respectively, the MMD largely ignored the education 
sector.  Spending on public education declined throughout Chiluba’s tenure, dropping to less 
than 1.93% of GDP in 1999 compared to an average of 4.14% of GDP during UNIPs last decade 
in power in the 1980s, causing the average real spending per student to fall from $118 in 1983 to 
$50 in 1996.416  Public opinion surveys in 1999 revealed that only 43% of citizens had a positive 
assessment of the MMD’s handling of the country’s educational needs.417  Even less, 37%, 
approved of the MMD’s provision of basic services as many citizens disapproved of the 
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government’s move to impose user fees on previously government-provided health, water and 
sanitations services.  Interviews with citizens regarding the MMD’s healthcare policies in 
specific confirm this widespread dissatisfaction, finding that:  
     People complained that the [user] fees had been forced upon them…  The fees were  
     always mentioned when we asked people if they knew of any recent changes in the health    
     care system. The fees preoccupied them, and nearly always negatively.  Only four people       
     expressed some support for them. All other informants denounced the new measure which  
     they had come to see as the sobering truth behind the attractive slogans of the health    
     reforms.
418
 
 
Overall, by the end of Chiluba’s second term, a majority of citizens disapproved of many 
of the policies the MMD had implemented over the course of their time in office.  When asked 
by the Afrobarometer survey in 1999 about their attitudes towards the MMD’s reform programs, 
a full 72% responded that “the government’s economic policies have hurt most people and benefited 
only a few” while a scant 18% felt that “the government’s reform policies have helped most people; only 
a few have suffered.”419  These statistics signal the growing weakness of the MMD going into the 2001 
elections and highlights the fact that there was a clear opportunity for opposition parties to take advantage 
of this high level of dissatisfaction and frustration with the MMD among voters to propose a ruling 
alternative.  Yet, in order for opposition parties to create a credible threat to the MMD, they had to show 
signs of increasing in strength as MMD was in decline.  Thus, the next section explores the nature of 
opposition parties between 1991-2001 in order to assess changes in their relative strength vis-à-vis the 
MMD. 
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Opposition Parties:  Potential Challengers 
 Zambia experienced a proliferation of new opposition parties during the 1990s so that by 
the time of the third-multiparty elections in 2001 more than thirty parties were registered with 
the Zambian Electoral Commission.
420
  As in most African countries, many of these were small, 
personalistic parties that disappeared between elections and, as a result, did not pose any 
challenge to the ruling MMD.  However,  eleven parties actively contested the 2001 polls, and of 
these, a few of the larger opposition parties had come to pose a credible challenge to the MMD, 
to the point that one Zambian political expert wrote in late 1999 that “MMD's retaining power in 
2001 is not as assured as it was in 1991 and 1996.”421  As Burnell (drawing on Sartori’s party 
system classification scheme) observed, by the latter half of the 1990s, the MMD was not acting 
like a dominant party and was feeling vulnerable to opposition challenges as evidenced by the 
tactics the MMD used in their attempts to squash the opposition, including harassing opposition 
party members, fighting hard for every by-election, directing the police to deny rally permits to 
opposition forces and incentivizing opposition and former-MMD defectors to join the MMD.  
“None of this would be necessary in a hegemonic party system,” Burnell explains, “where there 
is neither formal nor de facto competition for power.”422  What caused the MMD, which had won 
the previous two national elections by a landslide, to feel vulnerable to challenges by the 
opposition in the run up to the 2001 elections?  Put more broadly, what factors contributed to the 
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relative strengthening of opposition parties in Zambia and the resulting change from a dominant 
to a more competitive party system?
423
 
 The first factor that aided in the transition from a dominant to a competitive party system 
was the fact that, due to historical circumstances, Zambian voters are much more willing than 
their counterparts in Uganda and other sub-Saharan countries to view oppositional political 
parties as legitimate.  As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in the survey conducted just after the 
2001 elections, a majority (55%) of Zambian citizens report trusting opposition parties to some 
extent, which is well above the average of 23 percent of citizens who claim that opposition 
parties can be relied upon among all countries sampled by Afrobarometer.
424
  One reason for 
Zambia’s more open political environment is likely Zambia’s relatively peaceful political 
history.  Since independence, Zambia has largely remained free of coups, civil wars, and other 
incidence of political violence that have made citizens in other countries fearful of political 
competition in any form.  Furthermore, unlike the NRM in Uganda, MMD officials were not able 
to demonize the concept of plurality in the electoral arena since they themselves had embraced 
pluralism as the fundamental basis of their campaign against UNIP in the early 1990s.  
Furthermore, the very fact that the first multi-party election in Zambia did produce a peaceful 
turn-over in power from UNIP to the MMD demonstrated to Zambian voters that such a 
transition to an opposition party was safe, and potentially effective, way to achieve change 
within the government. Thus, the permissive attitude of citizens towards opposition parties based 
on the unique political history of the country created the possibility for opposition parties to pose 
a credible threat of replacement to the MMD in 2001. 
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 Second, the willingness of voters to elect opposition parties to power can only pose an 
effective threat to the  incumbent party if the opposition fields candidates in a high enough  
number of electoral districts to make capturing a plurality of seats in the legislature feasible.  The 
previous chapter revealed that in Uganda, the FDC was only able to run candidates in 59% of 
constituencies in the 2006 election, while the UPC and DP only managed to field candidates in 
34% and 31% of constituencies, respectively.  However, the picture in Zambia is quite different 
where multiple non-MMD parties have been able to run party candidates in 95% or more of the 
150 wards in at least one of the first three multi-party elections (in 1991 UNIP ran 150 legislative 
candidates,  ZDC ran 143 candidates in 1996 and in 2001 four parties besides MMD ran over 
100 candidates, including UNDP (148), FDD (145), UNIP (143), Zambian Republican Party 
(ZRP) (137), the Heritage Party (HP) (113) and the Patriotic Front (PF) (102).
425
 While the 
ability to run candidates in a high number of constituencies should not be assumed to imply that 
each of these parties had an active grassroots organizational presence in each province (as most 
of the parties save for UNIP had very few party offices outside of Lusaka), the fact that they 
were able to find people who were not afraid to run against MMD in every corner of the country 
and were able to finance, to some degree, so many campaigns created the  potential for 
governmental turn-over which introduced a level of uncertainty in the electoral arena that MMD 
could not ignore.    
Third, the rate of success of some opposition parties in local and by-elections between the 
1996 and 2001 national elections signaled the growing strength of such parties vis-à-vis the 
MMD.  Local election results from 1998 revealed that opposition and independent candidates 
were able to secure 40% of the total vote in an election where only 27% of registered voters 
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turned up at the polls. Official returns show that UNIP was still largely supported in Eastern 
Province, its historic stronghold, but had also gained the momentum to win some wards in 
Northern, Central and Luapula Province (the home province of President Chiluba).
426
 However, 
the main surprise of the 1998 local elections was the success of the UPND.  Registered just one 
week before the December 30th polls, the UPND won 28 wards despite its lack of time to 
officially campaign.
427
  Following this round of local elections, by-elections for National 
Assembly seats in August of 1999 saw both UPND and UNIP winning three seats each and 
MMD winning five.    Further by-elections in Mbabala,
428
 Sesheke,
429
 Mwadi
430
 and other wards 
demonstrated that the UPND was quickly gaining significant support throughout the country, 
including in Northwestern, rural zones in the Copperbelt, some parts of Central and, most 
notably, the Southern Province.  As Momba declared in 1999, “UPND is quickly establishing 
itself as a serious contender, and is encroaching on some of the areas that were traditionally 
MMD strongholds.”431  The combined results of these local and by-election returns demonstrated 
to all that Luapula and Copperbelt provinces were the only provinces where the MMD could be 
sure of doing well in the 2001 elections.
432
  Even in by-elections where the MMD was victorious, 
the fact that the combined opposition vote was sometimes higher than the MMD vote (for 
example, the Kalingalinga by-election where the MMD secured 522 votes against the combined 
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opposition tally of 660 votes)
433
 contributed to a third way the opposition posed a growing threat 
to the MMD- the possibility of forming election coalitions.   
Despite the electoral gains made by the UPND and UNIP in by-elections in the lead up to 
the 2001 election, it seemed likely that an opposition that was fragmented between a handful of 
parties would not be able to unseat the MMD as votes for the opposition would be divided, thus 
giving the MMD a plurality.
434
  However, the talk of a possible electoral alliance between a 
number of opposition parties for the 2001 election created a way by which the opposition could 
circumvent an MMD “divide and conquer” strategy.  Electoral coalitions were not a new concept 
in Zambia by 2001.  The Zambian opposition has in the past demonstrated a willingness to work 
together in a coalition in order to become a more plausible government alternative.  In 1994, 
UNIP and six other opposition parties joined forces under the Zambian Opposition Front 
(ZOFRO)
435
  alliance and in 1996 the opposition also coalesced around the call for a constituent 
assembly to draft a new constitution.  Following this tradition, Guy Scott, leader of the National 
Lima Party called the opposition’s performance in the 1998 local elections “a major catalyst” for 
an opposition alliance.
436
  His call resulted in the formation of the Zambia Alliance for Progress 
(ZAP) in May of 1999 as a partnership between the National Lima Party (NLP), Zambia 
Democratic Congress (ZDC), Agenda for Zambia (AZ), Labour Party, the National Christian 
Coalition (NCC) and a non-governmental organization called the National Pressure Group.  At 
the time, MMD chairman Vernon Mwaanga dismissed the formation of ZAP as “meaningless” 
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since the six parties in the alliance had only won 3.7% of the total vote in the recent local 
elections.
437
  However, talk of other mergers, such as between long-time MMD financier Ben 
Mwila’s new Republican Party, which drew an impressive 10,000 people to its launch rally in 
Copperbelt town of Luanshya in August 2000, and the UPND and/or UNIP
438
 was a more 
menacing threat to MMD’s dominance.  Thus, the willingness of largely non-programmatic 
opposition parties in Zambia to form coalitions (or, at the very least, the potential for this to 
occur), is the fourth way in which the opposition in Zambia gained strength relative to the MMD 
in the lead up to the 2001 polls.       
The discussion in the previous paragraphs on the ways in which the opposition was able 
to pose a growing threat to the MMD prior to the 2001 elections should not obscure the fact that 
there were real weaknesses in the Zambia opposition as well.  UNIP suffered from public 
squabbles over leadership succession, the back and forth of the multiple “retirements” and 
reintroduction into politics of Kenneth Kaunda, their boycotting of the 1996 elections and a 
damaged reputation from 27 years of economic mis-management during the one-party era.  
Meanwhile, the newer parties such as the UPND, ZDC and ZRP struggled to construct local 
bases of support, gain name recognition and obtain financial backing.  All opposition parties 
were also constrained by the MMDs concerted efforts to quash challenges to its authority, such 
as the party’s use of the local laws and police to deny permits to opposition groups for gatherings 
and rallies, the MMDs willingness to re-write electoral laws to exclude certain opposition 
candidates,
439
  the arresting of opposition party leaders on trumped up criminal charges and the 
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party’s abuse of some state-owned media outlets to restrict opposition’s access to citizens over 
print, radio or television.  Yet, while the absolute strength of the many opposition groups might 
appear low in a one-sided analysis, when compared with the decline in the MMDs strength over 
time, we see that the relative strength of the opposition increased between 1991-2001 to the point 
where most MMD members perceived that the opposition posed at least a modicum of a credible 
threat of replacement by the time the debates over Chiluba’s third term began in earnest in 2000.  
Writing in the middle of the contentious third term debate, Burnell confirms that “the ruling 
party has interpreted the very existence of political competition as a real potential for opposition 
competitiveness.  The opposition’s weaknesses have not prevented the ruling party from feeling 
vulnerable…”440  The next section will draw on interview data to ascertain how ruling party MPs 
actually viewed the level of competitiveness in the party system by 2001 and to reveal the 
preferences, strategies and actions of the individual MMD actors who were tasked with deciding 
whether or not to retain the two term limit in the Zambian constitution.   However, before 
discussing the actors’ decision processes, a brief summary of the term limit debate as it unfolded 
in Zambia is warranted.   
The Executive Term Limit Debate in Zambia 
 The opening statement on what came to be widely known as the “third term” debate in 
Zambia was delivered nearly two and a half years prior to the 2001 election when, in mid-May 
1999, Lusaka district MMD youth secretary David Chanda and MMD's Lusaka District 
Chairperson, Reuben Sunkutu both reacted to speculation that UNIP would run Kenneth Kaunda 
in the 2001 poll by asserting that such a move would prompt MMD to adopt Chiluba as its 
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candidate for the third time.
441
  However, even after Kaunda announced his retirement from 
politics in March 2000, rumors that the President was not ready to relinquish office continued to 
circulate around Lusaka following Chiluba’s public announcement in May forbidding anyone 
within the MMD to launch their own campaign for president.  The movement to eliminated 
executive term limits from the Zambian constitution became official in January and February of 
2001 when the question of changing the MMD party constitution, which also imposes a two term 
limit on the party president, was put before the provincial executive committees at the nine 
MMD province conferences.  While seven conferences endorsed the proposal to amend the party 
constitution in this way, delegates in two provinces- the Southern Province and Lusaka Province- 
rejected the measure.  These provincial conventions were marred by the bribing of officials to 
support the petition on term limits,
442
 the suspension of several MPs and district officials from 
the party,
443
 physical assaults on third term opponents such as ministers Desai and Malambo by 
Chiluba loyalists at the Southern conference and the subsequent firing of cabinet members Sejani 
and Hatembo for “not respecting authority” after leading the charge against the third term in 
Choma.
444
  President Chiluba himself maintained a stoic silence throughout this period regarding 
his preferences for a third term, remarking only that debate is part of plural politics and healthy 
in a democracy when questions on his intentions. 
 The inner-MMD wrangling over the issue was soon accompanied by strong reactions 
from civil society actors.  On February 21, 2001 a newly-formed coalition of civil society 
groups, which included the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ), Episcopal Conference (ZEC), 
Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ), Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ) and the Non-
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Governmental Coordinating Council (NGOCC), organized an event at Lusaka’s Oasis Restaurant 
that brought together nearly 1,000 citizens opposed to the third term agenda.  The gathering, 
which many felt was reminiscent of the rallies against the UNIP government in the early 1990s, 
sparked actions such as the green ribbon-wearing and car horn-honking campaigns, public 
protests, and seminars around the country.  When the MMD responded by pulling green ribbons 
from store shelves and denying the Oasis Forum, as the organization came to be called, permits 
for rallies, they group responded by importing ribbons from South Africa or the United Kingdom 
and continuing to hold schedule marches in defiance of police orders.
445
   
Few MMD members participated in the first Oasis meeting or early events, but by late 
April/early May eighty members of parliament had signed a letter tabled at an Oasis-organized 
prayer meeting at the Holy Cross Cathedral declaring their opposition to altering the national 
constitution and many party leaders, including Vice President Christon Tembo, had begun to 
publically speak out against the third term at public rallies organized by the Oasis Forum and in 
the media.  As a result, Tembo and eight other cabinet ministers who had signed the petition 
were expelled from the MMD in early May, and many of them promptly formed their own 
political party, the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD).  The day after their 
explosion, 65 out of the 158 MPs filed a motion of impeachment against the President for seven 
offences of gross violation of the constitution for using bribes during the third term campaign 
and engaging in “thuggery, gangsterism, and anarchy”.  These actions came only two weeks after 
the MMD national convention held in late April voted to amend the party constitution to allow 
unlimited terms for the party president as opponents to the measure were barred from entering 
the meeting.  However, despite this victory, President Chiluba announced unequivocally on May 
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5, 2001 that he would not seek additional terms in office and would stand down at the 
completion of his current term.   
Why did Chiluba choose to pursue the removal of term limits from the Zambian 
constitution?  What lead a majority of ministers and MPs to oppose the move, first cautiously but 
later actively?  The remainder of the chapter will explore, in their own words, the perceptions 
and preferences that lead the various MMD actors to pursue the strategies that they did during 
the contentious term limit debate in Zambia.   
 
Perceptions of Party System Competitiveness 
 The discussion of party system competitiveness earlier in this chapter sought to use data 
from electoral returns and public opinion polls as well as descriptions of party histories in order 
to explain the cause of the relative increase in opposition strength vis-à-vis the MMD by 2001.  
However, the question remains as to how the various actors in Zambia themselves perceived the 
MMD’s position relative to the opposition at the time they when they were compelled to make 
their decisions on the term limit issue.  Did they feel that other parties posed a threat of 
replacement to their party, or did they feel that their party’s hold on power was firm?  Why did 
President Chiluba, who appeared to think his party was strong as evidenced by the fact the he 
favored the lifting of term limits, have a different perception of the MMD’s strength from the 
MPs and cabinet ministers who opposed amending the constitution? 
 The difference in the timing between when the President had to make his decision to 
pursue a constitutional amendment lifting term limit and when the MPs/Cabinet Ministers had to 
make their own decision on the matter largely explains the discrepancy between Chiluba’s 
decision to attempt to lift term limits and the parliamentarian’s collective decision to oppose the 
amending of the constitution.  Although it is hard to ascertain exactly when the President 
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personally decided to initiate the campaign to abolish the restrictions on executive tenure, 
available evidence
446
 suggest that by late 1999, certain party insiders had been tapped by Chiluba 
to begin laying the groundwork for the move.
447
  In late 1990s, there were many factors which 
likely lead Chiluba to believe that both he and the MMD were in a strong position to ahead of the 
2001 elections.  During this period, Chiluba had mediated a peace deal in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and hosted South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki’s first foreign state visit, Wezi 
Kaunda, Kenneth’s son and rumored UNIP candidate in 2001, had been assassinated and 
government completed the privatization of the Zambia Consolidated Copper mine (ZCCM) with 
the final transfer of ZCCM’s assets to the Anglo-American Corporation in March of 2000.  The 
September 2000 by-elections seemed to confirm an MMD renaissance as the party won all eight 
open seats across four provinces, and opinion polls conducted in November and December 1999 
found that 64 percent of Zambians approved of the way President Chiluba has performed his job 
in the previous year.
448
  Furthermore, in December 1999 Chiluba had put in place 72 District 
Administrators (DAs).  Billed as civil servants tasked with improving service delivery at the 
local level, it quickly became apparent that Chiluba’s appointees to the post were party cadres 
who could do the President’s bidding at Provincial party conventions.449  Finally, Chiluba had 
just watched the neighboring Namibian Parliament easily amend the constitution to give 
President Sam Nujoma the ability to run for a third term the previous year in 1998 with a smaller 
SWAPO majority than he had in the MMD-dominated parliament.  Seeing little negative 
international reaction to Namibia’s constitutional amendment, one former MMD minister 
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maintains that, for Chiluba, international opinion regarding Zambia lifting term limits “would not 
have counted for much.  I don’t think he was worried about it [the reaction from abroad].”    
As the former Minister for Presidential Affairs revealed, all of these developments 
combined created an environment in which Chiluba  
     “must have thought ‘I’ve been working so hard and the economy is looking around and  
      I should take the glory, for one thing, maybe a third term.’  And there where those in  
      the party who [said] things are looking good, things have changed.  People are apprec- 
      iating the strides in the economy and governance structures.  So there was a case for him.”450   
   
Feeling that he and the MMD were much stronger than any opposition party, Chiluba gave his 
blessing for the term limit issue to be placed on the agenda at the MMD Provincial conferences 
in January and February 2001 in the first official step in the process of eliminating tenure 
restrictions on the executive office.  It was a decision made unilaterally by Chiluba who, at this 
time, was only consulting about the third term with a small sub-committee of the MMD lead by 
Paul Tembo, not within the Cabinet or the party’s National Executive Committee.451   As one 
former MMD divulged, “he realized the amount of power his office held and he felt that he was 
very popular.  And in fairness to him, he was popular, especially as it [the term limit debate] 
began.”452 
 Even though President Chiluba did not sense a threat of replacement from any of the 
opposition parties in the country, just as the term limit question was being adjudicated in the 
Provincial Conferences and MPs and Ministers were being asked to pronounce their views on the 
matter, the political environment shifted in a number of ways from the time when Chiluba made 
his decision to push for an amendment.  These developments persuaded many Ministers and MPs 
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that the MMD was losing strength and did face a real threat of replacement by opposition forces.  
First, in February of 2001, early reports of corrupt cobalt sales to the Bahamian Metals Resource 
Group broke in both the international and Zambian media revealing that Zambia had lost more 
than $150 million in the deal.
453
  Even though the MMD had faced other corruptions scandals 
before (i.e. individual ministers charged with drug-dealing or gun-running) the allegations of 
corruption on this scale, with some sources indicated that the President himself could be 
involved,
454
 was a major blow to the party and made the MMD more vulnerable than ever before.  
In addition to the cobalt scandal, one Zambian newspaper editor disclosed that as the third term 
debate began to unfold,  
       [t]here were a lot of leakages from civil servants just to expose what the ministers were 
       doing, the government, Chiluba… so we had so many scandals exposed during that 
       period with proper documentary evidence.  The civil servants were themselves very 
       upset.  They were just releasing information that they thought would help demolish 
       Chiluba’s intentions.  Things were quite bad and there was no hope for the future.  The 
       only hope they had was for a change of leadership.  So they had to do everything to  
       ensure that the third term bid was frustrated.
455
   
 
As a result of these growing revelations of corruption within the MMD, many parliamentarians 
began to sense that “people didn’t want MMD because of what Chiluba had done…. People 
didn’t like Chiluba’s economic policies and his corrupt practices”456   
  In addition to the mounting corruption scandals, the MMDs loss of strength was made 
apparent to the MPs and Ministers by the strong reaction to the third term issue by numerous 
facets of civil society.  In Uganda, there had been a few small demonstrations against the NRM’s 
plan to lift executive term limits in Kampala, but this movement never amounted to much due to 
the NRM’s widespread support among the population.  In contrast, the vocal and sustained anti-
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third term movement orchestrated by the Oasis Forum around Zambia signaled to 
parliamentarians that the MMDs popularity might not be strong enough to withstand the growing 
grassroots movement.  One former MMD minister remembers thinking that “the rallies by the 
UNDP and civil society groups in opposition to the third term were becoming unbearable.”457    
Finally, the mounting public rallies in opposition to the third term not only signaled the 
voters’ disapproval of the move, but also created an opportunity for opposition parties to gain 
popular support.  Indeed, in the words of one respondent, the popular movement against the term 
limit amendment served to benefit and strengthen opposition parties as “the power of civil 
society became a real force to get opposition parties together to face Chiluba’s ambition”458  
Another former Minister recalled thinking at the time that “the UPND was much stronger”459 at 
that point than at any other point in the party’s history.  As a result of these developments, it 
became clear to most MMD members that their party’s hold on power was anything but assured 
in the 2001 election and beyond.  The opposition had grown robust enough to pose a credible 
threat of replacement to the MMD in the 2001 elections.  How did MMD MPs and Ministers 
translate this perceived threat of replacement into their action and outcome preferences regarding 
their choice on the question of lifting executive term limits?  The next section of this chapter will 
explore this question in detail.   
 
Preferences of Ministers and Members of Parliament 
 
How did knowing that their party was losing strength relative to other parties in Zambia 
impact MMD members’ preferred outcome to the term limit debate?   As individual actors, each 
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MP and Minister had their personal outcome and action preferences when it came to the term 
limit amendment decision.  While the ultimate goal of each member was for the MMD to control 
the government after the 2001 elections and beyond, they had different ideas about whether an 
outcome preference of lifting or maintaining term limits as was the best strategy for achieving 
this goal.  In addition to each member’s outcome preference, each also had action preferences for 
retaining favor with both their constituents and the MMD leadership for their own future 
electoral viability.  The following section explores how MPs and Ministers were thinking about 
both their outcome and action preferences during the debate over executive term limits in 
Zambia.            
  
Outcome Preferences 
 Many cabinet Ministers within the MMD reported wanting to maintain the two-term limit 
on the executive enshrined in the Zambian constitution due to their own political ambitions.  
Despite President Chiluba’s May 2000 proclamation restricting MMD members from openly 
campaigning for the presidency, a number of Cabinet ministers coveted the post and were 
positioning themselves to be the MMD candidate in the 2001 polls.  As one then-minister 
disclosed “There were plenty of people who made it very clear that they wanted to succeed him 
[Chiluba], including myself!”460 The very fact that there were no less than four presidential 
candidates who had all been MMD ministers 15 months prior to the election but who were 
running in 2001 as opposition candidates demonstrates that a number of Ministers wished to 
uphold term limits and see Chiluba step down after two terms so that they could compete for the 
presidency themselves.  This group includes Christon Tembo (former National Vice President 
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running under FDD), Godfrey Miyanda (former MMD Vice President, running under HP), 
Michael Sata (former Minister without Portfolio, running under PF) and Ben Mwila (former 
Defense Minister, running under ZRP).  Except for Mwila, who was expelled from the party 
prior to the Provincial conferences where the proposal to lift term limits was first officially 
tabled, the other three, plus a number of other ministers who were widely thought to have 
presidential ambitions but did not end up standing in the election (including Vincent Malambo, 
Enoch Kavindele, Eric Silwamba) either left the MMD in the middle of the term limit debate or 
remained within MMD through the selection of Mwanawasa as party flag bearer in August of 
2001. Yet, whether they publically fought against amending Article 35(2)
461
 or claimed in 
interviews to have advocated against the third term from within the party,
462
 it is clear that a fair 
number of ministers, each with their own following within the party, preferred to keep executive 
term limits in place in order to pave the way for their own candidacy.     
 Among lower-level ministers and MP who were not in a position to contest for the 
presidency, divergent outcome preferences emerged during interviews.  First and foremost, just 
like their Ugandan counterparts, a number of interviewees expressed wanting to keep executive 
term limits in the constitution based on a sentiment that the national constitution should be a 
sacrosanct document that should not be amended at whim or for the advantage of just one 
person.
463
  They saw an inherent danger in setting a precedent whereby the constitution was seen 
as a malleable tool to be used to advantage whatever party was in power at the time.  The 
perceived threat of replacement posed by the relative strengthening of the opposition parties 
during this time made such a precedent an especially dangerous one because MMD members did 
not want an opposition president to gain a permanent incumbent advantage and additional 
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leverage to further amend the constitution to consolidate power should the MMD lift term limits 
and then lose the next election.  One MMD MP worried that “once you break the principle, it 
will be very difficult to defend it later… and subsequent presidents could equally manipulate the 
constitution to their benefit.”464   
Second, many MMD members also worried what changing the constitution just so 
Chiluba could run again would go against the very philosophy that the MMD was built upon.  
One MMD member of parliament at the time (who was also among the founding members of the 
party in the early 1990s) recalls favoring the upholding of term limits because changing the 
constitution to allow for unlimited executive tenure would run counter to the founding principles 
of the party itself.  He explained that, at the founding of the MMD 
       “we had stood on a platform of forming a government of laws and not men.  Now, 
         if the very first act, or one of the very major acts that such a government would do, 
         that stood on such a platform would be to say ‘we’re not going to recognize what has  
         been said in the constitution, instead we’re going to change the constitution,’ in my  
         opinion, was to set a very dangerous and serious precedent which would be very  
         difficult to rectify…So, I have absolutely no regrets for fighting against the third term. 
         In my  opinion, to have succeeded would have mean the whole spirit of the MMD  
         would  have been void.”465 
 
 More specifically than going against the spirit of the MMD, others felt that for the party 
to advocate lifting term limits so Chiluba could run again would be to directly contradict an 
argument the MMD had made in 1996 to block criticisms it endured the last time the party 
tampered with the constitution.  Shortly before the 1996 elections, the MMD-dominated 
parliament had pushed through an amendment to the constitution that required presidential 
candidates to have parents who were born in Zambia, a rule that effectively barred Kenneth 
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Kaunda from running as his parents had been born in present-day Malawi.  As a result, one 
former cabinet minister remembers arguing in 2001 that     
      “because in 1996 when the argument came that we were just doing that to bar Kaunda, 
        our response to that was that we can’t make constitutions to suit an individual.  Now,  
        to amend the constitution to extend Chiluba’s term for another term of office would  
        amount to changing the constitution to suit the will of an individual, running counter  
        to our argument in 1996.  I was not about to do that.  That was the fundamental basis  
        of my objection to the third term bid.”466 
 
  
Interestingly, as all of these positions show, a number of parliamentarians were cognizant of and 
concerned about how altering the constitution would affect the MMD as a party and its future 
competitiveness in elections.  If the electoral playing field remained equal and the MMD retained 
its reputation, MMD MPs felt they would personally have a better chance of winning subsequent 
elections.  Their concern for the endurance of constitutional principles in the abstract seemed 
secondary to these concerns to most respondents. 
 While this concern for the reputation and strength of the party in the future lead some 
parliamentarians to espouse and outcome preference of retaining term limits, other MPs and 
Ministers sided with the President in preferring term limits to be lifted due to other concerns 
about the strength of the party, namely the party’s cohesion.  As detailed earlier in the chapter, 
the MMD began as a loose coalition of individuals and groups with very disparate interests.  The 
numerous early defections from the party signaled to all within the MMD that the party’s 
cohesion was in perpetual danger.  As such, some MPs and Ministers felt that the best way to 
hold the party together was to keep Chiluba on as president because they thought an open 
succession debate would rip the party apart.  In addition to wanting to ensure the party hung 
together, other parliamentarians were nervous about what shape the party would take in a post-
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Chiluba era and wanted to keep the status quo in place in order to safeguard their own position 
within the party hierarchy.  One former Minister recollected that  
      There were people around him [Chiluba] who thought that there was no suitable 
      successor- that’s how people always start these things… People become comfortable in 
      the particular style of leadership and they are always uncomfortable with change.  You  
      never know what change brings.  So, I think people were afraid of change and what it  
      would mean for them.”467      
 
Sentiments like this, expressing fear over the fate of one’s position within the party in specific 
and the future shape of the party structure in general in the wake of a presidential turn-over were 
also prominent among Uganda MPs and Ministers.  This is understandable in new democracies 
that are facing their first transition of power from one leader to another in the multi-party era.  
Both a relative lack of experience with executive transitions (as in Zambia, where there had only 
been one leadership transition in 40 years of independence) or a history of violent transitions (as 
in Uganda) create a natural apprehension among ruling party members about uncertainty change 
may bring.  One respondent mentioned that it was an especially pressing concern among some 
MPs and Ministers in Zambia, especially those from Chiluba’s Luapula Province who wanted to 
keep the presidency within the region.
468
  
 Based on all of this information, it is clear that Zambian Ministers and MP were split in 
their preferred term limit outcome.  Some wished to keep term limits enshrined in the 
constitution based on concerns about retaining an equal playing field in future elections and 
protecting the MMDs reputation as a party that abided by the law in the face of the threat of 
replacement posed by the strengthening opposition.  However, others preferred to abolish term 
limits from the constitution in order to keep the status quo, thereby protecting the party and 
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themselves from the uncertainties of a transition.    Yet, these outcome preferences alone did not 
dictate how parliamentarians ultimately decided to proclaim themselves on the term limit 
question.  As in Uganda, MPs and Ministers’ action preference also influenced their ultimate 
decision on what side to support in the term limit debate.  It is to an analysis of the action 
preferences of Zambian respondents that the chapter now turns. 
 
Action Preferences 
 The action preferences of Zambia parliamentarians regarding the term limit question are 
rooted in their concern for how their constituents and the MMD leadership will view their choice 
on the matter.  As elected representatives who rely on constituents for votes and the party for their 
campaign funding, a parliamentarian has many reference groups whose interests she must consider 
whenever she makes a political decision regardless of her personal view on the issue at hand.  
What action preferences did Zambian MPs and Ministers form in light of the consequences they 
faced from their various reference groups? 
 
Constituent Support 
 Elections for legislative seats occur concomitantly with presidential elections in Zambia, 
meaning that Zambian MPs and Ministers were cognizant that their decision on the term limit issue 
would be in the forefront of voters’ minds when they went to the polls in late 2001.  In the early 
stages of the third term debate, it was unclear to MMD members what ordinary Zambians thought 
about the idea of lifting term limits.  Some respondents thought that public sentiment would 
support the upholding of term limits because the Zambian citizens had advocated for such limits in 
presidential power since 1972 when the Chona constitutional review commission found that a 
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majority of citizens wanted to see term limits added to the constitution.
469
  Even though the UNIP 
government at the time rejected the proposal in 1972, undaunted, citizens overwhelmingly 
supported the implementation of term limits in the 1991 constitution when polled by the Mvunga 
Constitutional Commission
470
 and also advocated the maintenance of executive term limits during 
the touring of the country by the Mwanakatwe Constitutional Review Commission in 1995.
471
  
Knowing that that citizens had long supported the institution of executive term limits, one former 
Minister claimed that “for people like me, to be requested to go back to the people again and tell 
them that we were revising the constitution, which only five years earlier we were changing, I 
think was totally unacceptable.”472     
 However, even though citizens seemed to support executive term limits as a concept, other 
parliamentarians recall wondering if Chiluba was personally strong enough to  draw citizen and 
interest group support for a third term.  Just as the President himself estimated that his personal 
popularity was high two years before the 2001 election, prompting him to go for the term 
extension, a former MMD MP recalls believing that the president was quite popular with the public 
when talk of the third term first began to surface.
473
  However, as the term limit debate progressed, 
the strong negative response from civil society through the Oasis Forum- the public meetings 
around the country, the green ribbon and car honking campaigns, the anti-third term t-shirts, 
bumper stickers and leaflets (which were translated into seven regional languages) that appeared 
all over Lusaka
474
- erased any perceptions among MMD members that the public supported the 
abolition of term limits for President Chiluba.  As one leader of the Oasis Forum movement said, 
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“the movement outside helped to remind [MMD members] that, hey, you have set up the standard, 
you have brought democracy!  You cannot go against what you have promised.”475  As a result, 
most parliamentarians, especially those in Lusaka, Eastern and Southern provinces came to view 
retaining term limits as in their best interest if they wanted to curry the favor of their constituents.         
 
Standing with the MMD Leadership 
 Constituents are not the only reference group each Zambian MP and Minister had to 
consider when forming their action preference with regards to the term limit issue.  Just as in 
Uganda, most politicians seek to retain favor with their party leadership because they are reliant on 
the party for campaign endorsement and funding as well as appointments after the election.   
Zambian electoral rules dictate that each party is free to choose candidates for parliamentary seats 
through any method they adopt.  In the MMD, candidates are selected after going through a series 
of interviews with party officers at both the local and national level before meeting final approval 
with the central MMD organization.
476
 As one MMD official summarized, “the adoption process is 
done by the party, so if you are perceived not to be a loyal MP, at the next election they won’t 
adopt you.”477  This process of candidate selection and the desire of candidates, once selected, to 
secure the highest possible amount of campaign funds from the party, leads to a situation in which 
sitting parliamentarians always want to be seen as towing the party line.  As one MMD MP 
remarked that “one of the major challenges we [MP candidates] have is resources.  What you earn 
from Parliament is a pittance… and most of the people do not have the kind of accumulated 
wealth” to fund their own campaigns.478  This same MP also remarked that the MMD had access to 
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greater sums of campaign dollars for the candidates than other parties because, as ruling party, it 
could tap into state resources and also enjoyed the support of Zambian businesses who donated to 
the MMD in order to secure lucrative government contracts.  As a result, all else being equal, 
MMD parliamentarians would prefer to run in the next election under the MMD banner.   
It is of the utmost importance to Zambian parliamentarians to retain their seats in the 
legislature because being in government not only provides a livelihood while serving as an MP,
479
 
but losing a seat can make life difficult for former MPs and Ministers even when they are no longer 
in government.  Many respondents claimed that politicians who are expelled from or 
decampaigned by the party face an uphill battle in finding employment in the private sector 
because their images are tarnished and possible employers may think “if you are fired, you must 
have done something sinister or you must have been a thief. They don’t believe you can be fired 
over a difference in matter of policy.”480  Even those MPs who own their own businesses or are 
otherwise self-employed are scared of losing office because once out of government “your 
businesses will suffer, your contracts will suffer, they will of course audit you… these things do 
happen and there’s evidence.  You’ll be squeezed.  So, better toe the line to make sure there is food 
on the table.”481  Thus, Zambian MPs and Ministers had to seriously consider the consequences 
opposing Chiluba’s third term bid could have on their future livelihood when deciding how to 
stand on the issue. 
The committee Chiluba had set up within MMD to push for the third term played on these 
fears in an attempt to build support among parliamentarians for the term limit amendment.  Shortly 
after the MMD Southern Province conference delegates rejected the proposal to abolish term limits 
from the MMD party constitution (becoming the second province after Lusaka Province to oppose 
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the change) two Ministers who had come out as early opponents of a third term for Chiluba - Local 
Government Minister Ackson Sejani and Home Affairs Deputy Minister Edwin Hatembo- were 
sacked from cabinet by the President in late February.  Officially fired for “conduct intended to 
incite tribal hatred” at the conference, their dismissal was widely seen as a warning to other 
parliamentarians of what could happen to those who did not tow the party line on the term limits 
question.
482
  Seeing this lead many MPs to think “I could be fired!  I don’t want this to happen to 
me. She has been fired, he has been fired because of that [opposing the third term], so I will 
refrain.  That would deter any would-be dissenters.”483  Alternatively, signals were sent by the 
party that those MPs who supported the bid to remove term limits from both the party and 
national constitutions would be rewarded.  One example was Levison Mumba, an MP who had 
formerly campaigned against the call to have President Chiluba run for another term of office at 
the Eastern Province MMD conference, who was appointed Minister for Eastern Province 
immediately after he reversed course and pledged to support the third term program.
484
  
However, even though MMD MPs had historically been accustomed to thinking that 
MMD endorsement was the ticket to electoral victory, the increasingly competitive nature of the 
party system in Zambia by 2001 and the growing civil society movement against term abolition 
caused some parliamentarians to reconsider this tenet.  The next section of this chapter will 
demonstrate how having the option to switch parties in Zambia created a situation in which many 
MPs and Ministers alike were able to follow their outcome preference for retaining executive 
term limits by lessening the potential costs of going against the party line. 
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Individual MPs’ Decisions 
 Since a proposal to lift executive term limits was never officially tabled and voted upon 
in the Zambian National Assembly as it was in the Ugandan parliament, an alternative decision 
point must be designated for the Zambian case.  For the majority of MPs, they key decision 
moment came on April 10, 2001 when parliamentarians were asked to sign a declaration opposed 
to changing the article on executive term limits in the national constitution at a prayer meeting 
organized by the Oasis Forum at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Lusaka.  That day, fifty-nine 
members of parliament, including forty-three MMD ministers and MPs (out of 131) added their 
names to the declaration, thereby taking a definitive public stance on the third term issue.  Over 
the following days, additional members of parliament signed the petition, which contained more 
than eighty names by the time the text and the list of signatories was published in The Post 
newspaper on April 12
th
.   
How did the MMD members who signed the declaration ultimately chose to dissent from 
their party and proclaim themselves in opposition to additional terms in office for President 
Chiluba?  The previous discussion of actors outcome and action preferences seemed to suggest 
that MPs and Ministers were divided in their action preferences between whether lifting or 
retaining term limits would be the best strategy for ensuring the MMD remained competitive in 
the future, while their action preferences were also split between bowing to popular pressure to 
keep term limits in place and staying in the good graces of MMD party leaders by choosing to 
lift term limits.  Therefore, just as in Uganda, MMD parliamentarians’ outcome and action 
preferences did not always align.  This drove MPs to search for the best way to adjudicate 
between the two.  What factors ultimately persuaded close to half of all MMD MPs to follow a 
combination of outcome and action preferences that led them to oppose the third term?   
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As the following discussion will demonstrate, the increasingly competitive nature of the 
party system in Zambia as perceived by MPs not only produced a threat of replacement to the 
MMD that made upholding term limits necessary to maintain the party’s future electoral chances, 
but also created the possibility for MMD members to switch parties.  The viable option of party-
switching made available to anti-third term parliamentarians a strategy that allowed to them to 
voice concerns and/or ultimately exit the party if necessary because they knew that they would 
still be able to vie for re-election under a different party if they were expelled or decampaigned 
from the MMD for opposing the lifting of term limits. One current PF member of parliament 
described the sentiment widely shared among politicians in Zambia regarding the ease of 
switching parties, noting that MPs  
       “are not bound to their so-called traditional parties.  You could have been MMD for five  
        years and you could leave MMD to join another party and you could be embraced in 
        another party and visa-versa. I think people are very free here to move between parties…  
        and are able to be re-elected where chance affords them.   It doesn’t exist here that you  
        are suspect [if you switch parties]… Even independents- we even have independents  
        who have been supported by their independent-minded constituents and they got them 
        into parliament… For example, if my party will not adopt me, I would try to stand as an  
        independent knowing very well that I have a lot of independent colleagues who would  
        vote for me.  If I don’t go that route, I would go to another party if they embraced me. I     
        would be confident that people would not say, ah, she was a member of this party, now 
        she has joined us so she’s a traitor or what.  No!  I think Zambian people are very open- 
        minded on these things… It just depends how you work with the various constituencies 
        and how popular you are. 
 
This is in direct contrast to their Ugandan counterparts who felt compelled to remain loyal to the 
NRM party even if they personally disagreed with lifting term limits because they did not have a 
viable option of switching parties.     
 The threat of replacement by an opposition party and having the option to switch parties 
impacted both MPs outcome and action preferences in parallel ways. In terms of 
parliamentarians’ outcome preferences, recall that when the MPs and Ministers interviewed 
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spoke of their early-held outcome preferences, many of them filtered their ultimate view on the 
term limits issue through the lens of how the outcome would affect the MMD as a party.  They 
ultimately desired two things- to ensure the MMD’s future competitiveness and to keep the party 
from fracturing.  The perceived threat of replacement posed by a strengthening opposition 
convinced many MPs that lifting term limits might actually inhibit the MMD’s future electoral 
chances since tampering with the constitution would harm the MMD’s democratic reputation 
with voters and disadvantage the MMD later if an opposition candidate won the presidency 
under a constitution with no limits on executive tenure.  Many MPs agreed with one former 
minister who perceived that “the opposition was growing faster”485 and therefore felt that it was 
dangerous to lift term limits because it could create a permanent incumbent advantage for an 
opposition party if the MMD went on to lose the presidential election in 2001 as the Parti 
Socialiste in Senegal had lost the 2000 presidential elections after lifting term limits for Diouf in 
1998.  Furthermore, many MPs began to wonder whether having President Chiluba stand again 
would actually be a disadvantage to the party.  One current MP claims that parliamentarians at 
the time “knew that Chiluba had engaged in corruption.  Therefore, they couldn’t be with him on 
the third term.  The third term would harm the party.”486  
In terms of party cohesion, early on some parliamentarians felt that lifting term limits and 
allowing Chiluba to be the MMD candidate in the 2001 elections would help hold the party 
together while others believed that the issue would cause additional rifts in the party.   However, 
by early April it was becoming more and more apparent that, contrary to keeping the party 
united, the term limit debate itself was tearing the party apart.  One former minister remembered 
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sensing that the “party was being divided by the day”487 as organized factions emerged within 
the MMD around both the pro- and anti-third term positions, each seeking to sway other 
parliamentarians to their side.
488
  “The lobby within the party was very strong to stop the third 
term,” remarked another then-minister, “we thought it was going to break the party.”489  At a 
meeting of the MMD National Executive Committee (NEC, the party’s leadership body which is 
composed largely of cabinet ministers) on March 24
th
, the NEC members were asked by the 
President to go around the table pronouncing themselves on the term limit issue.  All 
interviewees who were present at the meeting report that the ministers where split close to 50/50 
following a heated debate on the issue.
490
 According to a western embassy official, those 
ministers in the group who were opposed to lifting term limits claimed that they were prepared 
“to form a new party to remove Chiluba” from office if they were expelled from the MMD on 
account of their defiance.
491
  The ability for MPs to switch parties created the real possibility of 
large-scale defections from the MMD if the amendment lifting term limits was passed.  
Therefore, it became increasingly clear to many MMD members that retaining term limits was 
the strategy that was most likely to keep the party from fracturing fully.   
 The ability to switch parties also allowed parliamentarians to adjudicate between their 
two action preferences, namely maintaining favor with the MMD leadership and preserving their 
reputation with voters.  When it became apparent to many MMD MPs and Ministers that it 
would be impossible to achieve both of these action preferences simultaneously, the ability to 
switch parties provided them with a “safety valve” strategy that allowed them to discount the 
threat of punishment by the MMD for opposing the term limit amendment and instead side with 
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the voting public against the third term.   This is because an MP who was expelled or 
decampaigned by the MMD for challenging the lifting of term limits could still run in the next 
election and have a reasonable chance of winning under a different party.  Early on in the term 
limit debate, when parliamentarians were uncertain what views the majority of the voting public 
held regarding amending the constitution to abolish presidential term limits, many took care not 
to publically pronounce themselves either way on the issue.  One Oasis Forum leader recalls that 
most MPs were initially afraid to come out in public against the third term and did not attend the 
first meeting at the Oasis Restaurant or other early events.
492
  The main reason was because they 
were fearful of the consequences they might face within the party for opposing the president, as 
they had already witnessed the sacking of the early vocal opponents of the third term plan.
493
  
However, by early April, the bold and expanding Oasis Forum civil society movement revealed 
that public sentiment was widely against changing the constitution to allow Chiluba to run for 
additional terms in office.  Observing this strong public outcry, MMD MPs began to see that 
advocating for the abolition of term limits would be detrimental to their re-election chances with 
their constituencies.  One respondent divulged that “the pressure from outside helped them 
[MMD members] to make up their minds quickly and to reflect on what they promised when 
they came into power… and they eventually came out [against changing term limits].”494  
Another then-parliamentarian noted that many MPs and ministers would not have had the 
courage to publically come out in favor of retaining term limits “if not for the safe space that 
Oasis created.”495 
                                                 
492
 Author interview with civil society leader, July 24, 2008, Lusaka, Zambia. 
493
 Author interview with former MMD Minister, August 7, 2008, Lusaka, Zambia 
494
 Author interview with PF member of parliament, July 24, 2008, Lusaka, Zambia. 
495
 Author interview with former MMD MP, July 25, 2001, Lusaka, Zambia.  
 253 
 
As a result, through late March into April “people from MMD went to join [the Oasis 
movement].
496
 National Vice President Christon Tembo and MMD party Vice President Godfrey 
Miyanda addressed large public protests in Lusaka.  Other ministers such as Vincent Malambo 
and Newton N’guni toured the country speaking against the alteration of the term limit law at 
public fora organized by local press clubs
497
 while rank and file MPs were seen handing out 
leaflets and anti-third term t-shirts along Cairo Road, the main thoroughfare through downtown 
Lusaka.  Parliamentarians decided to come out and publically oppose lifting term limits because 
“they were looking at the number of organizations who they were thinking would come and back 
them up”498 during the forthcoming election and decided it was worth the risk of displeasing the 
MMD leadership.  In fact, von Doepp observed that the growing public opposition to altering the 
term limit provision made it so that “ the cost of not challenging it became even higher for MMD 
politicians who sought to survive over the medium to longer term”499  Indeed, a number of Oasis 
Forum leaders and MPs who were interviewed all describe the parliamentarians who were late in 
coming out against the third term as “joining for self-interested reasons for re-election,”500 
indicating that many MPs decided to follow their action preference of retaining favor with 
constituents and abandoned their action preference of staying in the good graces of the MMD 
leadership based on their personal calculations regarding what was best for their own political 
survival.   
Thus, when the three church mother bodies in the Oasis Forum organized a prayer 
meeting and “day of reflection” on the term limit issue at the Anglican Cathedral of the Holy 
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Cross in Lusaka on April 10
th, many MMD ministers and MPs chose to attend “to show they 
were against this third term business.”501  During the meeting, which was attended by a wide 
cross section of society, a declaration was initiated among parliamentarians that pledged the 
signers to defend the Constitution.  The document, later termed the “Cathedral Declaration” 
began with the words “"We the undersigned members of parliament, categorically state that we 
are opposed to any attempts to confer a third term of office on the President, Dr. FJT Chiluba, 
however contrived.”502  One former minister remembers that he got the feeling that day that the 
message in the room was “Those of you who are opposed to, you members of parliament… can 
you show today that you are on the side of the people?  Sign!”503 That day, emboldened by the 
presence of so many fellow MMD members, fifty-nine MPs, including forty-three MMD 
members added their name to the petition which was subsequently published in The Post 
newspaper on April 12
th
 under a headline exclaiming “Chiluba Loses Third Term Bid.”  In the 
following days, an additional twenty signatures were collected as the petition was taken around 
to “MP offices or wherever they could be found,”504 which resulted in a total of twenty-one 
MMD Ministers and fifty MMD MPs signing the document.  Thus, even before a bill eliminating 
term limits from the constitution was tabled in Parliament, where only fifty-three MPs would 
have to oppose such a bill to defeat it, more than eighty MPs had made the decision to vote 
against such an amendment.  One former MMD Minister says of his co-parliamentarians after 
the prayer meeting “at the end of the day we were sufficiently galvanized to start a meaningful 
movement against this.”505   
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 In sum, many MPs and Ministers decided to privilege an equal electoral playing field, the 
cohesion of their party and the views of their constituents over their commitment to the party 
leadership because the ability to switch parties gave parliamentarians a “safety valve” to 
overcome potential punishment from the party.  In fact, as opposition parties began to capitalize 
on the anti-third term sentiment to stage their own protest marches, some parliamentarians 
wondered if the anti-third term mood among voters would turn into an anti-MMD mood come 
election time.  Accordingly, when twenty-two MMD ministers and MPs were expelled from the 
party by the MMD national convention at Chiluba’s behest on May 2, 2001 for their open 
opposition to the third term, most did not even wait until their court challenge over the legality of 
their dismissal was decided before many of them formed a new parties- the Forum for 
Democracy and Development (FDD) by Tembo, Nawakwi and others and the Heritage Party by 
Miyanda- or joined an established opposition party.  As prominent ministers left the MMD, a 
number of other MPs followed as “backbenchers went with who they thought would win” 506 the 
next presidential election in order to increase their own chances of re-taking their parliamentary 
seat. 
 
Aggregate Decision- The Result 
 With the signatories of the April 10
th
 Cathedral Declaration physically barred by loyal 
party cadres from entering the MMD extra-ordinary party convention that was held over April 
27-29
th
, 2001, the pro-third term camp was able to amend the MMD constitution to eliminate 
term limits on the party presidency.  However, this was a largely futile exercise because it was 
glaringly apparent that there were not enough votes in the National Assembly to lift executive 
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term limits from the national constitution through an amendment based on the number of 
signatories to the Cathedral Declaration.  The fact that the Chiluba did not have the support of 
anywhere near the two-thirds of parliamentarians he would need to amend the national 
constitution was further emphasized when, on May 3, 2001, sacked Ministers Ackson Sejani and 
Mike Mulungoti submitted to the Speaker of the National Assembly a motion of impeachment 
against President Chiluba that had been signed by 65 parliamentarians.  The impeachment 
motion maintained that “[t]he president has grossly misconducted himself by failing to perform 
with dignity and leadership the functions of president in that he has initiated and orchestrated the 
third term debate through bribes applied to the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) 
members as well as other citizens for selfish rather than national interest” and also accused him 
of six other offenses including using state funds to bankroll the recent MMD convention, tapping 
of telephone lines and mishandling the privatization of Zambia’s copper mines among others.  
The impeachment motion was the final decisive signal to the President that lifting term limits 
through an amendment bill in parliament would not be possible. 
 Chiluba and his inner circle briefly considering circumventing the parliamentary dead-
end by putting the term limit question to a popular referendum, but quickly abandoned the idea 
due to the exorbitant cost of such an exercise
507
 and the uncertainty of the outcome given the 
Oasis Forum’s growing influence even in rural areas of the country.  With no options left, one 
former minister explained that “it wasn’t long before the president called in quits in terms of his 
desire to seek a third term.  It was a combination of pressure from all over.  Those who were 
urging him to go on were getting fewer and fewer, weaker and weaker by the day.  So he had no 
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choice but the drop that plot.”508   Accordingly, on May 5th, President Chiluba went on Zambian 
public TV to formally announce that he would not run at the MMD’s candidate in the upcoming 
election, thus ending the term limit debate in Zambia.  Later that year, on December 27
th
, the 
MMD’s presidential candidate, Levy Mwanawasa was elected by a less than two point margin 
over the UPND’s Anderson Mazoka in the closest electoral race in Zambian history.  Chiluba 
officially stepped down in early January when Mwanawasa was sworn in as president in 
accordance with the two-term limit enshrined (and now upheld) in the Zambian constitution.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Observing the patterns of executive term limit adoption and adherence across sub-
Saharan Africa since the early 1990s leads us to rethink how constraints on executive power 
operate in practice in young electoral democracies.  Often when American presidents have acted 
in ways that have seemingly overstepped their constitutional bounds, (i.e. Nixon’s abuse of 
office as detailed in Schlesinger’s The Imperial Presidency,509 and more recently  the George W. 
Bush administration’s sweepingly broad assertion of the executive to authorize the use of torture 
against prisoners of war following 9/11,)
 510
 scholars have pointed to the failure of the judiciary, 
legislature and other governmental bodies to check excessive presidential actions as the main 
cause of the executive branch’s ability to circumvent constraints on its power.   However, the 
recent cases of term limit abrogation across sub-Saharan Africa call into question the universality 
of this argument since, in these cases, African legislatures themselves oversaw the revocation of 
constraints on executive tenure.  Set in an environment of non-programmatic parties, patronage 
networks, limited professional opportunities outside of government and a historical prevalence of 
non-divided governments, constraints on executive tenure are often jettisoned by members of 
parliament in situations where ruling party MPs feel their own electoral odds can be improved by 
abolishing term limits so they can ride to re-election on the coattails of the incumbent President.  
As argued in the previous chapters, the only factor that seems to temper this mutual electoral 
advancement is a competitive party system that features opposition parties that pose a credible 
threat of replacement to the incumbent party.  By creating the possibility of the incumbent party 
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losing power in the foreseeable future, the presence of a competitive party system compels the 
incumbent party to retain checks on executive power so as to avoid creating a permanent 
incumbent advantage for an opposition party should their party lose the presidency in the future.             
 Yet, questions remain as to how applicable is this argument is beyond the borders of 
Africa and beyond the issue of term limits as just one example of a constraint on executive 
power.   This final chapter explores these questions in two ways.  First, an additional statistical 
analysis will be undertaken in order to assess the extent to which level of competitiveness within 
the party system explains variation in term limit adherence across other third-wave regions 
where constraints on executive tenure have also been challenged.  Second, I will explore whether 
the variation in enforcement of other limits on presidential discretion codified in African 
constitutions can also be explained by differences in the relative balance of power between 
parties in sub-Saharan states, or if different mechanisms are at play when African executives 
circumvent other limits on their power.  Finally, the chapter will conclude with a brief discussion 
of how the findings from this project help inform contemporary debates in comparative politics.     
 
Term Limit Challenges Across the “Third Wave” 
As documented in the Introductory chapter, sub-Saharan Africa is not the only region that 
has seen a recent rash of contestation over executive term limit laws.   In third wave liberalizers 
from Kazakhstan and Sri Lanka to Nicaragua, executives coming to the end of their time in 
office have sought to extend their stay in power by either extending (soft contravention) or 
outright abolishing (hard contravention) term limit provisions.  Is a low level of competition 
within the party system the main factor that drives term limit abrogation in these other countries 
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and regions, or is the relative strength of the incumbent party vs. the opposition an explanation 
that only holds in the sub-Saharan context due to the unique features of African politics?     
In order to assess the degree to which this explanations travels to other regional contexts, 
a the same series of logit analyses as in Chapter 4 is performed using all Latin American and 
former Soviet republic president-country cases since 1990 in which the president is directly 
elected and is bound by a constitutional limit on tenure.  Latin America and the former Soviet 
Republics were chosen for inclusion in the analysis because virtually all countries in these 
regions are considered to be part of the “third wave” of liberalization (unlike South and East Asia 
where a handful of countries liberalized but many in the region did not), are predominated by 
presidential systems (unlike Eastern Europe where parliamentary system are the norm) and 
because most countries in these regions have at least one executive who has reached the end of 
the two term limit.
511
  In all, the relevant Latin American and Central Asian regions provide 74 
president-country observations from the time period of 1990-2011.
512
  Among Latin American 
cases, there has been one case of term limit abrogation and nine cases of term limit extension
513
 
while among former Soviet republic states there have been four cases of total abolition of term 
limits and two cases of extended mandates.  In order to investigate whether term limit abolition 
and extension are both driven by similar factors or if soft contravention occur under different 
circumstances than hard contravention, the regression will be variously run with two different 
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outcome classifications- one that only considers full abrogation  (0= term limits lifted, 1= term 
limits retained (even if extended) and a second that combines both abrogations and extensions 
into one category (0= term limits abolished or extended 1= term limits remain unchanged).   In 
addition, the first two rounds of the analysis will incorporate only the Latin American and former 
Soviet republic president-country cases, but a second two rounds will be run with the sub-
Saharan cases added in with the other two regions.     
The possible explanatory variables included in this expanded logit analysis include four 
of the five relevant variables that were included in the model tested against the 26 sub-Saharan 
cases in Chapter 4:  1)  Amount of donor aid received as a percentage of GNI in the three years 
prior to the end of the president’s last term in office, 2) Level of democracy, 3) the freeness and 
fairness of the “third term” election and 4) the competitiveness of the party system as classified 
based on electoral results over three election cycles.  The colonial power variable that was 
incorporated in the original model is not included here due to a lack of variation within each 
region (i.e. mostly Spanish/Portuguese in Latin America, all Russian in the former Soviet 
republics) combined with a virtually perfect variation between regions in terms of former 
colonial powers causes the colonial power variable to be unfit for analysis.   
In terms of measurement of the four included variables, many of the same sources that 
were used for the African cases in chapter 4 are used to collect the data on the Latin American 
and Central Asian cases for three of the variables, including the World Bank Development 
Indicators for the aid as percentage of GNI figurers, Freedom House as a basis for the inverted 
level of democracy scores, and electoral data from Interparliamentary Union (IPU) election 
archives, Election Guide of the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), and 
various Europa Regional Surveys of the World to build the party system competitiveness 
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measure.  For the fourth variable, the freeness and fairness of elections, Lindberg’s dataset could 
not be used for the larger sample since it only covers African polities.  Thus, for the Latin 
American and former Soviet republics cases (and also for the African cases in this part of the 
analysis), the Free and Fair Elections (FF_Elect)
514
 variable from the CIRI Human Rights Data 
Project
515
 will be employed instead.
516
   To construct the FF_Elect score for each country, expert 
coding of United States State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for each 
country/year is undertaken in order to rate the freeness and fairness of elections in that year or 
recent years on a three point scale.
517
  The assigned values are as followed:  0= neither free nor 
fair elections; 1= moderately free and fair elections; 2= very free and fair elections.  The 
FF_Elect variable is highly correlated with Lindberg’s Free and Fair Election variable (at 
0.6331) and when Lindberg’s measures are replaced with FF_Elect values in the logit models in 
Chapter 4, Table 4.5, similar findings result with both the competitiveness of the party system 
and colonial power proving to be the only significant variables, and significant at the 95% level 
in each of the five of the models in which free and fair elections are included. 
 The results of the logit analyses (see Table 7.1) demonstrate that the competitiveness 
within the party system corresponds to a higher degree with term limit enforcement outcomes 
than the other explanatory variable in other third wave regions of the world in all six of the 
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analyses.
518
  Just as in the analysis of the African cases in Chapter 4 (Table 4.5), the only other 
variable that is found to be significant in any of the modes is the level of democracy, which is 
only significant at the 90% level in models Four and Five.   
 
Table 7.1:  Results of Logistic Regression Models on Term Limit Enforcement 
 
Model 1: 
LA/FSRs 
Abolish 
 
Model 2: 
LA/FSRs 
Abolish or 
Extend 
Model 3:  
LA/FSRs/Afr 
Abolish  
 
Model 4: 
LA/FSRs/Afr 
Abolish or 
Extend 
 
Model 5: 
LA/FSRs/Afr 
Abolish or 
Extend 
 
Model 6: 
LA/FSRs/Afr 
Abolish or 
Extend 
       
Aid as % of GNI 
3.1182 
(1.37) 
-0.0024 
(-0.03) 
0.0013 
(0.03) 
0.0707 
(1.32) 
0.06690 
(1.29) 
0.0597 
(1.22) 
Level of 
Democracy 
0.3024 
(1.16) 
0.2201 
(1.35) 
0.2864 
(1.56) 
    0.2508 ǂ 
(1.75) 
0.2185 ǂ 
(1.66) 
 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
2.2790 
(1.27) 
0.4361 
(0.60) 
0.2117 
(0.26) 
-0.2674 
(-0.39) 
 
0.1686 
(0.26) 
 
Competitiveness 
of Party System 
 
.6268 
(0.62) 
1.363* 
(2.27) 
1.2551** 
(2.58) 
1.6367*** 
(3.65) 
    1.6351*** 
(3.95) 
   1.8243*** 
(4.27) 
Constant 
-5.1184 
(-1.77) 
-4.9261 
(-2.53) 
-3.0582 
(-2.41) 
-4.8932 
(-3.42) 
 
-5.0311 
(-3.53) 
-3.6583 
(-3.12) 
Pseudo R 0.6595 0.3809 0.4923 0.4440 0.4466 0.4168 
N 72 72 97 97 98 97 
Coefficients above, z-value below. 2-tailed p-value: ǂ p< 0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 The fact that the level of party system competitiveness appears to be a driving factor in 
variations in term limit law enforcement across very different regional and political contexts 
supports the idea that constitutional provisions are in danger of being circumvented or 
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overturned if and when the power dynamic in place at the time of rule adoption shifts within a 
state.  While it may not seems surprising that new constitutional rules, such as term limit 
provisions passed in the 1990s in both sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia could face 
challenges early on as new political elites experiment with different institutional structures, the 
Latin American cases show that even long-entrenched rules can be altered if the level of 
competition in the party system has declined to the point where one party is confident of 
dominance into the foreseeable future.
 519
   Across Latin America, bans on re-election (or 
consecutive re-election in some cases) were written into the constitutions of virtually all 
countries in the region during the nineteenth century (i.e. 1853 in Argentina, 1822 in Peru, 1821 
in Colombia, 1871 in Chile, 1891 in Brazil, and so on).
520
  Yet, the fact that these long-standing 
provisions
521
 have been challenged recently in a number of Latin American states suggests that 
we cannot assume that rule habituation or institutional inertia will be able to keep in place 
established rules despite changes in the underlying power balance in the polity.  Furthermore, the 
level of party system competitiveness is a factor that can explain variation in term limit 
enforcement within both young (Central Asia), intermediate (sub-Saharan Africa) and older 
(Latin America) party systems.  In each region, states in which one or more opposition parties 
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 There are some countries in Latin American that have experienced earlier periods of low levels of inter- party 
competitiveness  but have still retained term limits (i.e. Mexico during the long-time dominance of the Institutional 
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factions rather than between the PDP and opposition parties.  This, combined with the informal practice of rotating 
the presidency between a Muslim and a Christian, greatly contributed to the failure of President Obasanjo’s bid to 
lift executive term limits in Nigeria in 2006.    
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 Term limit provisions have not been in force continuously in all Latin American countries since the 19
th
 century, 
however.  For example, during the military dictatorships in the second half of the 20
th
 century, many constitutions 
barring reelection were suspended, while the 1980 constitution in Chile provided at avenue for Pinochet’s (failed) 
reelection in the next election.   
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are able to continuously pose a credible threat of replacement to the ruling party, executive term 
limits have remained unchallenged even in the face of successful contravention in neighboring 
countries.     
 A brief country comparison of Armenia and Azerbaijan, neighboring countries nestled 
between the Black and Caspian Seas in the post-Soviet region, demonstrates how differences in 
the level of party system competitiveness leads to various term limit enforcement outcomes in 
regions outside of sub-Saharan Africa.  Both countries held their first presidential elections as 
independent states in the fall of 1991 (Azerbaijan in September, Armenia in November) and new 
constitutions containing two-term limits on the executive were promulgated by the elected 
governments of both countries in 1995.  Furthermore, in each country, the first president to serve 
out their full terms, Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan and Levon Ter-Petrossian in Armenia, both 
stepped down as scheduled at the conclusion of their second terms in office.  Yet, despite their 
similar beginnings as constitutional presidencies, by 2008 when subsequent Presidents 
Kocharyan in Armenia and Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan were in their second and constitutionally-
mandated final terms in office, their trajectories diverged.   
Armenia’s political history since independence in 1991 has been marked by high levels 
of political competition that has led to numerous party turnovers in both the presidency and the 
legislature.  During the 1990s, the Pan-Armenian National Movement of President Ter-
Petrossian dominated the legislature, but upon the 1998 election of independent candidate 
Kocharyan to the presidency, control of the legislature likewise shifted to the Miasnutiun (Unity) 
bloc of parties that supported Kocharyan.  Yet, in the 2003 legislative elections held shortly after 
Kocharyan’s re-election to a second term, the Republican Party of Armenia (HHK) won control 
of the legislature, producing what amounted to a divided government in Armenia.  As a result, 
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Kocharyan had no choice but to step down at the end of his second term in 2008.  In the 
subsequent election, Serzh Sargsyan of the HKK won the presidency, thus marking the second 
turn-over in the presidency in as many opportunities.  The high level of competition between 
parties and coalitions in Armenia has not only provided the impetus for the enforcement of 
executive term limits by all parties, but has also lead to further limitations being placed on 
executive power in general.  Most notably, amendments passed in 2005 sought to strengthen the 
authority of other branches of government through transferring some powers formally invested in 
the presidency to the National Assembly and the Prime Minister and by removing the President 
from the Council of Judges, thereby furthering the independence of the judiciary.   
The trend of party competition in Azerbaijan has followed the opposite path of the trend 
in Armenia.  The New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) of President H. Aliyev (the father) won a 
plurality (47%) but not a majority of seats in the first National Assembly elections in 1995-1996, 
with eight other parties and many independent candidates also winning seats.  However, in 
subsequent legislative elections in 2000, 2005 and 2010, YAP has continually won a majority of 
seats capturing a high of over 62% of the seats in 2000.  In each of these contests, independent 
candidates have won the bulk of the remaining seats, with the highest seat percentage won by an 
opposition party being the paltry 7.2% the Azadliq bloc won in the 2005 elections.  During this 
time span, the presidency has not only stayed within the YAP, but also “in the family” as Heydar 
Aliyev’s son Ilham won the 2003 election after his father appointed him as the YAP’s sole 
candidate when he stepped down for health reasons in the weeks before the October contest.  
This extreme lack of party competition with virtually no threat of replacement posed by any 
opposition group paved the way for Aliyev the son to seek the removal of executive term limits 
shortly following his re-election in 2008.  After the Azeri parliament approved the amendment 
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by a vote of 100 to 7 in late 2008, a popular referendum held in March 2009 to secure its passage 
resulted in 90% of citizens approving the abolition of term limits, a tally vigorously disputed by 
opposition forces.  In addition to the removal of a limit on executive tenure, the increasing lack 
of party competition has allowed the YAP to pass other amendments to the constitution in both 
2002 and 2009 that strengthened the presidency and weakens avenues for potential political 
opposition, including switching the order of presidential succession (in case of presidential 
incapacitation) from the elected speaker of the parliament to the presidential-appointed prime 
minister, moving away from a proportional representation to a majoritarian electoral system and 
implementing measures to further restrict press freedoms. 
The finding from the logit analyses that the level of party competition accounts for a 
large part of the variation in term limit outcomes across many third wave regions does not, of 
course, suggest that the causal mechanisms that link party competition with term limit 
enforcement are exactly the same in each region.  For example, while members of parliament 
from non-ideological ruling parties across sub-Saharan Africa’s may feel compelled to keep their 
president in power in order to maintain the prebendalist system that keeps them in office, Latin 
American MPs from parties that can be placed on a more traditional left-right spectrum may 
have different reasons for wanting to extend presidential terms in their polities, where patronage 
tends to take a more party-voter clientalism form.
522
  Additional case study work is needed to 
flesh out the intervening links between levels of party competition and term limit enforcement in 
non-African cases.   
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Party Competition as a General Constraint on Executive Power 
 The second question that springs from the findings of this research that links term limit 
enforcement to party competition is the question of whether variation in enforcement of other 
limits on presidential power can also be explained by party system competitiveness, or if 
different factors affect the strength of other constraints on presidential authority.   Since the 
number of times on person can serve as president (an electoral issue at its base) appears to be 
primarily affected by the level of competitiveness in the party system (another election-related 
factor), should we assume that that limits on executive power that are not directly related to the 
electoral realm will be influenced by more proximate causes rather than party competition? 
 It is outside of the scope of this project to undertake a systematic study of the cause of 
observable variation in the enforcement of other constraints on executive power in emerging 
democracies, but surveying some recent research on levels of interference in the judiciary by 
sitting presidents in third wave countries can point to some preliminary conclusions.  Rules that 
establish the separation of powers between branches of government delineate the boundaries of 
presidential authority.  While breaches of these boundaries may not be as cut and dry as breaches 
of term limit provisions, various scholars have found ways to operationalize executive 
interference in the judiciary in ways that allows them to compare variations in presidential 
adherence to rules related to judicial autonomy.     
A number of these studies investigating the extent to which judicial institutions are 
undermined or subverted by political leaders in new democracies share this project’s findings 
and identify the level of party competition as the primary independent variable. In much the 
same way as I have argued that the probability of executive term limits being enforced increases 
as the level of robust party competition rises, so too do these studies find that higher levels of 
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electoral competition compel leaders to refrain from contravening constitutional provisions on 
the separation of powers.  For example, Ginsburg argues that in emerging Asian democracies, 
leaders in completive party systems will uphold judicial autonomy in order to create an insurance 
mechanism against future persecution in the even that they find themselves out of power after the 
next election and a member of the opposition.
523
  Bill Chavez finds similar dynamics at play in 
Latin America and argues that leaders and parties who expect to remain in power for the 
foreseeable future will interfere in judicial matters in order to eradicate any barriers that might 
block them from exercising full political discretion.
524
   Findings such as these seem to support 
the idea that the level of party competition in a given country does affect the degree to which 
presidents are compelled to acquiesce to other constraints on their office over and above 
executive term limits.   
 However, VonDoepp’s work on judicial politics in Southern Africa suggests that, at least 
in sub-Saharan cases, just taking into account levels of party competition and electoral 
uncertainty may be insufficient for understanding variation in the enforcement of executive 
constraints. In his study on differences in the degree to which executives have overstepped their 
legal bounds to interfere in judicial autonomy in Malawi, Zambia and Namibia, he looks at a 
range of actions and behaviors that undermine judicial autonomy, including purging opponents 
from the bench, altering the institutional protections afforded to the judiciary by law, 
intimidating or incentivizing individual judges, declaring some issues outside of judicial control, 
and other such maneuvers in the three countries over the 1990s-2000s.  Based on his findings 
regarding the variation in the level of executive interference in the judiciary both between 
                                                 
523
 Ginsburg, Tom.  2003.  Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases.  New York:  
     Cambridge University Press. 
524
 Bill Chavez, Rebecca.  2004. “The Evolution of Judicial Autonomy in Argentina: Establishing the Rule of Law in  
     an Ultrapresidential System”  Journal of Latin American Studies, 36: 451-478.   
 270 
 
countries and within each country over time, VonDoepp argues that “while levels of electoral 
uncertainty, party competition and party discipline have played some role, they simply do not 
account for the nature and extent of executive manipulation of judicial institutions in the 
southern African countries.” 525   To gain a complete understanding of when executive leaders do 
or do not attempt to interfere in judicial autonomy, he maintains that factors such as the extent to 
which key political questions are referred to the judiciary (level of judicialization) and the extent 
to which judges themselves have taken an active role in fighting for judicial autonomy.  In cases 
where the judiciary has taken it upon itself to adjudicate important political issues and where 
judges rarely use the bench to block executive prerogatives, VonDoepp finds that executives do 
not face any incentive to intervene in the judiciary.  Alternatively, in cases in which the judiciary 
has been charged with ruling on issues that affect the discretion of the ruling party and where 
judges have displayed the willingness to rule against government interests in the past, executives 
are more likely to act in ways that undermine judicial autonomy.
526
   
VonDoepp argues that these findings hold even when levels of electoral uncertainty are 
added to the mix.  For example, in Namibia, SWAPO’s dominance in the party system should 
have paved the way for Nujoma to interfere in the judiciary virtually unchecked per the strategic 
framework theories forwarded by Ginsburg and Bill Chavez and the findings from this project on 
term limit adherence.  However, VonDoepp’s analysis contends that, in reality, Nujoma’s 
administration displayed the least proclivity to undermine judicial autonomy of the five 
presidents surveyed primarily due to the low levels of judicialization of issues in the country.
527
  
He finds the opposition in Malawi-  the high levels of party competition there should have lead 
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both Muluzi and Murtharika to uphold judicial autonomy in order to strengthen the courts in case 
they and their party lost power in the future.   However, the high levels of judicialization and 
anti-government signaling by judges combined to compel them both to interfere regularly with 
the operation of the judiciary.
528
  Based on these case studies, VonDoepp concludes that, in the 
end, these judicial-realm factors play a larger role in shaping patterns of presidential 
circumvention of constraints on their power vis-à-vis the judiciary that do leaders’ and parties’ 
perceptions of their future electoral chances in and of themselves.    
However, one question that VonDoepp leaves unanswered in his study is why the level of 
judicialization is lower in Namibia than in Malawi or Zambia,
529
 which is a critical issue that 
fundamentally affects the causal story that VonDoepp presents.  It is possible that Namibia 
features a lower level of judicialization, and thus less need for the executive to interfere in the 
judiciary, precisely because the dominance of SWAPO.  If SWAPO is able to control what 
issues are referred to the courts and/or choose to handle more politically sensitive matters within 
the party rather than submitting them to judicial scrutiny, and opposition forces are blocked by 
the ruling party from accessing the courts, the extent of judicialization of political issues 
becomes endogenous to the level of party competition in the polity.  If this is the case, it could be 
said that VonDoepp has identified mechanisms that link party competition and constitutional 
enforcement in similar but opposite way than Ginsburg, Bill Chavez and I have identified in our 
cases.  Rather than low levels of party competition leading to executive contravention of 
constitutional constraints and visa-versa, VonDoepp’s cases of levels of judicial interference 
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suggest that low level of party competition lead to low levels of judicial interference and high 
levels of party competition lead to a higher degree of executive interference in the courts.
530
   
Thus, while VonDoepp offers the important lesson that the level of party competition 
may not always produce the same directional variation in constitutional rule adherence for every 
type of constraint on executive power, his findings still largely support the theory forwarded by  
this project that presidents’ ability to and incentives for adhering to constitutional constraints on 
their power is primarily conditioned by the level of party competition present within their 
domestic political systems.  The exact causal mechanisms at play will determine in each 
particular situation if lower or higher levels of party competition will lead to increased adherence 
to constraints on executive power.  Thus, a future avenue for research in this vein could include 
constructing a typology of constraints on presidential power that categorizes checks on 
presidential authority in terms of whether high levels of party competition lead to higher or lower 
adherence to each constraint.  The results from such a study would further our understanding of 
the nature of executive power in new democracies where the longstanding informal power 
dynamics co-exist alongside of nascent formal political institutions. 
 
*** 
  
 As mentioned in the introduction, the finding that the level of electoral competition in 
young democracies with neo-patrimonial practices shapes both the adoption and enforcement of 
formal constraints on executive tenure across sub-Saharan Africa has broad implications for the 
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study of comparative politics more generally.  On a broad level, this research project informs our 
evolving understanding two main areas of political development:  the sources of institutional 
choice, strength and change in liberalizing countries and the changing nature of executive power in 
sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
Institutional Choice, Strength and Change 
Many recent studies on the workings of political institutions have raised questions about 
a central premise of mainstream institutionalism, namely that there exists a relatively tight 
coupling between formal rules and political behavior such that formal rules can be mapped more 
or less directly onto political outcomes.
531
  Yet, even if we accept that formal rules do not always 
effectively guide politicians’ expectations and behavior, we continue to know very little about 
exactly when and under what conditions formal institutions do drive outcomes versus when 
informal rules and practices are more likely to shape the conduct of political actors.  
The results from the African cases surveyed here suggest that, in at least the case of term 
limits adherence, formal institutions become effective conduits of political behavior when there 
is a genuine need by actors to accomplish what the term limit rule is intended to do: regulate 
political competition.  Many African governments adopted term limits in order regulate the 
uncertainty that was introduced into the electoral arena by the advent multi-party elections in the 
early 1990s.   However, simply having multi-party elections in a polity does not in and of itself 
create a high level of party competition.  Indeed, many African ruling parties have been able to 
maintain their dominance despite the advent of multi-party elections (including SWAPO in 
Namibia, CCM in Tanzania, CDP in Burkina Faso and others).  In most of these cases, the 
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formal limits on executive tenure have been circumvented because no opposition party poses a 
credible threat of replacement to the ruling regime, thus negating the need for a formal rule that 
regulates turn-over of the executive office.  Formal term limit rules are only able to consistently 
and effectively prompt presidents to step down at the conclusion of their final term in office in 
states in which at least one opposition party is perceived as having enough popular support to 
realistically challenge the ruling party for control of the presidency and/or the parliament in the 
foreseeable future.  In such cases, term limits are enforced by parliamentarians and followed by 
presidents due to a desire by all actors to keep their opponents from benefiting from incumbency 
advantage in the future.   
The finding that term limit laws are only effective when the original reason for their 
implementation remains in force suggests that scholars need to pay careful attention to the 
reasons for the original formation of formal institutions in order to understand variation in the 
their strength of parchment rules in later time periods.  This finding also echoes the growing 
consensus in comparative politics that some formal rules, especially in nascent democracies, may 
not be as “sticky” as path-dependent accounts of institutions portray them to be.  Instead of 
seeing institutions as rarely altered (except by exogenous shock) once established because the 
choice of one institutional design “canalizes future development”532 due to the vested interests it 
creates and the corresponding high cost of enacting changes,
533
 more recent scholarship has 
argued that institutions are themselves just as likely to be shaped by instrumental political actors 
to their own political advantage as they are to be structures that shape the behavior of actors.
534
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In these instances, the design and enforcement of political institutions can be seen as being 
endogenous to the political realities and power balances on the ground.   
 
Executive Power in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The study of African politics in the post-colonial era up until the period of liberalization 
that began in the 1990s widely focused on the subject of executive power.  It was the era of the 
“big men”: long-serving presidents-for-life who dominated politics in their countries and were 
virtually unchecked by other political actors or institutions.  Seminal works like Jackson and 
Rosenberg’s Personal Rule in Africa (1982) and others explored the intricacies of personalistic rule 
that was pervasive across the continent, observing that most African states had become regimes 
where:   
     persons take precedence over rules, where the officeholder is not effectively bound by his 
     office and is able to change its authority and powers to suit his own personal or political 
     needs.  In such a system of personal rule, the rulers … take precedence over the formal  
     rules of the political game [and] the rules do not effectively regulate political behavior… 
     To put this in old-fashioned comparative government terms, the state is a government of  
     men and not of laws.
535
 
 
However, following the political liberalization in the early 1990s, there have been few attempts 
to assess if and to what degree the democratizing reforms and institutional rules enacted during 
that period have been able to transform the political environment in African states.  Does the  
rule of law now takes precedence over personalistic power, or are African executives still able to 
exercise unconstrained discretion?  Understanding how the conduct of executive power across 
sub-Saharan Africa has and/or has not been altered by liberal-democratic reforms thus remains 
and important question in analyses of contemporary African politics.  
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The findings from this study demonstrate that the new democratic rules enacted in the 
1990s have made constraining executive power possible but not guaranteed.  They provide a 
framework in which both mechanisms of horizontal and vertical accountability can operate in 
order to check executive power.  Yet the effective operation of these mechanisms can be 
hampered by many factors, among them a lack of resources, knowledge or willingness by other 
actors to challenge presidents who attempt to circumvent legal mandates.  In the case of 
executive term limit enforcement, ruling party members of parliament were not willing to use 
their power as a body to vote “no” on proposals to lift term limits unless they felt that doing so 
was necessary in order to constrain potential opposition and would also improve their chances of 
retaining their own legislative seat in the medium-term.  In the case of other limits on executive 
power, such as rules that delineate the parameters of the executive’s role in the budget process, 
factors such as the lack of professional staff to operate legislative budget offices and a lack of 
resources by civil society groups to monitor and oversee the budget process contributes to the 
continued gross misappropriation of state funds by many African presidents.
536
  Thus, parchment 
institutions in and of themselves cannot and do not constrain executive power- rather, both a 
countervailing reason to enforce the rules and functional tools of enforcement must be present in 
order to actualize the potential power of written rules.  Where these tools are accessible and the 
political will exists to employ them, African presidents have found their discretion greatly 
reduced compared to the free reign earlier generations of presidents enjoyed over the state 
apparatus.  However, when and where these tools are difficult to utilize or actors do not possess 
the resolve to apply them consistently, sub-Saharan executives have been able to retain 
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significant de facto powers even when the new rules have been designed to limit their de jure 
authority. 
Yet, this leaves open the question of how much influence presidents have in shaping the 
larger political environment within which countervailing forces and tools of enforcement 
develop.  For example, in the case of executive term limit enforcement, this question is 
especially relevant with regards to factors that impact the latitude of opposition forces to operate.  
The cause of the variation in the strength of political opposition (i.e. whether it is due to the 
ability of the executive/ruling party to restrict opposition freedoms, due to limitations- financial, 
ideological, capacity- of the opposition parties themselves, or a combination thereof) is a prior 
question that this research project illuminates.  Therefore, additional research into the dynamics 
that create the level of political competition within a given state would help to further ground our 
understanding of when and how formal institutions are adopted and enforced in nascent 
democracies.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Text of executive term limit clauses in sub-Saharan African constitutions, by date adopted 
 
Country 
Date term 
limit clause 
adopted 
Text of term limit clause 
Sierra Leone June 1978 
Article 25:  The President shall assume office on the day his predecessor 
ceases to hold office or on the day following his election under Section 23 
of this Constitution (whichever is the later) and shall… continue in office 
for a period of seven years and until the person elected President at the 
next following Presidential Election assumes office, provided that no one 
President shall hold office for more than two consecutive terms.  
Nigeria Oct 1979 
Article 128: A person shall not be qualified for election to the office of 
President if… (b) he has been elected to such office at any 2 previous 
elections. 
Tanzania 1984 
Article 40: (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Article, any person 
who holds office as President shall be eligible for re-election to that 
office.  (2) No person shall be elected more than twice to hold the office 
of the President.   
Liberia 1986 
Article  50: The president shall be elected by universal adult suffrage of 
registered voters in the Republic and shall hold office for a term of six 
years commencing at noon on the third working Monday in January of the 
year immediately following the elections. No person shall serve as 
President for more than two terms.  
Namibia Feb 1990 
Article  29: (1)(a) The President's term of office shall be five (5) years 
unless he or she dies or resigns before the expiry of the said term or is 
removed from office…  (3) A person shall hold office as President for not 
more than two terms.   
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
Sept 1990 
Article 79: 1. The President is elected for five years…  3. Not being 
eligible for reelection for a third term running, either during the five years 
immediately following the end of second term row. 
Mozambique Nov 1990 
Article 147: 3. The term of the office of the President of the Republic 
shall be five years.  4. The President of the Republic may be re-elected 
only once.  5. A President of the Republic who has been elected on two 
consecutive occasions may be a candidate for further presidential 
elections only five years after the end of his last term of office. 
Benin Dec 1990 
Article 42: Le Président de la République est élu au suffrage universel 
direct pour un mandat de cinq ans, renouvelable une seule fois 
Guinea Dec 1990 
Article  24: Le Président de la République est élu au suffrage universel 
direct.  La duree de son mandat es de cinq ans, renouvelable une seule 
fois 
Gabon Mar 1991 
Article  9: Le Président de la République est élu pour cinq ans au suffrage 
universel direct. Il est rééligible une fois. 
Rwanda May 1991 
Article  40: 3) The President of the Republic shall be elected for a five 
year mandate.  (4) The President may be reelected.  However, he may not 
exercise more than two successive mandates.   
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Zambia Aug 1991 
Article  35: (1) Subject to clause (2) and (4) every President shall hold 
office for a period of five years.   (2) After the commencement of this 
Constitution no person who holds or has held office as President for two 
terms of five years each, shall be eligible for reelection to that office. (3) 
For the purposes of clause (2) the period of two terms of five years each 
shall be computed from the commencement of this Constitution. 
Senegal Sep 1991 
Article  27: La durée du mandat du Président de la République est de sept 
ans. Le mandat est renouvelable une seule fois (2001 constitution; 1991 
amendement not available). 
Burkina Faso Jun 1991 
Article  37: Le Président du Faso est élu pour cinq ans au suffrage 
universel direct, égal et secret. Il est rééligible une fois. 
Mali Jan 1992 
Article  30: Le Président de la République est élu pour cinq ans au 
suffrage universel direct et au scrutin majoritaire à deux tours. Il n'est 
rééligible qu'une seule fois. 
Congo-
Brazzaville 
Mar 1992 
Article 68: Le président de la République est élus pour cinq ans au 
suffrage universel direct. Il est rééligible une seule fois.  
Burundi Mar 1992 
Article  61: Le président de la République est élu au suffrage universel 
direct pour un mandat de cinq ans renouvelable une fois. Nul ne peut 
exercer plus de deux mandats présidentiels.  
Ghana Apr 1992 
Article  66: (1)   A person elected as President shall, subject to clause (3) 
of this article, hold office for a term of four years beginning from the date 
on which he is sworn in as President.  (2) A person shall not be elected to 
hold office as President of Ghana for more than two terms. 
Djibouti Sep 1992 
Article  23: Le Président de la République est élu pour six ans au suffrage 
universel direct et au scrutin majoritaire à deux tours. Il n'est rééligible 
qu'une seule fois. 
Angola Aug 1992 
Article  59: The President of the Republic shall serve a five-year term of 
office which shall end on the  swearing in of the new elected President. 
The President of the Republic may be re-elected for two consecutive or 
discontinuous terms of office.   
Madagascar Aug 1992 
Article  45: Le président de la République est élu au suffrage universel 
direct pour un mandat de cinq ans ; il n'est rééligible qu'une seule fois. 
Kenya Aug 1992 
Article 9: 1. The President shall hold office for a term of five years 
beginning from the date on which he is sworn in as President.  2. No 
person shall be elected to hold office as President for more than tw 
Cape Verde Sept 1992 
Article  146: 1. The President of the Republic shall not present his 
candidature for a third mandate in the five years immediately following 
the end of his second consecutive mandate. 
Togo Oct 1992 
Article  59: Le Président de la République est élu au suffrage universel 
direct pour un mandat de cinq ans renouvelable une seule fois. En aucun 
cas, nul ne peut exercer plus de deux mandats 
Seychelles Jun 1993 
Article  52: (1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions du présent article, la 
personne élue à la présidence de la République occupe sa charge pour un 
mandat de cinq ans qui commence :…  (2) La charge présidentielle ne 
peut comporter plus de trois mandats sous le régime de la présente 
constitution. 
Malawi May 1994 
Article  83: (1) The President and the Vice-President shall hold office for 
five years.  (2) The President or Vice-President may serve a maximum of 
two consecutive terms.  
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CAR Jan 1995 
Article  23: Le Président de la République est élu au suffrage universel, 
direct et secret pour un mandat de 6 ans, renouvelable une fois. 
Uganda Sep 1995 
Article  105: 1) A person elected President under this Constitution shall, 
subject to clause (3) of this article, hold office for a term of five years.(2) 
A person shall not be elected under this Constitution to hold office as 
President for more than two terms as prescribed by this article. 
Cameroon Jan 1996 
Article  6: (1) Le Président de la République est élu au suffrage universel 
direct, égal et secret, à la majorité des suffrages exprimés. (2) Le 
Président de la République est élu pour un mandat de sept (7) ans 
renouvelable une fois.    
Chad Mar 1996 
Article  61: Le Président de la République est élu pour un mandat de cinq 
ans au suffrage universel direct. Il est rééligible une seule fois. 
Niger Aug 1999 
Article 36: Le Président de la République est élu pour cinq (5) ans au 
suffrage universel libre, direct, égal et secret. Il est rééligible une seule 
fois. 
Cote d'Ivoire Jul 2000 
Article  35: Le Président de la République est élu pour cinq ans au 
suffrage universel direct. Il n'est rééligible qu'une fois.   
Congo- 
Kinshasa 
May 2005 
Article  70: Le Président de la République est élu au suffrage universel 
direct pour un mandat de cinq ans renouvelable une seule fois. 
Mauritania Jun 2006 Article 28: The President of the Republic can be reelected once. 
  
281 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Acemoglu, Daron Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2001.  “The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative  Development: An Empirical Investigation.” American Economic Review 91: 1369-
1401.      
 
Africa Confidential. 1989-2001. Various issues, Volumes 30-42.    
   
Alence, Rod. 2004. “Political institutions and developmental governance in sub-Saharan Africa” 
in the Journal of Modern African Studies, 42, 2. 
 
Almond, Gabriel.  1960. "Introduction” in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The 
Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Arriola, L., 2009.  “Patronage and Political Stability in Africa,” Comparative Political Studies, 
Vol. 42,10. 
 
Austen-Smith, David.  1992. “Strategic Models of Talk in Political-Decision Making” 
International Political Science Review Vol 13,1. 
 
Bamfo, Napoleon. 2005.  "Term Limit and Political Incumbency in Africa: Implications of Staying 
in Power Too Long with References to the Cases of Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia." African & Asian 
Studies, 4,3: 327-56. 
 
Barkan, J.; Adamolekum, L., and Zhou, Y. 2004.  “Emerging Legislatures: Institutions of 
Horizontal Accountability” in Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging 
Lessons, B. Levy and S. Kpundeh (eds), Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Barkan, Joel.  2009.  Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies. Boulder, CO:.Lynne 
Rienner. 
 
Barry Weingast. 1997. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,” 
American Political Science Review 91:245-63 
 
Bates, Robert. 1981. Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural 
Policies. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Bienen, Henry and Jeffrey Herbst. 1996. "The Relationship between Political and Economic 
Reform in Africa." Comparative Politics, October. 
 
Bienen, Henry and Nicolas van de Walle. 1991. Of Time and Power: Leadership Duration in the 
Modern World. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.  
 
  
282 
 
 
Bill Chavez, Rebecca.  2004. “The Evolution of Judicial Autonomy in Argentina: Establishing 
the Rule of Law in an Ultrapresidential System”  Journal of Latin American Studies, 36: 451-
478.   
 
Bogaards, Matthijs. 2004. “Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa,” 
in the European Journal of Political Research ,Vol. 43:173-97  
 
Bouckaert, Peter. 1999.  Hostile to Democracy: The Movement System and Political Repression 
in Uganda.  New York: Human Rights Watch.   
 
Bratton, Michael. 1992. "Zambia Starts Over," Journal of Democracy Vol. 3, 2 (April). 
 
Bratton, Michael. 2007. "Formal versus Informal Institutions in Africa." Journal of Democracy, 
18,3. 
 
Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van de Walle. 1997. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime 
Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas van de Walle. 1997.  “Political Regimes and Regime Transitions 
in Africa 1910-1994” dataset:  .Political Regimes and Regime Transitions in Africa, 1910-1994 
[Computer file]. ICPSR version. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University [producer], 1996. 
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].  
 
Bratton, Michael and Gina Lambright. 2001.  “Uganda’s Referendum 2000: The Silent Boycott.”  
Afrobarometer Working Paper, No. 6.  www.afrobarometer.org   
 
Bratton et al.  2004. “Afrobarometer Round 2: Compendium of Comparative Results from a 15-
Country Survey.” Afrobarometer, Paper 34. Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South 
Africa.  
 
Bratton, Michael and Peter Lolojih. 2009.  “Rationality, Cosmopolitanism and Adjustment 
Fatigue:  Public Attitudes to Economic Reform in Zambia” Afrobarometer, Paper 105. Cape 
Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa.   
 
Brender, Adi, and Allan Drazen. 2008. "How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect 
Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries." American Economic Review, 
98, 5. 
 
Brinks, Daniel and Michael Coppedge. 2006.  “Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in 
the Third Wave of Democracy." Comparative Political Studies, 39, 4. 
 
Bunce, Valerie and Sharon Wolchik.  2010. “Transnational Networks, Diffusion Dynamics, and 
Electoral Change in the Postcommunist World.” In Rebecca Kotlins Givan, Sarah A. Soule, and 
Kenneth M. Roberts, eds., The Diffusion of Social Movements: Actors, Mechanisms, and 
Political Effects. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
  
283 
 
 
 
Burmell, Peter. 2000. “The Significance of the December 1998 Local Elections in Zambia and 
their Aftermath.”  Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 38, 1. 
 
Callaghy, Thomas . 1988. “The State and the Development of Capitalism in Africa: Theoretical, 
Historical and Comparative Reflections” in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds.) The 
Precarious Balance: State and society in Africa, Boulder, CO: West View Press. 
  
Carbone, Giovanni.  2007.  “Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa: Themes and Research 
Perspectives.” World Political Science Review.  Vol 3, 3. 
 
Carbone, Giovanni. 2008.  No Party Democracy?: Ugandan Politics in Comparative 
Perspective.  Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
 
Carey, John.  2000.  “Parchement, Equilibria and Institutions” Comparative Political Studies. 
Vol. 33,6/7. 
 
Carey John M. 2009.  “The Reelection Debate in Latin America,” in William C. Smith, Ed. Latin 
American  Democratic Transformations: Institutions, Actors and Processes.  Chichester, West 
Sussex, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Cingranelli, David L. & David L. Richards, 2010. The Cingranelli–Richards (CIRI) Human 
Rights Dataset, Version 2010.08.15,  http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ (Accessed October 2011). 
 
Clark, John F. 2005. "The Collapse of the Democratic Experiment in the Republic of Congo: A 
ThickDescription"  in The Fate of Africa's Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions.  
Leonardo A. Villalâon and Peter vonDoepp, editors. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
 
Colomer, Josep. 1995. “Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe,” Journal of Democracy. 
Vol. 6, 2: 74-85.  
 
Coppedge, Michael et al.  2011.  “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New 
Approach.”  Perspectives on Politics, Vol 9,2. 
 
Corrales, Javier.  2009.  “Power Asymmetries and the Origin of Constitutions: Latin America, 
1987-2009.”  Paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 
Toronto Ontario, Sept., 3-6. 
 
Cowell, Alan. 2001.  "Draft Audit Faults Zambia's Mining Deals", The New York Times, 
February 16.   
 
Crook, Richard. 1995. “Cote d’Ivoire: Multi-party Democracy and Political Change.” In John 
Wiseman, ed,  Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa. London: Routledge. 
 
  
284 
 
 
Crook, Richard.  1997. “Winning Coalitions and Ethno-Regional Politics: The Failure of the 
Opposition in the 1990 and 1995 Elections in Cote d'Ivoire.” African Affairs, 96. 
 
Diamond, Larry and Leonardo Morlino. 2004. “The Quality of Democracy: An Overview,” 
Journal of Democracy, 15,4. 
 
Diamond, Larry.  2002. “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes” in Journal of Democracy Vol. 13, 2. 
 
Dickson Jere. 1999.  “Mwaanga Dismisses ZAP” The Post of Zambia, 5 May. 
 
Dunning, Thad and Lauren Harrison. 2010. “Cross-cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An 
Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali. American Political Science Review.  Vol. 104,1:21-
39. 
 
Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 1997. “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic 
Divisions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (November):1203–50. 
 
Elkins, Zachary.  2010. "Diffusion and the Constitutionalization of Europe," Comparative 
Political Studies, 43,8.
 
 
Erdmann, G. & Simutanyi, N. 2003 "Transition in Zambia: The Hybridisation of the Third 
Republic," Konrad-         Adenauer-Stiftung, Occasional Papers Series.  Lilongwe, Malawi.  
 
Erdmann, Gero. 2004. “Party Research: Western European Bias and the ‘African Labyrinth.” 
Democratization 11, 3:63-87.   
 
Ermakoff, Ivan. 2008. Ruling Oneself Out: A Theory of Collective Abdications. Durham: Duke 
University Press.  
     
Europa Publications Limited. 1990-2010. Africa South of the Sahara. London: Europa 
Publications Ltd. 
 
Fauré, Y. 1993.  “Democracy and Realism: Reflections on the Case of Côte d'Ivoire” Africa, Vol. 
63, 3. 
 
Ginsburg, Tom.  2003.  Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian 
Cases.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Giovanni Sartori. 1976.  Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Givan, Rebecca Kolins, Kenneth M. Roberts, and Sarah Anne Soule. 2010. The Diffusion of 
Social Movements: Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
  
285 
 
 
Gonzalez de Lara, Yadira, Avner Greif, and Saumitra Jha. 2008. "The Administrative 
Foundations of Self- Enforcing Constitutions." American Economic Review, 98,2: 105–09. 
 
Governmentof Uganda. 1996. Rules of procedure of the Parliament of Uganda: commencement: 
30th July, 1996. Kampala, Uganda:  Government Printers. 
 
Greif, Avner, and David Laitin. 2004. “A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change.” 
American Political Science Review. Vol. 98,4. 
 
Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2007. Party Competition and. State Exploitation in Post-Communist 
Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Habyarimana, James P. et al. 2009. Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective 
Action.  New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. 1996."Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms."  Political Studies 44,5:936-957. 
 
Hatchard, J, Ndulo, M, and Slinn, P. 2004. Comparative Constitutionalism and Good 
Governance in the Commonwealth: An Eastern and Southern African Perspective. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky. 2004. “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: 
A Research  Agenda.”  Perspective on Politics.  Vol. 2, 4.            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Hendrix, Cullen S. and Idean Salehyan. “Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD).” 
www.scaddata.org.  
 
Huntington, Samuel.  1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.  
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
 
Hyde, Susan D. 2011.  “Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm 
Diffusion,” American Journal of Political Science.  55, 2. 
 
Hyden, Goran.  2006.  African Politics in Comparative Perspective.  New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Ichino, Nahomi.  2006.  Thugs and Voters:  Political Tournaments in Nigeria.  Ph.D. Thesis, 
Stanford University. 
     
Ihonvbere, Julius O. 1995. "From Movement to Government: The Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy and the Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Zambia." Canadian Journal of 
African Studies. Volume 29, 1. 
 
  
286 
 
 
Ihonvbere,  Julius. 1996.  “The Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Zambia.” Civilisations. 
Vol. 43, 2: 83-109. 
 
   Ihonvbere, Julius. 2003. “Dismantling a Discredited One-Party Regime: Populism and Political 
Liberalization in Zambia” in  J. Ihonvbere and J. Mbaku (eds.), Political Liberalization and 
Democratization in Africa: Lessons from Country Experiences, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger 
Publishers. 
 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1991. Ivory Coast: Current political situation, 1 
June, CIV8987 www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6ac6858.html [accessed 10 June 2011] 
 
Inglehart, Ronald, et al. 2004. World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, 1999–2001. 
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.   
 
Joireman, Sandra Fullerton. 2001.  "Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa 
and the colonial legacy," Journal of Modern African Studies, 39,4: 571-596. 
 
Jones Luong, Pauline. 2002. Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central 
Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Joseph, Richard A. 1987. Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the 
Second Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Joseph, Richard. 1999.  “Africa, 1990-1997: From Abertura to Closure.” in L. Diamond and. M. 
Plattner (eds.), Democratization in Africa, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  pp 3-18. 
 
Kakande, John.  26 June, 2003.  “Forty-one percent Support Third Term” New Vision.  Kampala, 
Uganda. 
 
Karl, Terry Lynn. 1990. "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative 
Politics, 23,1. 
 
Karl, Terry Lynn and Schmitter, Philippe C. 1991. "Modes of transition in Latin America, 
Southern and Eastern Europe," International Social Science Journal, 43, 2. 
 
Kasfir, Nelson.  2000.  “Movement Democracy, Legitimacy and Power in Uganda,” No Party 
Democracy in  Uganda: Myths and Realities, J. Mugaju and J. Oloka-Onyango, eds.  Kampala, 
Uganda: Fountain Publishers. 
 
Kiiza, Julius, Sabiti Makara and Lise Rakner.  2008.  Electoral Democracy in Uganda.  
Kampala: Fountain Publishers. 
 
Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven Wilkinson. 2007. Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of 
Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press.  
  
287 
 
 
 
Kohno, Masaru. 1997. Japan's postwar party politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press.  
 
Kuenzi, Michelle and Gina Lambright. 2001. “Party System Institutionalization in 30African 
Countries,” Party Politics, Vol. 7,4. 
 
Laakso, M. and R. Taagepera. 1979.  “Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application 
to West Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 12,1:3-27. 
 
Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2002. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," Journal 
of Democracy Vol. 13:51–65.    
 
Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2010.  Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After 
the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Levitsky, Steven and Maria Victoria Murillo.  2009.  “Variation in Institutional Strength” in The 
Annual Review of Political Science,  Vol. 12. 
 
Lindberg, Staffan.. 2006.  Democracy and Elections in Africa. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
 
Lindberg, Staffan I. 2009. Elections and Democracy in Africa 1989-2007. STATA file.  
http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/sil/Lindberg%20elections%2069-06%20out.dta 
 
Lindberg, Staffan I. and  Morrison, Minion K.C. 2008. “Are African Voters Really Ethnic or 
Clientelistic? Survey Evidence from Ghana.”  Political Science Quarterly, 123, 1. 
 
Logan, Carolyn J., Nansozi Muwanga, Robert Sentamu, and Michael Bratton.  2003. “Insiders 
and Outsiders:   Varying Perceptions of Democracy and Governance in Uganda.” Afrobaromer 
Working Paper, No. 27. 
 
Lumumba-Kosongo T.  2001. "Political Parties and Ruling Governments in Sub-Saharan Africa" 
in The Politics and Policies of Sub-Saharan Africa, Robert Dibie, Ed. Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America.   
 
Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy R. Scully. 1995. “Introduction: Party Systems in Latin 
America”, in Mainwaring and Scully (Eds.) Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in 
Latin America, Stanford: Stanford                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
University Press.  
 
Makara, Sabiti, Lise Rakner, and Lars Svåsand. 2009. “Turnaround: The National Resistance 
Movement and the Reintroduction of a Multiparty System in Uganda,”  International Political 
Science Review, 30, 2. 
 
  
288 
 
 
Malido, Webster And Amos Malupenga.  2001. “Northern Province MMD Suspends 8 MPs, 4 
District Officials” The Post of Zambia, 20 April. 
 
Maltz, Gideon. 2007.  “The Case for Presidential Term Limits,” Journal of Democracy, 18: 128-
42. 
 
Malupenga, Amos.  2001. “Chiluba Loses Third Term Bid” The Post of Zambia, 12 April. 
 
Manning, Carrie. 2005.  “Assessing African Party Systems After the Third Wave.” Party 
Politics. 11, 6.    
 
Mbabazi, Pamela et al. 2001.  “Ugandan Elections 2001: Lessons for/from Democratic 
Governance” paper  presented at the Africana Studies Association (ASA) annual conference, 
Houston, TX, December, 2001. 
 
Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. and D. Chitala (eds.) 1990. The Hour Has Come! Proceedings of the 
National Conference on the Multi-party Option.  Lusaka: Zambia Research Foundation. 
 
Mehler, Andreas.  2005. "The Shaky Foundations, Adverse Circumstances, and Limited 
Achievements of  Democratic Transition in the Central African Republic." The Fate of Africa's  
Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions. Leonardo A. Villalâon and Peter vonDoepp, eds. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Michael Bratton. 1998. "Second Elections in Africa," Journal of Democracy Vol. 9 (July): 51–
66. 
  
Ministere de l'economie et de finances, Direction de la statistique, 1984. “Population de la C6te 
d'Ivoire.” Abidjan: Government Printing Office. 
 
Moehler, Devra.  2008.  Distrusting Democrats: Outcomes of Participatory Constitution-
Making.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
 
Momba, Jothen.  1999.  “Chiluba: The Third Term Temptation”  Southern Africa Report , Vol 15 
No 1. 
 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy. 1991.  “Manifesto,” Lusaka: Campaign Committee, 
MMD. 
 
Mulenga, C., A. Chikwanha and M. Msoni, 2004.  “Satisfaction with Democracy and 
Performance of the New Deal. Government: Attitudes and Perceptions of Zambians” 
Afrobarometer, Paper 41. Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa.  
 
Munene, Macharia.  2003. “The Kenyan 2002 Election: The Road Travelled , the Lessons 
Learned,” Wajibu: A Journal of Social and Religious Concern, 18, 1-2. 
 
  
289 
 
 
Museveni, Yoweri.  1997.  Sowing the Mustard Seed:  The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy 
in Uganda.  London:  Macmillan.   
 
Nasong'o, Shadrack W. 2007. "Political Transition Without Transformation: The Dialectic of 
Liberalization Without Democratization in Kenya and Zambia." African Studies Review. Vol. 50, 
1 (April). 
 
National Executive Committee. 2003.  “Report of the ad-hoc committee set up by the 6th 
meeting of the National Executive Committee.”  Kampala, Uganda: Government Printers. 
 
Ndulo, Muna B. and Kent, Robert B. 1996. "Constitutionalism in Zambia: Past, Present and 
Future." Journal of African Law. Vol. 40,2. 
 
New Vision Newspaper.  2001."Uganda: Multi-party Politics "Rotten Sectarianism," President 
Museveni Says." Sunday Vision (Kampala, Uganda)  July 1. 
 
Nyasulu, Hastings. 2001. “Ugandan Ex-President Living in Garage”  News 24 South Africa.  
Accessed on  6/29/10:  http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Ugandan-ex-president-living-in-
garage-20010109 
 
O’Laughlin, John, et al. 1998. “The Diffusion of Democracy, 1946-1994.” Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers,  88, 4. 
 
Oguttu, Wufala.  2010.  “Presidential Candidates Besigye And Museveni - Who is Copying 
Who?”  New Vision, December 15. 
 
Okoth-Ogendo , H.W.O. 1993.  “Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on  an  
African Political Paradox,” in Constitutionalism & Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary 
World, Douglas Greenberg et al. eds. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 65-82. 
 
Oloka-Onyango, J. 1997. “The Question of Buganda in Contemporary Ugandan Politic,” Journal 
of Contemporary African Studies, 15,2. 
 
Parliament of Uganda. 2005.  Hansard, March 31. 
 
Pauline Luong, 2000. “After the Break-up: Institutional Design in Transitional States,” 
Comparative Political Studies 33,5. 
 
Pearlstein, Deborah.  2006.  “Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, 
Detention, and Torture” Indiana Law Journal.  p. 1255-1287. 
 
Phiri, B. J. 2001. “Colonial Legacy and the Role of Society in the Creation and Demise of 
Autocracy in Zambia, 1964-1991,”  Nordic Journal of African Studies, 10,2. 
  
  
290 
 
 
Phiri, Brighton and Mackson Wasamunu. 2000. “UPND Pronounces MMD Dead After Mwandi 
Election Defeat.” The Post of Zambia, 16 November. 
 
Phiri, Brighton, Webster Malido and Bivan Saluseki. 2000.   “MMD Challenges Opposition to 
Accept Election Results” The Post of Zambia, 28 July. 
 
Posner, Daniel. 2004.  “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa.” American Journal of 
Political Science, 48. 
 
Posner, Daniel and Daniel J. Young. 2007. “The Institutionalization of Political Power in 
Africa,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18,3: 126-140. 
 
Przeworski, Adam. 1991.  Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Rakner, Lise. 2001. “The Pluralist Paradox: The Decline of Economic Interest Groups in 
Zambia.” Development and Change, Vol 32, 3 (June). 
 
Rakner, Lise. 2003. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia, 1991-2001. Uppsala, 
Sweden: Nordic Africa Institute.  
 
Rakner, L and Svasand, L.  2004. From Dominant to Competitive Party System: The Zambian 
Experience, 1991-2001”  Party Politics, Vol.10, 1. 
 
Reno, William. 1998. Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
 
Republic of Zambia. 1972.   Report of the National Commission on the Establishment of a One- 
party Participatory Democracy in Zambia (Chona Commission). Lusaka: Government Printer. 
 
Republic of Zambia. 1972.  White Paper No. 1.  Government Printer: Lusaka. 
 
Richard C. Crook. 1990. “Politics, the Cocoa Crisis, and Administration in Côte d'Ivoire.” 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 28, 4. 
 
Riedl, Rachel Beatty.  2008.  Institutions in New Democracies: Variations in African Political 
Party Systems.  Unpublished dissertation, Princeton University. 
 
Robinson, Pearl T. 1994.  “The National Conference Phenomenon in Francophone Africa,” 
Comparative Studies    in Society and History, Vol. 36, 3: 575-610 
 
Roessler, Philip and Marc Howard. 2009.  “Post-Cold War Political Regimes: When Do 
Elections Matter?" in Staffan I. Lindberg, ed., Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of 
Transition. Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Rounds 2 and 3 Afrobarometer Survey in Uganda, 2002- 2005.  www.afrobarometer.org 
  
291 
 
 
 
Rubongoya.  Joshua.  2007.  Regime Hegemony in Museveni’s Uganda.  New York, NY:  
Palgrave Macmillan.   
 
Salih, Mohamed and Nordlund, Per.  2007. “Political Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustained 
Multiparty Democracy.” Stockholm: International IDEA. 
 
Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Vol. 1. “Chapter 
8.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Schaeffer, Frederic C. 1998.  Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an 
Unfamiliar Culture.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Schlesinger, Arthur M. 1973. The Imperial Presidency. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Simmons, BA, Elkins Z.  2005.  “On  Waves, Clusters and Diffusion: A Conceptual 
Framework,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and  Social Science.   
 
Simutanyi, Neo. 1996. “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Zambia,” Third World 
Quarterly 17,4. 
 
Simutanyi, Neo R. 2002. “Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Zambia: Public Attitudes 
to Democracy and the Economy.” Afrobarometer, Paper 17. Cape Town: Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa. 
 
Smith, Daniel A. and Dustin Fridkin. 2008. “Delegating Direct Democracy: Interparty 
Legislative Competition and  the Adoption of the Initiative in the American States,” American 
Political Science Review, 102. 
 
Sorenson, George. 1993 Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a 
Changing World.   Boulder, CO: Westview Press.  
 
Ssenkumba,  John.  1998.  “The Dilemmas of Directed Democracy: Neutralizing Ugandan 
Opposition Politics    Under the NRM,” The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa, A. 
Olukoshi, editor.  Stockholm:  The  Nordic Africa Institute.   
 
Strang, David, and Sarah A. Soule. 1998. “Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements: 
From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills,” Annual Review of Sociology 24.    
 
Strang, David. 1991. Adding social structure to diffusion models: An event history framework. 
Sociological Methods and Research 19, 3. 
 
Stroh, Alexander.  2009.  “The Power of Proximity: Strategic Decisions in African Party 
Politics.” GIGA Working Paper No. 96: www.giga-
hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp96_stroh.pdf 
  
292 
 
 
 
Tangri, R. 2006. "Politics and Presidential Term Limits in Uganda," in R. Southall and H. Melber 
(eds), Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics. Cape 
Town, South Africa  HSRC Press.  
 
Times of Zambia. 1999.  “We'll force FJT to stand for third term if UNIP fields Kaunda” 19 
May. 
 
Tordoff, William. 1974. Politics in Zambia.  Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Toungara, Jeanne Maddox.  1990.  “The Apotheosis of Cote d'Ivoire's Nana Houphouet-
Boigny.” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 28. 
 
Tripp, Aili Mari. 2000.  Women and Politics in Uganda. Madison: University of. Wisconsin 
Press. 
 
Ulyabusiku, Mabeni,  Amos Malupenga and Sheikh Chifuwe. 2001. “Chiluba Fires 2 Ministers 
Over 3rd Term: I Expected It, Says Sejani”  The Post of Zambia.  28 February. 
 
United Nations Development Program. 2000.  Zambia Human Development Report 1999/2000: 
Report on Employment and Sustainable Livelihoods.  Lusaka.  
 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2001.  “ZAMBIA: IRIN 
Focus on run up to elections” IRIN news service.  February 28:   
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=18874 
 
United States Agency for International Development. 1991. Democracy and Governance: 
USAID Policy. Washington, D.C.: USAID. 
 
van de Walle, Nicolas and K. Butler. 1999. “Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa’s 
Illiberal Democracies.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 13, 1. 
 
van de Walle, Nicolas.  2002. “Africa’s Range of Regimes: Elections without Democracy.”  
Journal of  Democracy  Vol. 13: 66 
 
van de Walle, Nicolas. 2007. “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of 
Political Clientalism in Africa,” in Herbert Kitchelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds. Patrons, 
Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 50-67 
 
Van der Geest S, Macwan’gi M, Kamwanga J, Mulikelela D, Mazimba A and Mwangelwa M. 
2000. “User Fees and Drugs: What Did the Health Reforms in Zambia Achieve?”  Health Policy 
and Planning, 15, 1. 
 
  
293 
 
 
van Donge, Jan Kees. 2009. “The Plundering of Zambian Resources by Frederick Chiluba and 
His Friends: A Case Study of the Interaction Between National Politics and the International 
Drive Towards Good Governance,” African Affairs 108. 
 
von Doepp, Peter.  2005. “Party Cohesion and Fractionalization in New African Democracies: 
Lessons from Struggles Over Third-Term Amendments." Studies in Comparative International 
Development  40, 3: 65-87. 
 
VonDoepp, Peter. 2009. Judicial Politics in New Democracies: Cases from Southern Africa. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.  
 
Wasike, Alfred 2001. “Movemnent has 230 MPs – Museveni,”  The New Vision, Kampala, 
Uganda. 1 July 2001. 
 
Weingast, Barry R. 2005. "Self-Enforcing Constitutions," Journal of Economic 
Perspectives.Vol. 19,3. 
 
West Africa. 1989-1990. Various issues. 
 
Widner, Jennifer.  1991.  “The 1990 Elections in Cote d’Ivoire,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion.  
Vol 20:1 
 
Widner, Jennifer A. 1992.  The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From "Harambee!" to 
"Nyayo!". Berkeley: University of California Press.   
 
Young, Daniel. Forthcoming. “An Initial Look into Party Switching in Africa: Evidence from 
Malawi” Party Politics. 
 
